Assessment of the administration's September report on the status of U.S. political and military efforts in Iraq : hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, September 19, 2007.
The United States Government Printing Office (GPO) was created in June 1860, and is an agency of the U.S. federal government based in Washington D.C. The office prints documents produced by and for the federal government, including Congress, the Supreme Court, the Executive Office of the President and other executive departments, and independent agencies. A hearing is a meeting of the Senate, House, joint or certain Government committee that is open to the public so that they can listen in on the opinions of the legislation. Hearings can also be held to explore certain topics or a current issue. It typically takes between two months up to two years to be published. This is one of those hearings.
The last six years have witnessed a virtually unending debate over U.S. policy toward Iraq, a debate that is likely to continue well into the new administration and perhaps the next, notwithstanding recent improvements on the ground. Too often, however, the debate has been narrowly framed in terms of the situation in Iraq and what steps the United States should take there next, leaving the broader impact of the war on American interests largely overlooked. Ultimately, though, the success and failure of the war will have to be judged in terms of its overall contribution to U.S. national security, including those repercussions that extend far beyond the borders of Iraq. This book addresses this gap by providing a comprehensive evaluation of the consequences of the Iraq war for the national security of the United States. It is aimed at both those who have not yet made up their minds about the merits of the war and those who wish to ground their opinions in a clearer understanding of what effects the war has actually had. Balance Sheet examines both how the war has advanced or retarded the achievement of other important goals of U.S. national security policy and its impact on the ability of the United States to pursue its security interests now and in the future. Individual chapters by expert authors address such key issues as the war on terror, nuclear non-proliferation, stability in the Middle East, the health of the U.S. military, America's standing in the world, and U.S. public opinion. By doing justice to the full range of stakes involved, this book not only reframes the debate over the Iraq war but provides a necessary foundation for future U.S. policymaking toward Iraq and beyond.
From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, U.S. Government agencies have reported significant costs for U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. In addition, the United States currently has committed about 138,000 military personnel to the U.S.-led Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I). Over the past 3 years, worsening security conditions have made it difficult for the United States to achieve its goals in Iraq. In this statement, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) discusses trends in the security environment in Iraq, and progress in developing Iraqi security forces, as reported by the Departments of Defense (DoD) and State. GAO also presents key questions for congressional oversight, including the following: (1) What political, economic, and security conditions must be achieved before the United States can draw down and withdraw?; (2) Why have security conditions continued to deteriorate even as Iraq has met political milestones, increased the number of trained and equipped forces, and increasingly assumed the lead for security?; and (3) If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the administration propose for stemming the violence?
David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker examine the contentious debate over the Iraq war and occupation, focusing on the critique that the Bush administration squandered an historic opportunity to reconstruct the Iraqi state because of various critical blunders in planning. Though they conclude that critics have made a number of telling points against the Bush administration's conduct of the Iraq war, they argue that the most serious problems facing Iraq and its American occupiers -- criminal anarchy and lawlessness, a raging insurgency, and a society divided into rival and antagonistic groups -- were virtually inevitable consequences that flowed from the act of war itself. Military and civilian planners were culpable in failing to plan for certain tasks, but the most serious problems had no good solution. The authors draw attention to a variety of lessons, including the danger that the imperatives of "force protection" may sacrifice the broader political mission of U.S. forces and the need for skepticism over the capacity of outsiders to develop the skill and expertise required to reconstruct decapitated states.
The authors present a vital analysis of the foreign policy-making processes of the two Bush administrations prior to the attacks on Iraq. In a thorough comparison, they show how both presidents used historical analogies to evaluate information, relied on instinct to formulate decisions, and drew on moral language to justify their choices.
This volume explores in close detail the events and factors leading up to the second Gulf War in 2003 and considers whether war with Iraq was inevitable. Nick Ritchie and Paul Rogers argue that after the election of George W. Bush, conflict between Iraq and the United States was probable, and that after 9/11 it became virtually inevitable. They begin by setting the story of Iraq, Bush and 9/11 within the broader context of the importance of the Persian Gulf to enduring US national security interests and go on to examine the intense politicking that surrounded the conflict and still reverberates today. The authors examine US policy towards Iraq at the end of the Clinton administration, the opposition in Congress and Washington’s conservative think tanks to Clinton’s strategy of containment, and the evolution of Iraq policy during the first eight months of the Bush presidency and the growing pressure for regime change. They also explore the immediate focus on Iraq after the attacks of September 11 that marked a watershed in US national security policy and chart the construction of the case against Iraq through 2002 and the administration’s determination to end Saddam Hussein’s regime at all costs. The Political Road to War with Iraq will be of great interest to all students and scholars of US foreign policy, war and peace studies and international relations.
