Since the late 1960s, trust in government has fallen precipitously. The nine essays composing this volume detail the present character of distrust, analyze its causes, assess the dangers it poses, and suggest remedies. The focus is on trust in the Congress. The contributors also examine patterns of trust in societal institutions and the presidency, especially in light of the Clinton impeachment controversy. Among the themes the book highlights are the impacts of present patterns of politics, the consequences of public misunderstanding of democratic politics, the significance of poll data, and the need for reform in campaign finance, media practices, and civic education.
Since the time of Watergate and Vietnam, trust in government has fallen precipitously. This can easily be sensed in the apathy and divisiveness that now characterize American politics, but it is perhaps most clearly revealed in poll data. The great majority of Americans do not trust the government “to do what's right all or most of the time”. Nor do they believe that government is run for “the benefit of all” rather than for “a few big interests”. The nine essays in this volume detail the present character of distrust, analyze its causes, assess the dangers it poses for the future of representative government in the United States, and suggest remedies.The focus of the analysis is on Congress because of its pivotal role in representative government in the United States. The authors also examine patterns of trust in societal institutions and trust in the Presidency, especially in light of the Clinton impeachment controversy. Because the causes and effects of distrust are complex and pervasive, the individual chapters highlight many of the defining features and issues of contemporary American politics. These include the emergence of a politics that is far more ideological, candidate centered, and captive to interest groups, the changing character and enhanced importance of the media, the mounting costs of campaigns, the contradictions in public attitudes toward political leaders and processes, the causes and consequences of public misconceptions of democratic politics, and the need for reform in campaign finance, media practices, and civic education.
Confidence in American government has been declining for three decades. Leading Harvard scholars here explore the roots of this mistrust by examining the government's current scope, its actual performance, citizens' perceptions of its performance, and explanations that have been offered for the decline of trust.
American public policy has become demonstrably more conservative since the 1960s. Neither Jimmy Carter nor Bill Clinton was much like either John F. Kennedy or Lyndon Johnson. The American public, however, has not become more conservative. Why, then, the right turn in public policy? Using both individual and aggregate level survey data, Marc Hetherington shows that the rapid decline in Americans' political trust since the 1960s is critical to explaining this puzzle. As people lost faith in the federal government, the delivery system for most progressive policies, they supported progressive ideas much less. The 9/11 attacks increased such trust as public attention focused on security, but the effect was temporary. Specifically, Hetherington shows that, as political trust declined, so too did support for redistributive programs, such as welfare and food stamps, and race-targeted programs. While the presence of race in a policy area tends to make political trust important for whites, trust affects policy preferences in other, non-race-related policy areas as well. In the mid-1990s the public was easily swayed against comprehensive health care reform because those who felt they could afford coverage worried that a large new federal bureaucracy would make things worse for them. In demonstrating a strong link between public opinion and policy outcomes, this engagingly written book represents a substantial contribution to the study of public opinion and voting behavior, policy, and American politics generally.
A leading conservative intellectual argues that to renew America we must recommit to our institutions Americans are living through a social crisis. Our politics is polarized and bitterly divided. Culture wars rage on campus, in the media, social media, and other arenas of our common life. And for too many Americans, alienation can descend into despair, weakening families and communities and even driving an explosion of opioid abuse. Left and right alike have responded with populist anger at our institutions, and use only metaphors of destruction to describe the path forward: cleaning house, draining swamps. But, as Yuval Levin argues, this is a misguided prescription, rooted in a defective diagnosis. The social crisis we confront is defined not by an oppressive presence but by a debilitating absence of the forces that unite us and militate against alienation. As Levin argues, now is not a time to tear down, but rather to build and rebuild by committing ourselves to the institutions around us. From the military to churches, from families to schools, these institutions provide the forms and structures we need to be free. By taking concrete steps to help them be more trustworthy, we can renew the ties that bind Americans to one another.
Major polls all report that "trust in government is at an all-time low" in the United States. At the same time, polarization is at an all-time high. Hetheringon and Rudolph's timely book demonstrates a direct link between polarization and the decline of political trust in America. And it's not just legislators and party leaders who are polarized, but ordinary Americans. Drawing on a cornucopia of evidence and data, the authors show that since the early 2000s polarization in the electorate has increasingly been rooted not in ideological or policy differences, but, for the first time, in extremely negative feelings toward the other party. To an unprecedented degree, Republicans and Democrats simply do not like each other. These polarized feelings are central to why trust in government has polarized which, in turn, is central to "why Washington won't work." On most issues, presidents and other party leaders can convince their own party faithful in the electorate to support their positions. In order to pass legislation, however, a public consensus is needed to push policymakers toward action. Some proportion of the out-party partisans and independents have to have enough trust in government to make an ideological sacrifice and form that consensus. As the authors persuasively explain, this is no longer occurring. Far from being a long-term and relatively stable psychological trait, political trust is highly variable and contingent. Whether or not one trusts government will vary depending on whether one's party is in control, what part of government one is referring to, and what policies or events are most salient. Political trust increases, for example, when the public identifies international issues as most important (as during the 1950s and 60s). They also find that the effects of economic performance on political trust are asymmetric: weak economies harm trust more than strong economies help it. Ultimately, Hetherington and Rudolph have to conclude that it is unlikely political trust will ever to return to 1960s levels (a high point in the US) for any length of time unless international concerns again dominate politics and, just as important, the economy becomes consistently strong.
Why do members of Congress resort to name-calling? In this provocative book, Eric M. Uslaner proposes that Congress is mirroring the increased incivility of American society. He points to five core values - American exceptionalism, enlightened individualism, egalitarianism, science as social engineering. and religion - that have been eroded since the 1960s. The author argues that a lack of trust permeates members of Congress to the point that they would rather seek control than compromise. This, Uslaner contends, is the real cause of gridlock in Washington. The Decline of Comity in Congress demonstrates why institutional reform will not correct this problem and why Americans need to change before their government can.
Congress today is falling short. Fewer bills, worse oversight, and more dysfunction. But why? In a new volume of essays, the contributors investigate an underappreciated reason Congress is struggling: it doesn’t have the internal capacity to do what our constitutional system requires of it. Leading scholars chronicle the institutional decline of Congress and the decades-long neglect of its own internal investments in the knowledge and expertise necessary to perform as a first-rate legislature. Today’s legislators and congressional committees have fewer—and less expert and experienced—staff than the executive branch or K Street. This leaves them at the mercy of lobbyists and the administrative bureaucracy. The essays in Congress Overwhelmed assess Congress’s declining capacity and explore ways to upgrade it. Some provide broad historical scope. Others evaluate the current decay and investigate how Congress manages despite the obstacles. Collectively, they undertake the most comprehensive, sophisticated appraisal of congressional capacity to date, and they offer a new analytical frame for thinking about—and improving—our underperforming first branch of government.
The Decline and Resurgence of Congress, after reviewing relations between president and Congress over two centuries, traces the long series of congressional decisions that created the modern presidency and relates these to certain weaknesses that the Congress recognized in itself.
