Brown offers an examination of the jurisprudence of a range of international courts and tribunals relating to issues of procedure and remedies, and assessment whether there are emerging commonalities regarding these issues which could make up a unified law of international adjudication.
Brown offers an examination of the jurisprudence of a range of international courts and tribunals relating to issues of procedure and remedies, and assessment whether there are emerging commonalities regarding these issues which could make up a unified law of international adjudication.
In A Nascent Common Law: The Process of Decisionmaking in International Legal Disputes Between States and Foreign Investors Frédéric Gilles Sourgens submits that investor-state dispute resolution relies upon an inductive, common law decisionmaking process, which reveals a necessary plurality of first principles within investor-state dispute resolution. Relying upon, amongst others, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, the book explains how this plurality of first principles does not devolve into arbitrary indeterminacy. A Nascent Common Law provides an alternative account to current theoretical conceptions of investor-state arbitration. It explains that these theories cannot adequately resolve a key empirical challenge: tribunals frequently reach facially inconsistent results on similar questions of law. Sourgens makes an inductive approach, focused on the manner of decisionmaking by tribunals in the context of specific records that can explain this inconsistency.
International courts and tribunals differ in their institutional composition and functions, but a shared characteristic is their reliance on the contribution of individuals other than the judicial decision-makers themselves. Such 'unseen actors' may take the form of registrars and legal officers, but also non-lawyers such as translators and scientific experts. Unseen actors are vital to the functioning of international adjudication, exerting varying levels of influence on judicial processes and outcomes. The opaqueness of their roles, combined with the significance of judicial decisions for the parties involved as well as a wider range of stakeholders, raises questions about unseen actors' impact on the legitimacy of international dispute settlement. This book aims to answer such legitimacy questions and identify 'best practices' through a multifaceted enquiry into common connections and patterns in the institutional composition and daily practice of international courts and tribunals.
The vast majority of all international judicial decisions have been issued since 1990. This increasing activity of international courts over the past two decades is one of the most significant developments within the international law. It has repercussions on all levels of governance and has challenged received understandings of the nature and legitimacy of international courts. It was previously held that international courts are simply instruments of dispute settlement, whose activities are justified by the consent of the states that created them, and in whose name they decide. However, this understanding ignores other important judicial functions, underrates problems of legitimacy, and prevents a full assessment of how international adjudication functions, and the impact that it has demonstrably had. This book proposes a public law theory of international adjudication, which argues that international courts are multifunctional actors who exercise public authority and therefore require democratic legitimacy. It establishes this theory on the basis of three main building blocks: multifunctionality, the notion of an international public authority, and democracy. The book aims to answer the core question of the legitimacy of international adjudication: in whose name do international courts decide? It lays out the specific problem of the legitimacy of international adjudication, and reconstructs the common critiques of international courts. It develops a concept of democracy for international courts that makes it possible to constructively show how their legitimacy is derived. It argues that ultimately international courts make their decisions, even if they do not know it, in the name of the peoples and the citizens of the international community.
One of the most noted developments in international law over the past twenty years is the proliferation of international courts and tribunals. They decide who has the right to exploit natural resources, define the scope of human rights, delimit international boundaries and determine when the use of force is prohibited. As the number and influence of international courts grow, so too do challenges to their legitimacy. This volume provides new interdisciplinary insights into international courts' legitimacy: what drives and undermines the legitimacy of these bodies? How do drivers change depending on the court concerned? What is the link between legitimacy, democracy, effectiveness and justice? Top international experts analyse legitimacy for specific international courts, as well as the links between legitimacy and cross-cutting themes. Failure to understand and respond to legitimacy concerns can endanger both the courts and the law they interpret and apply.
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice defines "international law" to include not only "custom" and "convention" between States but also "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" within their municipal legal systems. In 1953, Bin Cheng wrote his seminal book on general principles, identifying core legal principles common to various domestic legal systems across the globe. This monograph summarizes and analyzes the general principles of law and norms of international due process, with a particular focus on developments since Cheng's writing. The aim is to collect and distill these principles and norms in a single volume as a practical resource for international law jurists, advocates, and scholars. The information contained in this book holds considerable importance given the growth of inter-state intercourse resulting in the increased use of general principles over the past 60 years. General principles can serve as rules of decision, whether in interpreting a treaty or contract, determining causation, or ascertaining unjust enrichment. They also include a core set of procedural requirements that should be followed in any adjudicative system, such as the right to impartiality and the prohibition on fraud. Although the general principles are, by definition, basic and even rudimentary, they hold vital importance for the rule of law in international relations. They are meant not to define a rule of law, but rather the rule of law.
This volume arises from the inaugural Public Law Conference hosted in September 2014 by the Centre for Public Law at the University of Cambridge, which brought together leading public lawyers from a number of common law jurisdictions. While those from such jurisdictions share background understandings, significant differences within the common law world create opportunities for valuable exchanges of ideas and debate. This collection draws upon one of the principal sub-themes that emerged during the conference – namely, the the way in which relationships and distinctions between the notions of 'process' and 'substance' play out in relation to and inform adjudication in public law cases. The essays contained in this volume address those issues from a variety of perspectives. While the bulk of the chapters consider topical issues in judicial review, either on common law or human rights grounds, or both, other chapters adopt more theoretical, historical, empirical or contextual approaches. Concluding chapters reflect generally on the papers in the collection and the value of facilitating cross-jurisdictional dialogue.