Board Characteristics, Audit Committee Characteristics and Abnormal Accruals
Board Characteristics, Audit Committee Characteristics and Abnormal Accruals

Author: Michael E. Bradbury

Publisher:

Published: 2005

Total Pages: 29

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Prior research examines the relation between board characteristics and financial reporting violations relating to fraud and earnings overstatement. This paper examines the relation between governance (as measured by board and audit committee characteristics) and accounting quality (as measured by abnormal accruals) where there is no a priori reason to suspect systematic management of earnings. We find both board size and audit committee independence are related to higher quality accounting (i.e., lower abnormal working capital accruals). Furthermore, the relation between audit committee independence and higher quality accounting exists only when the abnormal accruals are income increasing. This suggests that audit committees are effective in the financial reporting process by reducing the level of income increasing abnormal accruals. The results also indicate that audit committees are effective only when they comprise independent directors.

Do Audit Committee and Characteristics of Board of Directors Influence Earnings Management?
Do Audit Committee and Characteristics of Board of Directors Influence Earnings Management?

Author: CPA Pathak PhD (CGA, CFF, CFE, CISA, Jag)

Publisher:

Published: 2014

Total Pages: 38

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Earnings management has attracted much attention in this globalized economic environment due to large accounting scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. National governments and other market-regulation institutions are taking measures to restrain earnings management in order to ensure the reliability and transparency of financial reporting. This study explores whether audit committees and boards of directors influence earnings management using the literary review method. The findings show that both discretionary accruals and abnormal accruals are mostly used as dependent variables to detect earnings manipulation estimated by the Jones and Modified Jones Models. For the most part, evidence from previous literatures indicates that the more independent the members of the audit committee and board, the higher the quality of earnings in financial reporting. However, some opposite findings exist.

Board Monitoring, Audit Committee Effectiveness, and Financial Reporting Quality
Board Monitoring, Audit Committee Effectiveness, and Financial Reporting Quality

Author: Luo He

Publisher:

Published: 2010

Total Pages: 42

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

We review and synthesize the results of empirical studies of associations between corporate oversight measures and financial reporting quality (FRQ). We examine two oversight components, board characteristics and audit committee characteristics. For each component, we summarize associations between variables contributing to monitoring effectiveness and three presumptive FRQ monitoring outcomes: (1) ex post consequences of low FRQ, such as financial reporting fraud; (2) earnings management measures, such as abnormal accruals; and (3) perceived informativeness of financial reports, manifest in earnings-returns associations, earnings response coefficients, and analyst perceptions of FRQ. Our classification scheme provides a coherent framework for synthesizing the implications of empirical findings, highlighting the role of different corporate governance variables in enhancing different aspects of FRQ. This synthesis has the potential to inform regulators, boards of directors, and forensic accountants who are concerned with improving the oversight of public corporations and reducing opportunities for managers and others to engage in financial fraud.

Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management
Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management

Author: April Klein

Publisher:

Published: 2008

Total Pages: 42

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

This study examines whether audit committee and board characteristics are related to earnings management by the firm. The motivation behind this study is the implicit assertion by the SEC, the NYSE and the NASDAQ that earnings management and poor corporate governance mechanisms are positively related. A non-linear negative relation is found between audit committee independence and earnings manipulation. Specifically, a significant relation is found only when the audit committee has less than a majority of independent directors. Surprisingly, and in contrast to the new regulations, no significant association is found between earnings management and the more stringent requirement of 100% audit committee independence. Empirical evidence also is provided that other corporate governance characteristics are related to earnings management. Earnings management is positively related to whether the CEO sits on the board's compensation committee. It is negatively related to the CEO's shareholdings and to whether a large outside shareholder sits on the board's audit committee. These results suggest that boards structured to be more independent of the CEO may be more effective in monitoring the corporate financial accounting process.

The Relationship Between Board Characteristics and Voluntary Improvements in Audit Committee Composition and Experience
The Relationship Between Board Characteristics and Voluntary Improvements in Audit Committee Composition and Experience

Author: Mark S. Beasley

Publisher:

Published: 2008

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

This study empirically examines the relation between certain board of director characteristics and the extent that audit committee composition voluntarily exceeds minimum mandated levels and includes outside directors with financial reporting and audit committee knowledge and experience. This study focuses on board characteristics as the board directly controls audit committee membership. Such staffing decisions can directly affect the ability of the audit committee to monitor management's financial reporting process on behalf of the board. Results suggests that Canadian firms which voluntarily include more outside directors on the audit committee than the mandated minimum have larger boards with more outsiders serving on those boards and are more likely to segregate the board chairperson position from the CEO/president positions. Additionally, firms who voluntarily create audit committees composed of outsider members with a breadth of relevant financial reporting and audit committee knowledge and experience have boards that are larger, have more outside members, and are less likely to be chaired by the CEO/president. Implications of these findings for auditors, institutional investors, regulators and other interested parties are discussed.

Audit Committee Characteristics and Financial Reporting Comparability
Audit Committee Characteristics and Financial Reporting Comparability

Author: Zhuoan Feng

Publisher:

Published: 2014

Total Pages: 99

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Financial reporting comparability is one of the key qualitative characteristics that allows accounting information users to identify and understand similarities and differences in the financial performance of two firms. While prior studies manily focus on the role of accounting standards in the production of comparability, the role of economic agents and institutional incentives has been largely overlooked. To fill this gap, this study argues that a firm's audit committee, as an economic agent within the firm, is important in shaping financial reporting comparability because the audit committee oversees the financial reporting and disclosure process, and monitors the choice od accounting policies and principles.

Board Characteristics, Accounting Report Integrity, and the Cost of Debt
Board Characteristics, Accounting Report Integrity, and the Cost of Debt

Author: Ronald C. Anderson

Publisher:

Published: 2014

Total Pages: 43

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Creditor reliance on accounting-based debt covenants suggests that debtors are potentially concerned with board of director characteristics that influence the financial accounting process. In a sample of Samp;P 500 firms, we find that the cost of debt financing is inversely related to board independence and board size. We also examine the impact of audit committee characteristics on corporate yields spreads as audit committees are the direct mechanism that boards use to monitor the financial accounting process. We find that fully independent audit committees are associated with a significantly lower cost of debt financing. Similarly, yield spreads are also negatively related to audit committee size and the number of audit committee meetings. Overall, these results provide market-based evidence that boards and audit committees are important elements affecting the reliability of financial reports.

Board Characteristics, Audit Committee Independence and Auditor Fees
Board Characteristics, Audit Committee Independence and Auditor Fees

Author: Dr. Rajnish Kumar

Publisher:

Published: 2017

Total Pages:

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

This paper examines the effect of level of corporate governance measured in terms of the board of directors' and the audit committee's characteristics on auditor fees in the Indian corporate sector. In particular, we examine the effect of the board of directors' and the audit committee's independence, diligence, expertise and size on audit fee, non-audit fee and the ratio of non-audit fee to audit fee for the top 100 companies listed on the National Stock Exchange for the financial year 2012-13. We hypothesize that an independent, diligent, experienced and a larger board of directors require higher audit quality and hence higher audit and non-audit fees. However, there is no effect of audit committee's characteristics (independence, diligence, expertise and size) on audit and non-audit fees because of inherent dependence of the audit committee on the board as envisioned by the Companies Act, 2013. The results indicate that an independent board defined as the proportion of independent directors in the board positively affects the audit fee and there is no effect of the audit committee's characteristics on auditor fees. Even after controlling for audit committee's characteristics in the board of directors' model, an independent board and chairperson positively affect the auditor fees.

Board Characteristics And Its Impact On Firm Free Cash Flows
Board Characteristics And Its Impact On Firm Free Cash Flows

Author: Razieh Adinehzadeh

Publisher: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing

Published: 2012

Total Pages: 84

ISBN-13: 9783659305108

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

This research tries to achieve to provide sufficient view about free cash flow and internal governance in corporate governance (CG) by addressing the relationship between board and audit characteristics with free cash flow. Specifically, this research tries to explore if internal governance practices are substitutes to control agency problem within the Malaysian firms. This book employs panel regression analysis. The panel data set comprise of 50 Malaysian companies (200 observations) which has be done for four consecutive years which comprise of 2005 to 2008. According to samples which has been taken from 2005 to 2008; the results show no significant relationship between board characteristics except board size and free cash flow. Instead, it shows a significant relationship between all audit committee variables except financial expertise and free cash flow. The finding of this book provides that the structure of audit committee is an important element in firm's decisions which consist of deciding on keeping or spending free cash flow in different ways that can be of interests to both managers and shareholders in Malaysian firms.