In 2015, the Australian government will produce a new Defence White Paper to outline revised and refined defense objectives. As it prepares the new report, a basic question facing the government is whether Australia should buy ships from foreign shipbuilders or support a domestic naval shipbuilding industry. This question is complex, containing many facets and issues that often center on cost trade-offs and economic considerations, but that also touch upon important national and strategic concerns.
Warship Builders is the first scholarly study of the U.S. naval shipbuilding industry from the early 1920s to the end of World War II, when American shipyards produced the world's largest fleet that helped defeat the Axis powers in all corners of the globe. A colossal endeavor that absorbed billions and employed virtual armies of skilled workers, naval construction mobilized the nation's leading industrial enterprises in the shipbuilding, engineering, and steel industries to deliver warships whose technical complexity dwarfed that of any other weapons platform. Based on systematic comparisons with British, Japanese, and German naval construction, Thomas Heinrich pinpoints the distinct features of American shipbuilding methods, technology development, and management practices that enabled U.S. yards to vastly outproduce their foreign counterparts. Throughout the book, comparative analyses reveal differences and similarities in American, British, Japanese, and German naval construction. Heinrich shows that U.S. and German shipyards introduced electric arc welding and prefabrication methods to a far greater extent than their British and Japanese counterparts between the wars, laying the groundwork for their impressive production records in World War II. While the American and Japanese navies relied heavily on government-owned navy yards, the British and German navies had most of their combatants built in corporately-owned yards, contradicting the widespread notion that only U.S. industrial mobilization depended on private enterprise. Lastly, the U.S. government's investments into shipbuilding facilities in both private and government-owned shipyards dwarfed the sums British, Japanese, and German counterparts expended. This enabled American builders to deliver a vast fleet that played a pivotal role in global naval combat.
This open access book compares the experiences of large-scale military procurement in Canada and Australia. Focusing on the recent frigate and jet-fighter programmes, it demonstrates how delays suffered in delivering weapons systems and platforms in these countries have been caused by misalignments between the strategic requirements set out by the armed forces and government defence policies. By bringing the insights of public management and administration to those of defence studies, the book presents policy options that will help improve the nature of future large-project military procurement. It will appeal to scholars and students of public administration, public management, and defence studies, as well as practitioners and policymakers.
A unique and outstanding military and industrial achievement, the Collins class submarine project was also plagued with difficulties and mired in politics. Its story is one of heroes and villains, grand passions, intrigue, lies, spies and backstabbing. It is as well a story of enormous commitment and resolve to achieve what many thought impossible. The building of these submarines was Australia's largest, most expensive and most controversial military project. From initiation in the 1981–2 budget to the delivery of the last submarine in 2003, the total cost was in excess of six billion dollars. Over 130 key players were interviewed for this book, and the Australian Defence Department allowed access to its classified archives and the Australian Navy archives. Vividly illustrated with photographs from the collections of the Royal Australian Navy and ASC Pty Ltd, The Collins Class Submarine Story: Steel, Spies and Spin, first published in 2008, is a riveting and accessibly written chronicle of a grand-scale quest for excellence.
The central theme running through this book is the mutual dependence of navies and shipbuilding industries. Historically, naval ambitions and the ambitions of industrialists converge, and a symbiosis is born. The technical competence of industry emerges as a key player in determining the effectiveness of navies. That industrial capability, for its part, rests increasingly on the navy as chief customer because progressive specialization renders it more and more unsuited for any other use. These trends are universal, afflicting the relations of all major navies and their industrial suppliers since the dawn of the modern age. They continue to complicate the running of navies today. The book enlarges on this fundamental fact, explaining why the symbiosis emerged and how it is manifested in the contemporary world.
A vital component of the interdependent global economy, maritime transit routes are nowhere more critical than those traversing the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. Previously, areas of the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific have been viewed as separate and discrete political, economic, and military regions. In recent years, however, a variety of economic, political, and military forces have created a new understanding of these maritime expanses as one zone of global interaction. This book complements the material presented in its companion volume, Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific, by analysing the perceptions, interests, objectives, maritime capabilities, and policies of the major maritime powers operating in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. In addition, the book also assesses the contemporary maritime challenges and opportunities that confront the global community within what is rapidly becoming recognised as an integrated zone of global interaction. A valuable study for researchers and policymakers working in the fields of maritime security; military, security and peace studies; conflict resolution; and Asian affairs.
The United States-Australia alliance has been an important component of the US-led system of alliances that has underpinned regional security in the Indo-Pacific since 1945. However, recent geostrategic developments, in particular the rise of the People’s Republic of China, have posed significant challenges to this US-led regional order. In turn, the growing strategic competition between these two great powers has generated challenges to the longstanding US-Australia alliance. Both the US and Australia are confronting a changing strategic environment, and, as a result, the alliance needs to respond to the challenges that they face. The US needs to understand the challenges and risks to this vital relationship, which is growing in importance, and take steps to manage it. On its part, Australia must clearly identify its core common interests with the US and start exploring what more it needs to do to attain its stated policy preferences. This book consists of chapters exploring US and Australian perspectives of the Indo-Pacific, the evolution of Australia-US strategic and defence cooperation, and the future of the relationship. Written by a joint US-Australia team, the volume is aimed at academics, analysts, students, and the security and business communities.
Why are Australians anxious and pessimistic? Who or what has caused our loss of trust in Australia? Why has a feeling of powerlessness crept in for so many? Has the luck really run out for the lucky country? And what can we do to get it back? Every generation believes its forebears have messed up the planet. That's how we evolve. But the mood in Australia at the moment, for all ages, seems one of gloom. People are angry. Distrustful. And not just because we are losing Prime Ministers faster than we are losing wickets! Sport, business, education, banking, farming, religion, trade unions, charities and hospitals have all lost their way through a series of scandals that we must learn from. And disillusion with our leaders is at its peak. Policy has been replaced by politicking. Commentator, author and former newspaper editor David Fagan asks the questions we all want answered as he traces the not-so-gentle decline of important Australian institutions. Through analysis and interviews with experts he explores what has defined Australia in the past and how we want to be defined in the future. Peeling back the rot that has contaminated almost everything Australians believe in, he asks: are we still the economically, socially and culturally strong country that most aspire to? Should we be alarmed? Or has the laconic Australian drifted from believing 'she'll be right' to being a 'bloody knocker'? Has the Luck Run Out? shines a spotlight on the mistakes we have made, our national disillusion and looks to what can be done to re-set the mood of the times. And, more importantly, what we have to do to set things right.
Updated 12/10/2020: In December 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that callsfor achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers. The 355-shipgoal was made U.S. policy by Section 1025 of the FY2018 National Defense AuthorizationAct (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115- 91 of December 12, 2017). The Navy and the Department of Defense(DOD) have been working since 2019 to develop a successor for the 355-ship force-level goal.The new goal is expected to introduce a new, more distributed fleet architecture featuring asmaller proportion of larger ships, a larger proportion of smaller ships, and a new third tier oflarge unmanned vehicles (UVs). On December 9, 2020, the Trump Administration released a document that can beviewed as its vision for future Navy force structure and/or a draft version of the FY202230-year Navy shipbuilding plan. The document presents a Navy force-level goal that callsfor achieving by 2045 a Navy with a more distributed fleet architecture, 382 to 446 mannedships, and 143 to 242 large UVs. The Administration that takes office on January 20, 2021,is required by law to release the FY2022 30-year Navy shipbuilding plan in connection withDOD's proposed FY2022 budget, which will be submitted to Congress in 2021. In preparingthe FY2022 30-year shipbuilding plan, the Administration that takes office on January 20,2021, may choose to adopt, revise, or set aside the document that was released on December9, 2020. The Navy states that its original FY2021 budget submission requests the procurement ofeight new ships, but this figure includes LPD-31, an LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ship thatCongress procured (i.e., authorized and appropriated procurement funding for) in FY2020.Excluding this ship, the Navy's original FY2021 budget submission requests the procurementof seven new ships rather than eight. In late November 2020, the Trump Administrationreportedly decided to request the procurement of a second Virginia-class attack submarinein FY2021. CRS as of December 10, 2020, had not received any documentation from theAdministration detailing the exact changes to the Virginia-class program funding linesthat would result from this reported change. Pending the delivery of that information fromthe administration, this CRS report continues to use the Navy's original FY2021 budgetsubmission in its tables and narrative discussions.
In modern history, China has been primarily a land power, dominating smaller states along its massive continental flanks. But China’s turn toward the sea is now very much a reality, as evident in its stunning rise in global shipbuilding markets, its vast and expanding merchant marine, the wide offshore reach of its energy and minerals exploration companies, its growing fishing fleet, and indeed its increasingly modern navy. Yet, for all these achievements, there is still profound skepticism regarding China’s potential as a genuine maritime power. Beijing must still import the most vital subcomponents for its shipyards, maritime governance remains severely bureaucratically challenged, and the navy evinces, at least as of yet, little enthusiasm for significant blue water power projection capabilities. This volume provides a truly comprehensive assessment of prospects for China’s maritime development by situating these important geostrategic phenomena within a larger world historical context. China is hardly the only land power in history to attempt transformation by fostering sea power. Many continental powers have elected or been impelled to transform themselves into significant maritime powers in order to safeguard their strategic position or advance their interests. We examine cases of attempted transformation from the Persian Empire to the Soviet Union, and determine the reasons for their success or failure. Too many works on China view the nation in isolation. Of course, China’s history and culture are to some extent exceptional, but building intellectual fences actually hinders the effort to understand China’s current development trajectory. Without underestimating the enduring pull of China’s past as it relates to threats to the country’s internal stability and its landward borders, this comparative study provides reason to believe that China has turned the corner on a genuine maritime transformation. If that proves indeed to be the case, it would be a remarkable if not singular event in the history of the last two millennia.
