In America today, a public official's lawful income consists of a salary. But until a century ago, the law frequently authorized officials to make money on a profit-seeking basis. Prosecutors won a fee for each defendant convicted. Tax collectors received a cut of each evasion uncovered. Naval officers took a reward for each ship sunk. The list goes on. This book is the first to document American government's "for-profit" past, to discover how profit-seeking defined officials' relationship to the citizenry, and to explain how lawmakers-by banishing the profit motive in favor of the salary-transformed that relationship forever.
Most businesses are driven to maximize profit, but what does this drive really mean in action? In Profit Motive: What Drives the Things We Do economist Charles Sauer makes the case that identifying your own and others’ “Profit Motives” provides the foundation for running a successful business, being an effective leader, a good consumer, and getting what you really want out of life. In this highly praised new treatise on economic behavior, Sauer examines how businesses make decisions in pricing and employment and how the search for long-term profit can mean adopting practices that may seem contrary to fundamental capitalist principles. But the Profit Motive analysis goes well beyond the realm of finance and corporate decision-making to explain how gaining a profit, or a benefit, is the motivating force behind an endless array of choices made by everyone from large organizations to individuals and their families―and everything in between.
War Is a Racket is a speech and a 1935 short book, by Smedley D. Butler, a retired United States Marine Corps Major General and two-time Medal of Honor recipient. Based on his career military experience, Butler frankly discusses how business interests commercially benefit (including war profiteering) from warfare. He had been appointed commanding officer of the Gendarmerie during the United States occupation of Haiti, which lasted from 1915 to 1934.
A timeless classic of economic theory that remains fascinating and pertinent today, this is Frank Knight's famous explanation of why perfect competition cannot eliminate profits, the important differences between "risk" and "uncertainty," and the vital role of the entrepreneur in profitmaking. Based on Knight's PhD dissertation, this 1921 work, balancing theory with fact to come to stunning insights, is a distinct pleasure to read. FRANK H. KNIGHT (1885-1972) is considered by some the greatest American scholar of economics of the 20th century. An economics professor at the University of Chicago from 1927 until 1955, he was one of the founders of the Chicago school of economics, which influenced Milton Friedman and George Stigler.
The UK government in common with the governments of many Western countries is in the midst of implementing policies to reform education. However, the government has, as a matter of principle, decided that profit-making schools cannot provide state-funded education even if they would lead to substantial improvements in quality. This monograph makes the case for widespread acceptance of the profit motive in education. It does so not by presenting statistics that demonstrate that profit-making organisations could drive up quality there is already a substantial literatureon this. Instead, the authors show how profit-making organisations could create an entirely new dynamic of entrepreneurship and innovation. As well as improving quality and reducing costs within existing models, such an approach could lead to the development of completely new ways ofproviding education. The authors of this monograph have a range of international experience. Many of them have run profit-making schools in countries more accepting of the profit motive than the UK, suchas Sweden. Others have struggled against the odds to participate in education reform programmes in the UK. Overall, this collection makes an important contribution to the international debate about education reform
In this penetrating analysis, Bradford Gray tackles the thorny issues surrounding the question of to whom and for what our physicians and hospitals are accountable. This book provides a careful evaluation of the mechanisms of accountability that have developed along with a growing profit orientation of health care, and it alerts us to keep a sharp eye focused on who is looking out for the interests of the patient.
Today, the American administrative state is one in which public officials carry out their day-to-day tasks in return for a salary. However, as Nicholas Parrillo argued in his well-regarded book, Against the Profit Motive, the early American administrative state functioned quite differently -- “[j]udges charged fees for transactions in the cases they heard...Tax investigators received a percentage of the evasions they discovered...Clerks deciding immigrants' applications for citizenship took a fee for every application...Even diplomats could lawfully accept a 'gift' from a foreign government upon finalizing a treaty.”This prior system of compensation could be thought of as “profit seeking" -- a system of administration whereby public officials carry out their duties in return for payment on a task-by-task basis. This system assumedly contrasts with today's salary compensating, or “nonprofit seeking” system. In fact, it is generally accepted that, as to the profit/nonprofit seeking transition, at a certain point a confluence of factors made profit seeking no longer tenable within the administrative state, ultimately securing nonprofit seeking's supremacy. But, is this assertion really true?This paper challenges the currently accepted understanding of the administrative state's profit/nonprofit seeking transition -- as unidirectional and permanent one. Instead, clear evidence exists to prove that profit/nonprofit seeking transitions operate cyclically -- it is more often the case that given areas of administrative law swing between profit seeking and nonprofit seeking based on each system's utility. Furthermore, the cyclicality of these transitions has huge implications for how we think about statutory administration and that the private sector's role in it is significantly larger that currently understood.
