The turn of the century has seen the US greatly enhance its military supremacy across the world. It has also played a key role in shaping the international economic order. More recently, however, its world-wide economic domination has started to diminish as other regions and countries have become globally important players. Simon Bromley brings a fresh perspective to these issues, arguing that it is as yet unclear whether the US will be capable of rising to the challenges posed by the new world order. He carefully examines the intricacies of these debates including the American ideology of a liberal international order and the relation of this to the Bush doctrine; US power in the transatlantic arena and US-European integration in relation to the EU and NATO; and the geo-politics of oil. He looks at a range of challenges to US dominance, including the weakening of the dollar; the rapid growth and industrialization of Asia; and the strengths and weaknesses of Bush's foreign policy. This book is set to spark debate amongst students and scholars of international politics, as well as appealing to anyone interested in the changing shape of the international order.
The introduction, “Power Structure in the New World Order (Argument of the Book),” highlights the main theme around which the study revolves, namely the “new world order.” It presents the hypothesis of the study regarding this new order, along with several questions including: what are the factors that indicate the coming of a new world order?; what are the most influential forces in that order?; how is that order structured?; and what are the most important and influential factors in the world order? The introduction also presents the main premise of the book — that the United States of America may be considered the dominant pole in the new world order, and that the world will continue to exist in an American age that is expected to extend for at least a further five decades. The qualitative supremacy of the United States of America has proven inescapable according to the data, statistics and information presented in this book, as well as the scales and variables of comparison adopted by the author in terms of economics, military advancement, energy resources, transportation, education, culture, and technological progress. According to these standards, the structure of the new world order may be described as a hierarchy, with the United States of America alone at the top, followed by a second tier comprising Russia, China and the European Union, a third tier consisting of Japan, India and Brazil, followed by the rest of world. The introduction to this book may be considered a basic foundation for the analysis presented in the following seven chapters, which examine the emergence, current status, and future of the new world order in its various dimensions. Under the heading, “The New World Order: Features and Concepts,” the first chapter of Al-Suwaidi’s new book presents a theoretical paradigm for the concept of the new world order in its various dimensions. It presents two main themes: the first deals with concepts relating to the world order, drawing on literature that examines the evolution of the world order from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to the present day. It also presents various different views and arguments concerning the nature of the world order, and the distribution of power within it. The first theme also explores the political, military, economic, cultural, educational, technological and energy-related dimensions of the world order, and their importance in determining the relative powers of actors in the new world order. Moreover it explains how the United States of America has succeeded in utilizing all these tools to achieve its ends, and how it leads this world order according to a universal strategic vision aimed at maintaining US supremacy vis-à-vis other major powers. The first theme also presents an objective assessment of the different frameworks which are employed in analyzing the concept of the new world order. The second theme of this chapter discusses the main features of the new world order, which play a significant role in the interactions that occur within it, and which define it with regard to previous historical eras of the global system. Chapter II, “Factors Influencing the Structure of the New World Order,” examines the factors and patterns of influence and interaction within the world order. These factors include: relations among civilizations, relative power in international relations, economic factors, military superiority, technological development, levels of knowledge, challenges and variables, and the behavior of major powers. Chapter III, “The World Order: Decisive Historic Junctures,” aims to draw a comprehensive analytical map to help in understanding the historical transformations of the world order and, ultimately, the nature of contemporary global realities. The historical review presented in this chapter features an element that may make it unique; it tackles the historical evolution of the world order from the emergence of the Ottoman state in the East through the ages of the Spanish, Portuguese and other empires of the West. It is an effort to present a balanced, scholarly chronicle of the world order, without neglecting the influence of the East on international relations throughout history. Chapter IV, “The Economy, Trade and Energy in the New World Order,” focuses on the role of economic factors in deciding the structure of the new world order and the hierarchy of powers within it. It reveals that despite the spectacular rise of the Chinese economy during the past two decades, it is still about half that of the United States, and China still falls within the ranks of developing countries in terms of its average GDP per capita. While the US economy is characterized by flexibility and high reliance on innovation and internal forces for growth, China depends on foreign investment and employing low-cost labor in export-oriented industries. This could make China more vulnerable to adverse economic shocks in the future. The author also expects that developments in the energy sector will greatly affect the ranking of powers in the new world order. The United States of America will increasingly become self-dependent in terms of energy, utilizing its various innovations in the field of shale gas and oil extraction, and its gradual shift toward unconventional energy sources from the western hemisphere (the Americas), giving it a strong comparative advantage in the future. Chapter V, “Public Opinion Regarding the New World Order: A Sample Survey of UAE Citizens,” resents the findings of a public opinion survey in the UAE concerning the new world order. The survey focuses on nationality, age, gender and educational level as explanatory variables of differences in public opinion toward the new world order. In Chapter VI, “Prospective Structural Changes and their Consequences for the New World Order,” the author discusses the potential structural, strategic changes in the new world order in the coming five decades; stressing that unipolarity will have a variety of impacts on the world. The author anticipates that US influence in international financial institutions will increase, and that over the next decade Washington will reduce its dependence on oil from regions plagued by risk and instability.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, transformed the way in which Americans and their leaders viewed the world. The tragic events of that day helped give rise to a foreign policy strategy commonly referred to as the “Bush Doctrine.” At the heart of this doctrine lie a series of claims about the need to encourage liberal democracy as the antidote to jihadist terrorism. President George W. Bush proclaimed in a variety of addresses that democracy now represented the “single surviving model” of political life to which all people aspired. In the course of making this argument, President Bush linked his policies to an overarching “teleology” of progress. This discourse suggested that the United States might use force to hasten the emergence of liberal norms and institutions in rogue states. With a sense of irony, some commentators soon referred to the Bush administration’s position as “Leninist” because of its determination to bring about the so-called “end of history” today. Yet, surprisingly, these critics had little more to add. This book assesses in greater depth the Bush administration’s claim to comprehend the purpose of historical progress. Developing a concept termed “democratic vanguardism,” this study investigates the idea of liberal modernity, the role of the United States as a force for democracy, and the implications of using military intervention in the service of idealistic ends. It examines disputes among political theorists, public intellectuals, and elected statesmen that help to enrich our understanding of the United States’ efforts under President Bush to bend history to its will.
A major re-thinking of the concept of hegemony in international relations. On the basis of historical examples, Ian Clark presents an innovative scheme for rethinking hegemony, and applies it to the US role in international organizations, in East Asia, and in the policy on climate change.
Inderjeet Parmar reveals the complex interrelations, shared mindsets, and collaborative efforts of influential public and private organizations in the building of American hegemony. Focusing on the involvement of the Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie foundations in U.S. foreign affairs, Parmar traces the transformation of America from an ÒisolationistÓ nation into the worldÕs only superpower, all in the name of benevolent stewardship. Parmar begins in the 1920s with the establishment of these foundations and their system of top-down, elitist, scientific giving, which focused more on managing social, political, and economic change than on solving modern societyÕs structural problems. Consulting rare documents and other archival materials, he recounts how the American intellectuals, academics, and policy makers affiliated with these organizations institutionalized such elitism, which then bled into the machinery of U.S. foreign policy and became regarded as the essence of modernity. America hoped to replace Britain in the role of global hegemon and created the necessary political, ideological, military, and institutional capacity to do so, yet far from being objective, the Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie foundations often advanced U.S. interests at the expense of other nations. Incorporating case studies of American philanthropy in Nigeria, Chile, and Indonesia, Parmar boldly exposes the knowledge networks underwriting American dominance in the twentieth century.
The quest for oil can be seen as a defining principle of global US foreign policy, an imperative which has shaped and redefined the practice of American diplomacy, especially in the wake of 9/11, which raised questions about the stability of global oil resources. In "Energy and US Foreign Policy", Ahmed Mahdi relates the military expansion of the world's biggest superpower to its quest to gain guaranteed and secure access to the world's most important commodity. Examining the foreign policy of George Bush Sr., Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, culminating in the unprecedented military campaigns of the latter, Mahdi demonstrates how and why oil has played a central role in US relations with the wider world. By dissecting the failures of the US to secure its own economic and energy interests, and by demonstrating the devastating impact this has had on the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East, Mahdi offers vital analysis for researchers and students of International Relations, Diplomacy, Security and Energy Studies.
This free course explores the relationship between China and the United States and analyses whether China?s rapid rise will lead to greater cooperation or conflict with the US. The answer to this question will have profound implications for both countries and the wider international system. The course introduces some of the contemporary issues in China-US relations and provides historical background on the evolution of relations between the two countries. It introduces and applies some key ideas drawn from the discipline of International Relations relating to interdependence to assess the prospects for the future trajectory of relations between these two major powers.
The third volume of The Cambridge History of America and the World covers the volatile period between 1900 and 1945 when the United States emerged as a world power and American engagements abroad flourished in new and consequential ways. Showcasing the most innovative approaches to both traditional topics and emerging themes, leading scholars chart the complex ways in which Americans projected their growing influence across the globe; how others interpreted and constrained those efforts; how Americans disagreed with each other, often fiercely, about foreign relations; and how race, religion, gender, and other factors shaped their worldviews. During the early twentieth century, accelerating forces of global interdependence presented Americans, like others, with a set of urgent challenges from managing borders, humanitarian crises, economic depression, and modern warfare to confronting the radical, new political movements of communism, fascism, and anticolonial nationalism. This volume will set the standard for new understandings of this pivotal moment in the history of America and the world.
This is a must-read volume on globalization in which some of the foremost scholars in the field discuss the latest issues. Truly providing a global perspective, it includes authorship and discussions from the Global North and South, and covers the major facets of globalization: cultural, economic, ecological and political. It discusses the historical developments in governance preceding globalization, the diverse theoretical and methodological approaches to globalization, and analyzes underdevelopment, anti-globalization movements, global poverty, global inequality, and the debates on international trade versus protectionism. Finally, the volume looks to the future and provides prospects for inter-civilizational understanding, rapprochement, and global cooperation. This will be of great interest to academics and students of sociology, social anthropology, political science and international relations, economics, social policy, social history, as well as to policy makers.
The global financial crisis of 2007–2008 was both an economic catastrophe and a watershed event in world politics. In American Power after the Financial Crisis, Jonathan Kirshner explains how the crisis altered the international balance of power, affecting the patterns and pulse of world politics. The crisis, Kirshner argues, brought about an end to what he identifies as the "second postwar American order" because it undermined the legitimacy of the economic ideas that underpinned that order—especially those that encouraged and even insisted upon uninhibited financial deregulation. The crisis also accelerated two existing trends: the relative erosion of the power and political influence of the United States and the increased political influence of other states, most notably, but not exclusively, China.Looking ahead, Kirshner anticipates a "New Heterogeneity" in thinking about how best to manage domestic and international money and finance. These divergences—such as varying assessments of and reactions to newly visible vulnerabilities in the American economy and changing attitudes about the long-term appeal of the dollar—will offer a bold challenge to the United States and its essentially unchanged disposition toward financial policy and regulation. This New Heterogeneity will contribute to greater discord among nations about how best to manage the global economy. A provocative look at how the 2007–2008 economic collapse diminished U.S. dominance in world politics, American Power after the Financial Crisis suggests that the most significant and lasting impact of the crisis and the Great Recession will be the inability of the United States to enforce its political and economic priorities on an increasingly recalcitrant world.
