From Summary: ... the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Acy, which gives DOJ's Civil Rights Division the authority to investigate state and local law enforcement agencies that it believes have unconstitutional policies or practices of conduct. The law is intended to address systemic issues, rather than individual complaints... The alleged misconduct cannot be an isolated incident. And there is no private right of action under the 1994 law; only the Justice Department is given authority to launch investigations and litigation under this statute.
This book evaluates how structural reform litigation initiated by federal intervention has transformed police departments and reduced law enforcement misconduct.
This book reproduces the complete report from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division about the practices of the Chicago Police Department (CPD), along with the agreement in principle between the DOJ and the city of Chicago, as released in January 2017. Introduction * 1. Investigation of the Chicago Police Department / United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and United States Attorney's Office Northern District of Illinois / January 13, 2017 * 2. Agreement in Principle Between The United States Department of Justice and the City of Chicago Regarding the Chicago Police Department * 3. Factsheet * 4. Police Reform and Accountability Accomplishments The city of Chicago and the Justice Department have signed an agreement in principle to work together, with community input, to create a federal court-enforceable consent decree addressing the deficiencies found during the investigation. "One of my highest priorities as Attorney General has been to ensure that every American enjoys police protection that is lawful, responsive, and transparent," said Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch. "Sadly, our thorough investigation into the Chicago Police Department found that far too many residents of this proud city have not received that kind of policing. The resulting deficit in trust and accountability is not just bad for residents - it's also bad for dedicated police officers trying to do their jobs safely and effectively. With this announcement, we are laying the groundwork for the difficult but necessary work of building a stronger, safer, and more united Chicago for all who call it home." "The failures we identified in our findings - that we heard about from residents and officers alike - have deeply eroded community trust," said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Vanita Gupta, head of the Civil Rights Division. "But today is a moment of opportunity, where we begin to move from identifying problems to developing solutions. I know our findings can lead to reform and rebuild community-police trust because we've seen it happen in community after community around the country over the past 20 years." "The findings in our report, coupled with the City of Chicago and Police Department's commitment to work together with us, are an historic turning point and a major step toward sustained change," said U.S. Attorney Zachary T. Fardon of the Northern District of Illinois. "Implementing these findings is a necessary precursor to our long-term success in fighting violent crime in Chicago." On Dec. 7, 2015, Attorney General Lynch announced the investigation into the CPD and the city's Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA). The investigation focused on CPD's use of force, including racial, ethnic and other disparities in use of force, and its systems of accountability. In the course of its pattern or practice investigation, the department interviewed and met with city leaders, current and former police officials, and numerous officers throughout all ranks of CPD. The department also accompanied line officers on over 60 ride-alongs in every police district; heard from over 1,000 community members and more than 90 community organizations; reviewed thousands of pages of police documents, including all relevant policies, procedures, training and materials; and analyzed a randomized, representative sample of force reports and the investigative files for incidents that occurred between January 2011 and April 2016, including over 170 officer-involved shooting investigations and documents related to over 400 additional force incidents.
Over the course of the investigation, we interviewed City officials, including City Manager John Shaw, Mayor James Knowles, Chief of Police Thomas Jackson, Municipal Judge Ronald Brockmeyer, the Municipal Court Clerk, Ferguson's Finance Director, half of FPD's sworn officers, and others. We spent, collectively, approximately 100 person-days onsite in Ferguson. We participated in ride-alongs with on-duty officers, reviewed over 35,000 pages of police records as well as thousands of emails and other electronic materials provided by the police department. Enlisting the assistance of statistical experts, we analyzed FPD's data on stops, searches, citations, and arrests, as well as data collected by the municipal court. We observed four separate sessions of Ferguson Municipal Court, interviewing dozens of people charged with local offenses, and we reviewed third-party studies regarding municipal court practices in Ferguson and St. Louis County more broadly. As in all of our investigations, we sought to engage the local community, conducting hundreds of in-person and telephone interviews of individuals who reside in Ferguson or who have had interactions with the police department. We contacted ten neighborhood associations and met with each group that responded to us, as well as several other community groups and advocacy organizations. Throughout the investigation, we relied on two police chiefs who accompanied us to Ferguson and who themselves interviewed City and police officials, spoke with community members, and reviewed FPD policies and incident reports. We thank the City officials and the rank-and-file officers who have cooperated with this investigation and provided us with insights into the operation of the police department, including the municipal court. Notwithstanding our findings about Ferguson's approach to law enforcement and the policing culture it creates, we found many Ferguson police officers and other City employees to be dedicated public servants striving each day to perform their duties lawfully and with respect for all members of the Ferguson community. The importance of their often-selfless work cannot be overstated. We are also grateful to the many members of the Ferguson community who have met with us to share their experiences. It became clear during our many conversations with Ferguson residents from throughout the City that many residents, black and white, genuinely embrace Ferguson's diversity and want to reemerge from the events of recent months a truly inclusive, united community. This Report is intended to strengthen those efforts by recognizing the harms caused by Ferguson's law enforcement practices so that those harms can be better understood and overcome. Ferguson's law enforcement practices are shaped by the City's focus on revenue rather than by public safety needs. This emphasis on revenue has compromised the institutional character of Ferguson's police department, contributing to a pattern of unconstitutional policing, and has also shaped its municipal court, leading to procedures that raise due process concerns and inflict unnecessary harm on members of the Ferguson community. Further, Ferguson's police and municipal court practices both reflect and exacerbate existing racial bias, including racial stereotypes. Ferguson's own data establish clear racial disparities that adversely impact African Americans. The evidence shows that discriminatory intent is part of the reason for these disparities. Over time, Ferguson's police and municipal court practices have sown deep mistrust between parts of the community and the police department, undermining law enforcement legitimacy among African Americans in particular.
Proactive policing, as a strategic approach used by police agencies to prevent crime, is a relatively new phenomenon in the United States. It developed from a crisis in confidence in policing that began to emerge in the 1960s because of social unrest, rising crime rates, and growing skepticism regarding the effectiveness of standard approaches to policing. In response, beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, innovative police practices and policies that took a more proactive approach began to develop. This report uses the term "proactive policing" to refer to all policing strategies that have as one of their goals the prevention or reduction of crime and disorder and that are not reactive in terms of focusing primarily on uncovering ongoing crime or on investigating or responding to crimes once they have occurred. Proactive policing is distinguished from the everyday decisions of police officers to be proactive in specific situations and instead refers to a strategic decision by police agencies to use proactive police responses in a programmatic way to reduce crime. Today, proactive policing strategies are used widely in the United States. They are not isolated programs used by a select group of agencies but rather a set of ideas that have spread across the landscape of policing. Proactive Policing reviews the evidence and discusses the data and methodological gaps on: (1) the effects of different forms of proactive policing on crime; (2) whether they are applied in a discriminatory manner; (3) whether they are being used in a legal fashion; and (4) community reaction. This report offers a comprehensive evaluation of proactive policing that includes not only its crime prevention impacts but also its broader implications for justice and U.S. communities.
Blue Mafia shows that small towns have even more severe police misconduct than many major metro areas by recounting the causes and consequences of two federal investigations of local police misconduct. Steubenville was the second city in the U.S. to sign a consent decree with the Justice Department, but nobody really knows why. Little do local residents know, the county narcotics squad was committing crimes similar to the LAPD's Rampart Scandal and the county prosecutor was setting up, robbing, and framing innocent locals and drug dealers alike. Warren had the fourth oldest Justice Department investigation in the country until the Trump administration unilaterally lifted the consent decree in April 2017. However, similar to Baltimore, the Warren police had a pattern or practice of illegal strip searches and cavity searches, excessive force, and a failure to investigate and discipline misconduct by officers. Blue Mafia recounts the struggle of two small communities with troubled police departments, focusing on the consequences of systemic police misconduct for women and people of color. Blue Mafia gives the most detailed account to date of police reform by consent decree, which can serve as a blueprint for citizens interested in investigating police misconduct and promoting police reform.
Today, we announce the outcome of the Department of Justice's investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department (BPD). After engaging in a thorough investigation, initiated at the request of the City of Baltimore and BPD, the Department of Justice concludes that there is reasonable cause to believe that BPD engages in a pattern or practice of conduct that violates the Constitution or federal law. BPD engages in a pattern or practice of: (1) making unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrests; (2) using enforcement strategies that produce severe and unjustified disparities in the rates of stops, searches and arrests of African Americans; (3) using excessive force; and (4) retaliating against people engaging in constitutionally-protected expression. This pattern or practice is driven by systemic deficiencies in BPD's policies, training, supervision, and accountability structures that fail to equip officers with the tools they need to police effectively and within the bounds of the federal law.
