Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives
Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives

Author: Günter Bamberg

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2012-12-06

Total Pages: 538

ISBN-13: 3642750605

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Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.

Agency Theory and Work Incentives
Agency Theory and Work Incentives

Author: Maurizio Lisciandra

Publisher:

Published: 2016

Total Pages: 30

ISBN-13:

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This paper is an extensive review of agency theory applied to labour incentives. It introduces a generalised principal-agent model that goes through a certain degree of critical assessment. The analysis of the optimality within the trade-off of insurance against incentives is enriched by bringing in the contribution of established extensions and new approaches to the agency theory and, to a larger extent, labour incentives.

The Theory of Incentives
The Theory of Incentives

Author: Jean-Jacques Laffont

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2009-12-27

Total Pages: 436

ISBN-13: 1400829453

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Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.

Ethics and Agency Theory
Ethics and Agency Theory

Author: Norman E. Bowie

Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA

Published: 1992

Total Pages: 264

ISBN-13:

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Agency theory involves what is known as the principal-agent problem, a topic widely discussed in economics, management, and business ethics today. It is a characteristic of nearly all modern business firms that the principals (the owners and shareholders) are not the same people as the agents (the managers who run the firms for the principals). This creates situations in which the goals of the principals may not be the same as the agents--the principals will want growth in profits and stock price, while agents may want growth in salaries and positions in the hierarchy. The fourth volume in the Ruffin Series in Business, this book explores the ethical consequences of agency theory through contributions by ethicists, economists, and management theorists.

Agency Theory and Executive Pay
Agency Theory and Executive Pay

Author: Alexander Pepper

Publisher: Springer

Published: 2018-11-19

Total Pages: 133

ISBN-13: 3319999699

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This new book examines the relationship between agency theory and executive pay. It argues that while Jensen and Meckling (1976) were right in their analysis of the agency problem in public corporations they were wrong about the proposed solutions. Drawing on ideas from economics, psychology, sociology and the philosophy of science, the author explains how standard agency theory has contributed to the problem of executive pay rather than solved it. The book explores why companies should be regarded as real entities not legal fictions, how executive pay in public corporations can be conceptualised as a collective action problem and how behavioral science can help in the design of optimal incentive arrangements. An insightful and revolutionary read for those researching corporate governance, HRM and organisation theory, this useful book offers potential solutions to some of the problems with executive pay and the standard model of agency.

The System of Incentives for Managers with Multitasks
The System of Incentives for Managers with Multitasks

Author: Chong-En Bai

Publisher:

Published: 2001

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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The multitask principal-agent theory argues that incentive devices for the agent tend to be complementary due to the need for balanced allocation of effort among the tasks. A growing body of empirical literature appears to support this notion. However, when there can be several signals for each of the tasks, incentive devices based on individual signals for each task can be complements or substitutes for one another. This paper studies the complementarity and substitutability theoretically and empirically. The theoretical study extends the framework of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) to incorporate the case of multiple signals for some tasks. The empirical work is based on a rich panel data set of managerial incentives from more than 300 Chinese state-owned enterprises. The empirical findings support most of the theoretical predictions but also suggest that profits are not the only objective of the Chinese government (the principal) in designing managerial contracts. Our findings about the determinants of the incentive devices offer support to some notions in the agency theory and the literature on incomplete contracts. state-owned enterprises.

A Handbook of Management Theories and Models for Office Environments and Services
A Handbook of Management Theories and Models for Office Environments and Services

Author: Rianne Appel-Meulenbroek

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2021-08-02

Total Pages: 292

ISBN-13: 1000434206

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Although workplace design and management are gaining more and more attention from modern organizations, workplace research is still very fragmented and spread across multiple disciplines in academia. There are several books on the market related to workplaces, facility management (FM), and corporate real estate management (CREM) disciplines, but few open up a theoretical and practical discussion across multiple theories from different disciplines. Therefore, workplace researchers are not aware of all the angles from which workplace management and effects of workplace design on employees has been or could be studied. A lot of knowledge is lost between disciplines, and sadly, many insights do not reach workplace managers in practice. Therefore, this new book series is started by associate professor Rianne Appel-Meulenbroek (Eindhoven University of Technology, the Netherlands) and postdoc researcher Vitalija Danivska (Aalto University, Finland) as editors, published by Routledge. It is titled ‘Transdisciplinary Workplace Research and Management’ because it bundles important research insights from different disciplinary fields and shows its relevance for both academic workplace research and workplace management in practice. The books will address the complexity of the transdisciplinary angle necessary to solve ongoing workplace-related issues in practice, such as knowledge worker productivity, office use, and more strategic management. In addition, the editors work towards further collaboration and integration of the necessary disciplines for further development of the workplace field in research and in practice. This book series is relevant for workplace experts both in academia and industry. This second book in the series focuses on the role of workplace management in the organization and the tasks that workplace management needs to consider. The 18 theories that are presented in this book and applied to workplace research discuss management aspects from the organization’s perspective or dive deeper into issues related to people and/or building management. They all emphasize that workplace management is a complex matter that requires more strategic attention in order to add value for various stakeholders. The final chapter of the book describes a first step towards integrating the presented theories into an interdisciplinary framework for developing a grand workplace management theory.

The Economic Nature of the Firm
The Economic Nature of the Firm

Author: Randall S. Kroszner

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2009-09-21

Total Pages: 664

ISBN-13: 1316025233

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This book brings together classic writings on the economic nature and organization of firms, including works by Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson, and Michael Jensen and William Meckling, as well as more recent contributions by Paul Milgrom, Bengt Holmstrom, John Roberts, Oliver Hart, Luigi Zingales, and others. Part I explores the general theme of the firm's nature and place in the market economy; Part II addresses the question of which transactions are integrated under a firm's roof and what limits the growth of firms; Part III examines employer-employee relations and the motivation of labor; and Part IV studies the firm's organization from the standpoint of financing and the relationship between owners and managers. The volume also includes a consolidated bibliography of sources cited by these authors and an introductory essay by the editors that surveys the new institutional economics of the firm and issues raised in the anthology.