Is the judicial execution of the innocent permissible to deter crime? Some advocates of consequentialism would respond yes, while moral absolutists argue that certain kinds of conduct, including this one, are absolutely prohibited, no matter what the consequences. This is the first collection that does justice to absolutism in its richness and subtleties.
The central problem for normative ethics is the conflict between a consequentialist view--that morality requires promoting the good of all--and a belief that the rights of the individual place significant constraints on what may be done to help others. Standard interpretations see Kant as rejecting all forms of consequentialism, and defending a theory which is fundamentally duty-based and agent-centered. Certain actions, like sacrificing the innocent, are categorically forbidden. In this original and controversial work, Cummiskey argues that there is no defensible basis for this view, that Kant's own arguments actually entail a consequentialist conclusion. But this new form of consequentialism which follows from Kant's theories has a distinctly Kantian tone. The capacity of rational action is prior to the value of happiness; thus providing justification for the view that rational nature is more important than mere pleasures and pains.
This volume presents papers discussing arguments on both sides of the consequentialist debate. The distinguished contributors include John Rawls, Bernard Williams, Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, among others.
Begins by explaining and arguing for certain criteria for assessing normative moral theories. Then argues that these criteria lead to a rule-consequentialist moral theory.
The book addresses a dilemma at the heart of the 'War on Terror': is it ever justifiable to torture terrorists in order to save the lives of innocent civilians; the so-called 'ticking bomb' scenario?The book first analyzes the ticking bomb dilemma as a pure moral one, facing the individual would-be torturer. A 'never-say-never' utilitarian position is pitted against a 'minimal absolutist' view that some acts are never justifiable, and that torture is one such act.It then looks at the issues that arise once a state has decided to sanction torture in extreme situations: when, how, and whom to torture; the institutionalization of torture; its effects on society; and its efficacy in combatting terrorism in the shorter and longer runs.Four models of legalized torture are next examined-including current ones in Israel and the USA and the idea of torture warrants.Finally, related legal issues are analyzed; among them the lawfulness of coercive interrogation under international law and attempts to allow torture 'only' after the fact, for instance by applying the criminal law defence of necessity.A 'minimal absolutist' view - under which torture, whether by private individuals or by state officials, must be prohibited absolutely in law, policy and practice, and allowing no exceptions for ticking bomb situations - is defended throughout.
Providing a thorough introduction to current philosophical views on morality, Normative Ethics examines an acts rightness or wrongness in terms of such factors as consequences, harm, and consent. Shelly Kagan offers a division between moral factors and theoretical foundations that reflects the actual working practices of contemporary moral philosophers.Intended for upper-level or graduate students of philosophy, this book should also appeal to the general reader looking for a clearly written overview of the basic principles of moral philosophy. }Providing a thorough introduction to current philosophical views on morality, Normative Ethics examines an acts rightness or wrongness in light of such factors as consequences, harm, and consent. Shelly Kagan offers a division between moral factors and theoretical foundations that reflects the actual working practices of contemporary moral philosophers. The first half of the book presents a systematic survey of the basic normative factors, focusing on controversial questions concerning the precise content of each factor, its scope and significance, and its relationship to other factors. The second half of the book then examines the competing theories about the foundations of normative ethics, theories that attempt to explain why the basic normative factors have the moral significance that they do.Intended for upper-level or graduate students of philosophy, this book should also appeal to the general reader looking for a clearly written overview of the basic principles of moral philosophy.
The essays in Explorations of Value are drawn from work first presented at the 20th Conference of Value Inquiry. They are not mere records of conference presentations. The authors have reflected on their initial presentations. They have re-thought arguments in light of discussions at the conference. They have revised their work. All of this has combined to bring fresh ideas on important issues into carefully considered discussions. The nineteen authors of the essays do not share a common viewpoint on all problems of value inquiry. They are certainly not in agreement in their conclusions. Their concerns, however, cluster around a recognizable body of questions. Several of the authors raise fundamental questions on the nature of values and the possibility of giving them an objective status. Some of the authors raise questions about where value inquiry becomes value advocacy. They are also ready to ask whether or not advocacy is in the legitimate purview of philosophers. A number of authors set out to examine conditions of moral practice and of harming or benefiting people in general. Other authors show a concern for juxtaposing moral values and aesthetic values, in some cases to observe similarities, in some, differences. Finally, a few authors focus on particular notions such as forgiveness, intimacy, and love that are central to our lives.
Free Will, also known as Freedom of the Will, is appraised as the one of the greatest works ever produced in America. The mid-eighteenth-century New England philosophical theologian Jonathan Edwards (1703–58) defines the will by importing terms from John Locke. Edwards states the Arminian nature of free will, suspects the need for such free will, and finally defends Calvinist free will and objects to the Arminian one. In his argument, he chooses three British antagonists: Daniel Whitby, Thomas Chubb, and Isaac Watts. These antagonists insist that the self-determining will is necessary for us to be morally accountable. Edwards disputes their objections that God’s determination is contradictory to the liberty of the human will. He then goes to argue what kind of freedom of the will is necessary for the former and latter to be compatible. Edwards’s psychological, moral, and theological philosophy is displayed. In addition, readers can learn how our will chooses something pleasant by following the dictate of understanding, while the author demonstrates the natures of New England Arminianism and Calvinism.
This volume addresses whether, how, and where laws (variously defined) teach values and shape moral character in late modern liberal societies. Each author recognizes the essential value of state law in fostering peace, security, health, education, charity, trade, democracy, constitutionalism, justice, and human rights, among many other moral goods. Each author also recognizes, however, the grave betrayals of law in supporting fascism, slavery, apartheid, genocide, persecution, violence, racism, and other forms of immorality and injustice. They thus call for state laws that set a basic civil morality of duty for society and for robust freedoms that protect private individuals and private groups to cultivate a higher morality of aspiration. With contributions by Rüdiger Bittner, Brian Bix, Frank Brennan, Allen Calhoun, Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Kenneth John Crispin, Jean Bethke Elshtain, E. Allan Farnsworth, James E. Fleming, M. Cathleen Kaveny, Ute Mager, Linda C. McClain, Reid Mortensen, Patrick Parkinson, Thomas Pfeiffer, Robert Vosloo, Michael Welker, and John Witte, Jr.
