When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Army Air Forces had only 1,100 combat-ready planes. No one could have imagined then that within the next four years the AAF would become the mighty weapon commemorated in the paintings reproduced on the following pages, or that it would have to scope to engage in what its commander, General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, described as a "global mission." Nevertheless, by 1944 the AAF had grown into 16 separate air forces stationed around the world, and its 1,100 planes had grown to nearly 80,000.
This history book celebrates a near-forgotten band of gallant American airmen, led by Claire Lee Chennault, who served in the midst of a strange land at a time of great turmoil. They arrived in China, not as conquerors, but as codefenders, appreciated by the most humble and grateful Chinese who would smile to them and in many cases utter the only mutually recognizable words of communication: 'Ding Hao, ' meaning 'It is good.'
During the first 10 months of the war in the Pacific, Japan achieved air supremacy with its carrier and land-based forces. But after major setbacks at Midway and Guadalcanal, the empire's expansion stalled, in part due to flaws in aircraft design, strategy and command. This book offers a fresh analysis of the air war in the Pacific during the early phases of World War II. Details are included from two expeditions conducted by the author that reveal the location of an American pilot missing in the Philippines since 1942 and clear up a controversial account involving famed Japanese ace Saburo Sakai and U.S. Navy pilot James "Pug" Southerland.
“An essential part of the literature of World War II.” —Jonathan Yardley, The Washington Post From acclaimed World War II historian Richard Overy comes this startling new history of the controversial Allied bombing war against Germany and German-occupied Europe. In the fullest account yet of the campaign and its consequences, Overy assesses not just the bombing strategies and pattern of operations, but also how the bombed communities coped with the devastation. This book presents a unique history of the bombing offensive from below as well as from above, and engages with moral questions that still resonate today.
Except in a few instances, since World War II no American soldier or sailor has been attacked by enemy air power. Conversely, no enemy soldier orsailor has acted in combat without being attacked or at least threatened by American air power. Aviators have brought the air weapon to bear against enemies while denying them the same prerogative. This is the legacy of the U.S. AirForce, purchased at great cost in both human and material resources.More often than not, aerial pioneers had to fight technological ignorance, bureaucratic opposition, public apathy, and disagreement over purpose.Every step in the evolution of air power led into new and untrodden territory, driven by humanitarian impulses; by the search for higher, faster, and farther flight; or by the conviction that the air way was the best way. Warriors have always coveted the high ground. If technology permitted them to reach it, men, women andan air force held and exploited it-from Thomas Selfridge, first among so many who gave that "last full measure of devotion"; to Women's Airforce Service Pilot Ann Baumgartner, who broke social barriers to become the first Americanwoman to pilot a jet; to Benjamin Davis, who broke racial barriers to become the first African American to command a flying group; to Chuck Yeager, a one-time non-commissioned flight officer who was the first to exceed the speed of sound; to John Levitow, who earned the Medal of Honor by throwing himself over a live flare to save his gunship crew; to John Warden, who began a revolution in air power thought and strategy that was put to spectacular use in the Gulf War.Industrialization has brought total war and air power has brought the means to overfly an enemy's defenses and attack its sources of power directly. Americans have perceived air power from the start as a more efficient means of waging war and as a symbol of the nation's commitment to technology to master challenges, minimize casualties, and defeat adversaries.
The plans that Nazi Germany had to raid - and bomb - New York and the eastern seabord are revealed in this book. They were were based on the use of transoceanic aircraft planes, such as the six-engined Ju 390, Me 264 or Ta 400, but the Third Reich was unable to produce such machines in sufficient numbers. If the Soviet Union had been conquered, however, these plans would have become a reality. With the seizure of vital resources from the Soviet Union the Wehrmacht would have had enough fuel and material to mass-produce giant bomber aircraft: it was a near run thing. The collapse of the Wehrmacht infrastructure and the end of the Thousand-Year Reich ensured that plans for long-range remote-controlled missiles never got off the drawing board and were never manufactured. Manfried Griehl makes it clear that until the collapse, numerous secret research laboratories seemed to have worked in parallel seeking nuclear power and explosives. Only classified material held within British, French and American archives can prove whether these groups were close to perfecting small atomic explosives. But, without a shadow of doubt, Germany was far more technologically advanced by the end of 1944 that has been previously suspected.
In early 1965 the United States unleashed the largest sustained aerial bombing campaign since World War II, against North Vietnam. Through an ever escalating onslaught of destruction, Operation Rolling Thunder intended to signal Americas unwavering commitment to its South Vietnamese ally in the face of continued North Vietnamese aggression, break Hanois political will to prosecute the war, and bring about a negotiated settlement to the conflict. It was not to be. Against the backdrop of the Cold War and fears of widening the conflict into a global confrontation, Washington policy makers micromanaged and mismanaged the air campaign and increasingly muddled strategic objectives and operational methods that ultimately sowed the seeds of failure, despite the heroic sacrifices by U.S. Air Force and Navy pilots and crews Despite flying some 306,000 combat sorties and dropping 864,000 tons of ordnance on North Vietnam 42 per cent more than that used in the Pacific theater during World War II Operation Rolling Thunder failed to drive Hanoi decisively to the negotiating table and end the war. That would take another four years and another air campaign. But by building on the hard earned political and military lessons of the past, the Nixon Administration and American military commanders would get another chance to prove themselves when they implemented operations Linebacker I and II in May and December 1972. And this time the results would be vastly different.
During 1932, the occupation of the Colombian towns of Leticia and Tarapacá by Peruvian troops and civilians, in the Amazon region, led to a conflict that almost ended in a total war between both countries. Aviation played an important role on both sides, due to the complicated jungle environment, which makes any land movements almost impossible. After some ground and air combats, a ceasefire was agreed and the conflict was resolved. But the war over the Putumayo area became the baptism of fire for the Peruvian and Colombian air forces, leading, in the second case, to the development of its military aviation, which was almost nonexistent in 1932. For Peru, the result of the conflict was also a rearming process, which proved important when in 1941 it entered into war with Ecuador. This book is supported by a large number of rare and previously unpublished images, and specially commissioned color profiles showing camouflage and markings.
