This book argues that accountability for extraordinary atrocity crimes should not uncritically adopt the methods and assumptions of ordinary liberal criminal law. Criminal punishment designed for common criminals is a response to mass atrocity and a device to promote justice in its aftermath. This book comes to this conclusion after reviewing the sentencing practices of international, national, and local courts and tribunals that punish atrocity perpetrators. Sentencing practices of these institutions fail to attain the goals that international criminal law ascribes to punishment, in particular retribution and deterrence. Fresh thinking is necessary to confront the collective nature of mass atrocity and the disturbing reality that individual membership in group-based killings is often not maladaptive or deviant behavior but, rather, adaptive or conformist behavior. This book turns to a modern, and adventurously pluralist, application of classical notions of cosmopolitanism to advance the frame of international criminal law to a broader construction of atrocity law and towards an interdisciplinary, contextual, and multicultural conception of justice.
Child soldiers are generally perceived as faultless, passive victims. This ignores that the roles of child soldiers vary, from innocent abductee to wilful perpetrator. This book argues that child soldiers should be judged on their actions and that treating them like a homogenous group prevents them from taking responsibility for their acts.
"In the past couple of decades an autonomous international system of law has aggressively developed to deal with individual criminal responsibility for the most heinous of crimes. However, the development and application of the international criminal system is mired in criticism and concern. While international criminal law is playing an increasingly important role in global politics and issues of global security, normative theory has not kept pace with the advancements in this area of law. This book examines international criminal law (ICL) from a normative perspective, setting out how individuals ought to be held accountable to the world for their contribution to atrocity. In addition to addressing the normative basis for ICL, the book provides criteria for determining the kinds of actions that should be addressed through international criminal law. It asks, and answers, how individual responsibility can be determined in the context of collectively perpetrated political crimes and whether an international criminal justice system can claim universality in a culturally plural world. The book scrutinizes the function of ICL and finally considers how the goals and purpose of international law can be best institutionally supported"--
This brief review of Mark Drumbl's recent work, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (2007), explains the author's project and how it fits into the contemporary literature on international criminal law. Marked by prodigious research and rigorous interdisciplinary analysis, Drumbl persuasively critiques the predilection for ICL as the default response to mass atrocity; offers cautionary lessons about the limits and dangers of ICL; and provides an original argument for a more pluralistic, cosmopolitan response to mass atrocity that welcomes diverse, in situ justice modalities, subject to prudent qualifications. I think that he tends to be overly optimistic about those modalities and that the indigenous traditions to which he recommends qualified deference will in practice prove more problematic and subject to abuse than he sometimes seems to suppose. Also, reflection on the penological issues raised by ICL in the strict sense will require more precise and methodical analytic distinctions before they can be genuinely helpful to the ICL sentencing process. But above all, I think, Drumbl's work suggests the limits of ex post legal responses to mass atrocity generally rather than of ICL in particular. ICL's principal goal should be to contribute to a normative climate sufficient to compel genuinely effective international legal responses to prevent or forestall mass atrocity - so that retrospective transitional justice of any sort will be understood as the moral failure it so often reflects.
This book is the first comprehensive study of the international law encompassing hate speech. Prof. Gordon provides a broad analysis of the entire jurisprudential output related to speech and gross human rights violations for courts, government officials, and scholars. The book is organized into three parts. The first part covers the foundation: a brief history of atrocity speech and the modern treatment of hate speech in international human rights treaties and judgments under international criminal tribunals. The second part focuses on fragmentation: detailing the inconsistent application of the charges and previous prosecutions, including certain categories of inflammatory speech and a growing doctrinal rift between the ICTR and ICTY. The last part covers fruition: recommendations on how the law should be developed going forward, with proposals to fix the problems with individual speech offenses to coalesce into three categories of offense: incitement, speech-abetting, and instigation.
This edited volume provides, for the first time, a comprehensive account of theoretical approaches to international punishment. Its main objective is to contribute to the development of a consistent and robust theory of international criminal punishment. For this purpose, the authors - renowned scholars in the fields of criminal law, international criminal law, and philosophy of law, as well as practitioners working at different international criminal courts and tribunals - address the question of meaning and purpose of punishment in international law from various perspectives. The volume fleshes out the predominant dimensions of a theory of international punishment and highlights the differences between 'ordinary' (domestic) crime and international crimes and their respective enforcement. At the same time, throughout the volume a major focus is on the practical consequences of the different theoretical approaches, in particular for the activities of the International Criminal Court.
In the past twenty years, international criminal law has become one of the main areas of international legal scholarship and practice. Most textbooks in the field describe the evolution of international criminal tribunals, the elements of the core international crimes, the applicable modes of liability and defences, and the role of states in prosecuting international crimes. The Oxford Handbook of International Criminal Law, however, takes a theoretically informed and refreshingly critical look at the most controversial issues in international criminal law, challenging prevailing practices, orthodoxies, and received wisdoms. Some of the contributions to the Handbook come from scholars within the field, but many come from outside of international criminal law, or indeed from outside law itself. The chapters are grounded in history, geography, philosophy, and international relations. The result is a Handbook that expands the discipline and should fundamentally alter how international criminal law is understood.
This book brings a new focus to the ongoing debate on holding perpetrators of massive humanitarian and human rights violations accountable in countries in transition. It provides a clear-cut and comprehensive legal analysis of the content and nature of a state's obligations to investigate and prosecute as enshrined in the most important humanitarian and human rights treaties; it disentangles the common fallacy that these procedural obligations are naturally rooted and clearly spelled out in the general human rights treaties; and it explains the flaws in an absolutist interpretation. This analysis serves to understand whether such procedural obligations, if narrowly construed, act as impediments to countries emerging from periods of conflict or systematic repression in the face of contingent circumstances and the formidable dilemmas raised by a univocal understanding of justice as retribution. Exploring the latest instances of interpretation and application via an analysis of state practice, the jurisprudence of treaty bodies, international courts and tribunals, soft law instruments, and doctrinal contributions, the book also addresses the complex issue of amnesty, and other transitional justice mechanisms designed to restore peace and facilitate transition traditionally included in national reconciliation programs, and criticizes the contention that amnesty is always prohibited by international law. It also considers these problems from the viewpoint of the International Criminal Court, focusing on the cases of Uganda and Colombia after the 2016 peace agreement. Lastly, the volume offers a detailed analysis of techniques that may neutralize relevant obligations under international law, such as denunciation, derogation, limitation, and the public international law defenses of force majeure and necessity. Drawing attention to the importance of a multidisciplinary and practical approach to these unsettling questions, and endorsing a pluralistic notion of accountability, the book will appeal to legal scholars and transitional justice experts as well as practitioners, human rights advocates, and government officials. Dr Jacopo Roberti di Sarsina is an International Law Expert at the Alma Mater Studiorum - University of Bologna School of Law, and a dual-qualified lawyer (Italy and New York). He completed a PhD in public international law, label Doctor Europaeus, at the School of International Studies, University of Trento, holds an LLM from NYU School of Law, and read law at the University of Bologna.
