The paper presents a theoretical model to explain how debt overhang is generated in low-income countries and discusses its implications for debt relief. The paper indicates that the extent of debt overhang, and the effectiveness of debt relief, would depend on a recipient country's initial economic conditions and level of total factor productivity.
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, launched in 1999 by the IMF and the World Bank, was the first coordinated effort by the international financial community to reduce the foreign debt of the world’s poorest countries. It was based on the theory that economic growth in heavily indebted poor countries was being stifled by heavy debt burdens, making it virtually impossible for these countries to escape poverty. However, most of the empirical research on the effects of debt on growth has lumped together a diverse group of countries, and the literature on the countries’ impact of debt on poor is scant. This pamphlet presents the findings of the authors’ empirical research into the subject, analyzing the channels through which debt affects growth in low-income countries.
La conferencia se enfoco en el impacto de la deuda externa en paises de bajo ingreso, particularmente los paises pobres, pasos que se toman para tratar los problemas de la deuda y los flujos de capital privado. Este volumen reune las ponencias de estudiosos de universidades y de organizaciones de investigacion internacional y los miembros del Fondo y el Banco Mundial.
The general objective of this study is to analyze the external debt and debt burdens of the severely indebted sub-Saharan African countries, estimate the magnitude of capital flight from them, and relate the estimate of capital flight to some macroeconomic aggregates. The study also contains policy implications of international efforts to deal with the high levels of external debt in sub-Saharan Africa in conditions of extreme poverty, and stagnant and declining exports. It questions the theoretical foundation in which the external debt strategy has been based and offers solutions to the external debt problem.
June 1996 A group of heavily indebted low-income countries (HIPCs), most in Sub-Saharan Africa, has continued to experience external debt problems. Because the HIPCs' economic characteristics and external imbalances are very different from those of middle-income countries, the analysis of debt problems and debt-reduction must be modified and complemented in important ways. Therefore, the authors revisit the methodological issues underlying debt sustainability analysis, as well as theory and empirical evidence on how large debts affect economic performance. Their main question is: Should consideration be given to more upfront debt reduction for HIPCs, over and above that provided under current mechanisms, or should debts continue to be refinanced, subject to conditionality? Ongoing refinancing with conditionality reduces moral hazard and gives countries an incentive to maintain good policies. However, this approach entails transition costs, can create uncertainty, may lack credibility, and can impede local ownership of reform programs. Upfront debt reduction can create moral hazard problems and may weaken the incentives for maintaining sound policy. There are theoretical arguments about why a high level of debt can impede investment and policy reform. Although empirical evidence concerning the hypothesis that HIPCs suffer significant adverse effects from their large debt overhang is inconclusive, evidence from middle-income countries suggests that debt reduction can benefit an economy if the policy environment is right. Whether there should be further debt reduction for specific heavily indebted low-income countries depends on the facts for each case and requires quantitative analysis of data about different forces at play in the countries involved.
Do Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) suffer from a debt overhang? Is debt relief going to improve their growth rates? To answer these important questions, we look at how the debt-growth relationship varies with indebtedness levels and other country characteristics in a panel of developing countries. Our findings suggest that there is a negative marginal relationship between debt and growth at intermediate levels of debt, but not at very low debt levels, below the “debt overhang” threshold, or at very high levels, above the “debt irrelevance” threshold. Countries with good policies and institutions face overhang when debt rises above 15-30 percent of GDP, but the marginal effect of debt on growth becomes irrelevant above 70-80 percent. In countries with bad policies and institutions, overhang and irrelevance thresholds seem to be lower, but we cannot rule out the possibility that debt does not matter at all.
"The authors revisit the debt overhang question. They first use nonparametric techniques to isolate a panel of countries on the downward sloping section of a debt Laffer Curve. In particular, overhang countries are ones where a threshold level of debt is reached in sample, beyond which (initial) debt ends up lowering (subsequent) growth. On average, significantly negative coefficients appear when debt face value reaches 60 percent of GDP or 200 percent of exports, and when its present value reaches 40 percent of GDP or 140 percent of exports. Second, the authors depart from reduced form growth regressions and perform direct tests of the theory on the thus selected sample of overhang countries. In the spirit of event studies, they ask whether, as the overhang level of debt is reached: (1) investment falls precipitously as it should when it becomes optimal to default; (2) economic policy deteriorates observably, as it should when debt contracts become unable to elicit effort on the part of the debtor; and (3) the terms of borrowing worsen noticeably, as they should when it becomes optimal for creditors to preempt default and exact punitive interest rates. The authors find a systematic response of investment, particularly when property rights are weakly enforced, some worsening of the policy environment, and a fall in interest rates. This easing of borrowing conditions happens because lending by the private sector virtually disappears in overhang situations, and multilateral agencies step in with concessional rates. Thus, while debt relief is likely to improve economic policy (and especially investment) in overhang countries, it is doubtful that it would ease their terms of borrowing or the burden of debt. "--World Bank web site.
The effects of debt relief on incentives to accumulate debt, consume, and invest are an important concern for donors and recipients. Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy with a minimum consumption requirement and an endogenous relief probability, we show that excessive debt accumulation is consistent with an anticipation of a future debt relief. Simulations of the calibrated model using 1982-2006 Ugandan data suggest that debt-relief episodes are likely to have only a temporary impact on the level of debt in low-income countries, while being associated with more consumption and less invesment. The long-run debt-to-GDP ratio is estimated to be about twice as high with debt relief than without it.
