This chapter provides a description of the nowadays most commonly used methods for measuring earnings management in the accounting and finance literature. First, it covers the most important and commonly used models of accrual based earnings management (i.e., Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Teoh et al., 1998 a, b; DeFond and Park, 2001; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Larcker and Richardson, 2004; Kothari et al., 2005 and Dechow et al., 2012). In sequence, it describes the most important and commonly used models that examine real activities earnings management (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010). Finally, the chapter summarises briefly the most common determinants and motives for earnings management. On that basis, this chapter provides a practical guidance on how scholars can apply earnings management models, after considering their advantages and disadvantages. It also considers the suggested solutions offered in the literature, which aim to overcome problems in their implementation.
This book provides researchers and scholars with a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of earnings management theory and literature. While it raises new questions for future research, the book can be also helpful to other parties who rely on financial reporting in making decisions like regulators, policy makers, shareholders, investors, and gatekeepers e.g., auditors and analysts. The book summarizes the existing literature and provides insight into new areas of research such as the differences between earnings management, fraud, earnings quality, impression management, and expectation management; the trade-off between earnings management activities; the special measures of earnings management; and the classification of earnings management motives based on a comprehensive theoretical framework.
Master's Thesis from the year 2019 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, University of Duisburg-Essen, course: Master Thesis, language: English, abstract: This paper delves into various theories and approaches, aiming to define and differentiate earnings management from related concepts such as fraud, expectation management, and impression management. It explores the goals and incentives driving earnings management, including maximizing or minimizing earnings, beating targets, and smoothing. At the onset of the new millennium, corporate scandals rocked the business world, eroding trust in management, boards of directors, and the accounting profession. In response, regulations and policies aimed at enhancing corporate governance and financial reporting were swiftly implemented. The credibility, clarity, and consistency of financial reporting practices play a pivotal role in enabling investors to make informed decisions. Accurate and fair financial performance representations, as opposed to inflated and misleading figures, are essential for market players, including shareholders and creditors. Investors rely on audited financial reports to guide their investment decisions, underscoring the critical importance of accuracy and reliability in publicly available financial disclosures. Auditors, by reducing the risk of material misstatement, ensure the integrity of the information disclosed in a company's financial statements. Management, with the goal of achieving promised targets and ensuring the company's existence, may engage in earnings management as a strategic contribution to corporate policy. Financial reporting serves as a means to distinguish well-performing companies from their counterparts, facilitating efficient resource allocation and empowering stakeholders to make effective decisions. The disclosed earnings results significantly impact a firm's overall business activities and management decisions, particularly in satisfying analysts' expectations, which can influence equity value. While accounting standards play a role, the quality of financial statements is more influenced by company-specific and institutional factors shaping managers' incentives. These factors lead to financial reporting practices being viewed as the outcome of a cost-benefit assessment.
This paper develops a simple model to examine the dynamic relationship between earnings management and accounting regulations. In this model, current accrual-based earnings management affects the tightness of future regulations and managers rationally choose the levels of both accrual-based and real earnings management. We compare this dynamic model with the static one where the tightness of regulations is not affected by past levels of accrual-based earnings management and is, thus, constant over time. Our analysis reveals that accounting regulations directly affect relative costs of accrual-based and real earnings management in both static and dynamic settings, which is consistent with prior empirical and analytical studies. More importantly, we find that the impact of the change in manager's time horizon may be different for static and dynamic models of regulations. We also find that the initial state of the economy affects how managers adjust the levels of earnings management over time.
We examine earnings management behavior around SEOs, focusing on both real activities and accrual-based manipulation. Although research has addressed the issues of earnings management around SEOs and earnings management via real activities manipulation, ours is the first paper to put these two issues together. We make three contributions to the literature. First, we document that firms use real, as well as accrual-based, earnings management tools around SEOs. Second, we show how the tendency for firms to tradeoff real versus accrual-based earnings management activities around SEO s varies cross-sectionally. We find that firms choices vary predictably as a function of the firm s ability to use accrual management and the costs of doing so. Our model is a first step in examining how firms tradeoff between real versus accrual methods of earnings management. Third, we compare the economic costs of accrual versus real earnings management around SEO s, by examining the effect of each type of earnings management on the firm s future performance. We provide the first evidence on this important issue by showing that the costs of real earnings management are likely greater than the costs of accrual earnings management, at least in the SEO context.
Earnings management is an issue that directly affects the overall integrity and quality of financial reporting and to date, many studies have been conducted in an attempt to gain an understanding of whether firms are engaging in earnings management, why they do so, what are the motives that drive managers' discretionary behaviour, what are the economic consequences and whether investors can see through this behaviour? In this book, Chapter One reviews the developments and the trends in the contemporary earnings management research and discuss several possible avenues for future research. Chapter Two provides an overview of the most recent studies on earnings management in relation to the financial crisis and the institutional environment and firm characteristics. Chapter Three provides a description of the nowadays most commonly used methods for measuring earnings management in accounting and finance literature. Chapter Four examines earnings management and corporate social responsibility as an entrenchment strategy.
The beginning of the new millennium was characterized by company scandals in accounting around the world. A transparent and fair presentation of financial statements is beneficial for capital market participants. Especially around initial public offerings different incentives of these players exist to influence financial statements in diverse aspects. Therefore, studies of earnings management try to identify abnormal behavior. Peter Ising covers additional aspects to shed light on substantial drivers of discretionary reporting behavior around going public. Factors like influence on real activities, industry affiliation, and specific years in the IPO process add further insight to this theoretical and practical topic. The dependence on these factors is high and confirms that company specifics are important for interpretation of financial results.
Earnings management is a key issue for financial reporting. The purpose of this paper is to derive a set of indices to measure the pervasiveness of earnings management (PEM) using the properties of quarterly accrual volatility. The PEM index can be viewed as a quality measure of financial reporting and an effectiveness measure for financial monitoring. In contrast to mean-shifting studies in the literature, our measure based on accrual volatility yields two major advantages. First, it relieves us of the necessity of precise assumptions regarding economic events. Second, it provides a macro-perspective on the overall patterns in earnings management. The methodology based on accrual volatility can address issues like the earnings quality, the nature of the informational environment, and the effect of accounting standard setting. The seasonal pattern of accrual volatility can provide a trace of earnings management, even in the absence of further information about specific economic events and resulting managerial actions. Our working hypothesis is that pervasive earnings management leads to the first order stochastic dominance of fourth quarter accrual volatility over the other three quarters. We provide evidence on the relations between previously documented drivers of earnings management and seasonal accrual heteroskedasticity. These drivers include executive compensation, regulatory requirements, bond covenants, and political costs. This empirical support of our working hypothesis validates our application of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) Distance to measure the pervasiveness of earnings management (PEM). We use raw total accruals as the basis for measuring PEM1 and use residuals from Jones? [1991] model to control for mechanical factors in our measurement of PEM2. The usefulness of controls is an empirical issue. Our results suggest that additional controls do not add much power to detect earnings management over and above the simplest measure based on total accruals. KS Distance is powerful in detecting the difference around the central locations of two distributions, but not powerful at the tail ends. We develop two other measures for PEM. First, we estimate the fraction of fourth quarter accruals volatility exceeding the 95th percentile value for the first three quarters (base period) distribution. This fraction, reduced by 5%, constitutes PEM3. Second, we design a simulation method to determine PEM4 as the percentage of firms with a given magnitude of accrual adjustment for the base period accrual volatility to match that of the fourth quarter. Both PEM3 and PEM4 are estimates of percentage of firms involved in earnings management of a given magnitude. However, we should note here that our PEM indices are more likely ordinal than cardinal measures. Though our methods of measuring PEM rely on indirect measurement, we provide direct evidence on the relevance of our method through a series of external validation checks. First, we use a subsample of firms subject to SEC actions relating to alleged earnings manipulation. This data was collected from Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER's) by the SEC. We compare PEM?s for the AAER sample to PEM?s for the COMPUSTAT sample to assess the power of our measures. The PEM indices for the AAER sample are two to three times as large as the PEM indices for the COMPUSTAT sample. Though we avoid interpreting the relative magnitudes literally, these differences do suggest a positive correlation between our PEM indices and the degree of earnings management. Second, we conduct case studies for 10 firms identified by fourth quarter accrual volatility as strongly suspect of earnings management. These studies show that suspect firms frequently engage in activities associated with earnings management, such as CEO turnover, restructuring, public offerings, or they experience losses. Applying our PEM indices to COMPUSTAT data, we find that pervasiveness of earnings management has been relatively stable in the period of 1988-1996.
We document that accrual-based earnings management increased steadily from 1987 until the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, followed by a significant decline after the passage of SOX. Conversely, the level of real earnings management activities declined prior to SOX and increased significantly after the passage of SOX, suggesting that firms switched from accrual-based to real earnings management methods after the passage of SOX. We also find evidence that the accrual-based earnings management activities were particularly high in the period immediately preceding SOX. Consistent with these results, we find that firms that just achieved important earnings benchmarks used less accruals and more real earnings management after SOX when compared to similar firms before SOX. Finally, our analysis provides evidence that the increases in accrual-based earnings management in the period preceding SOX were concurrent with increases in the fraction of equity based compensation.
This study examines whether the trade-off between real and accrual-based management strategies differs between firms with and without political connections. We argue that politically-connected firms are more likely to substitute real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management than non-connected firms. Although real earnings management is more costly, we expect that politically connected firms prefer this strategy because of its higher secrecy and potential to mask political favors. Using a unique panel data set of 5,493 publicly traded firms in 30 countries, our results show that politically-connected firms are more likely to substitute real earnings management strategies for accrual-based earnings management strategies than non-connected firms. We also find that when public monitoring and therefore the risk of detection increases, politically connected firms are more likely to resort to less detectable real earnings management strategies. Our finding that political connections play a significant role in the choice between accrual-based and real earnings management strategies suggests that a focus only on accrual-based measurements underestimates the total earnings management activities of politically-connected firms.
