We study the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of competitive insurance markets with endogenous information disclosure by both firms and consumers. We show that an equilibrium always exists, (even without the single crossing property), and characterize the unique equilibrium allocation. With two types of consumers the outcome is particularly simple, consisting of a pooling allocation which maximizes the well-being of the low risk individual (along the zero profit pooling line) plus a supplemental (undisclosed and nonexclusive) contract that brings the high risk individual to full insurance (at his own odds). We show that this outcome is extremely robust and Pareto efficient.
We study the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance markets, introducing endogenous information disclosure about insurance sales and purchases by firms and consumers. We show that a competitive equilibrium exists under unusually mild conditions, and characterize the unique equilibrium outcome. With two types of consumers the outcome is particularly simple, consisting of a pooling contract which maximizes the well-being of the low risk individual (along the zero profit pooling line) plus a supplemental (undisclosed and nonexclusive) contract that brings the high risk individual to full insurance (at his own odds). We show that this outcome is extremely robust and constrained Pareto efficient. Asymmetric equilibrium information flows with endogenous consumer disclosure are critical in supporting the equilibrium.
This report examines possible outcomes of greater competition in insurance markets. The report describes the nature of insurance offerings in equilibrium if firms offer multiple policies; but it replaces the conventional assumption that each policy must earn nonnegative profits with the more realistic requirement that the portfolio of policies offered by the firm earn nonnegative profits in the aggregate. Theorems regarding the existence, optimality, and uniqueness of the subsidy equilibrium are presented, together with a simple characterization of the subsidy equilibrium and a comparison with existing equilibrium notions. Because the subsidy patterns, from low to high, that emerge under this formulation appear to characterize multiple-option insurance plans such as the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan, this model may be more useful than conventional methods in the analysis of such plans.
We study insurance markets with nonexclusive contracts, introducing bilateral endogenous information disclosure about insurance sales and purchases by firms and consumers. We show that a competitive equilibrium exists under remarkably mild conditions, and characterize the unique equilibrium outcome. With two types of consumers the outcome consists of a pooling contract which maximizes the well-being of the low risk type (along the zero profit pooling line) plus a supplemental (undisclosed and nonexclusive) contract that brings the high risk type to full insurance (at his own odds). We show that this outcome is extremely robust and constrained Pareto efficient. Consumer disclosure and asymmetric equilibrium information flows are critical in supporting the equilibrium.
Public Finance: A Normative Theory, Fourth Edition provides a classic text on the normative theory of government policy. This valuable and accessible resource covers the welfare aspects of public economics, with considerable coverage of European examples. The work presents detailed and comprehensive coverage of theoretical literature, empirical work, environmental issues, social insurance, behavioral economics and international tax issues. The book is organized logically, written in an engaging manner, and is both sufficiently rigid for use by those with PhDs in math and accessible to students less well trained in math. - Provides a logical progression from normative theory to concise mathematical applications - Covers European examples, welfare economics and tax law updates - Includes pedagogical supplements such as end-of-chapter questions and answers
"The process by which securities are traded is very different from the idealized picture of a frictionless and self-equilibrating market offered by the typical finance textbook. This book offers a more accurate and authoritative take on this process. The book starts from the assumption that not everyone is present at all times simultaneously on the market, and that participants have quite diverse information about the security's fundamentals. As a result, the order flow is a complex mix of information and noise, and a consensus price only emerges gradually over time as the trading process evolves and the participants interpret the actions of other traders. Thus, a security's actual transaction price may deviate from its fundamental value, as it would be assessed by a fully informed set of investors. The book takes these deviations seriously, and explains why and how they emerge in the trading process and are eventually eliminated. The authors draw on a vast body of theoretical insights and empirical findings on security price formation that have come to form a well-defined field within financial economics known as "market microstructure." Focusing on liquidity and price discovery, the book analyzes the tension between the two, pointing out that when price-relevant information reaches the market through trading pressure rather than through a public announcement, liquidity may suffer. It also confronts many striking phenomena in securities markets and uses the analytical tools and empirical methods of market microstructure to understand them. These include issues such as why liquidity changes over time and differs across securities, why large trades move prices up or down, and why these price changes are subsequently reversed, and why we observe temporary deviations from asset fair values"--
In this relatively short survey, we present the core elements of the microeconomic analysis of insurance markets at a level suitable for senior undergraduate and graduate economics students. The aim of this analysis is to understand how insurance markets work, what their fundamental economic functions are, and how efficiently they may be expected to carry these out.
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
The first in a series of six volumes containing a selection of Joseph Stiglitz's most important and widely cited work, this volume includes a number of seminal papers on the economics of information. The volume contains substantial additional original commentary by Joseph Stiglitz on his work and the field more generally.
