Over the past several decades, increases in acquisition costs for U.S. Navy combatants have outpaced the rate of inflation. To understand why, the authors of this book examined two principal source categories of ship cost escalation (economy-driven factors and customer-driven factors) and interviewed various shipbuilders. Based on their analysis, the authors propose some ways the Navy might reduce ship costs in the future.
Over the past four decades, the growth of U.S. Navy ship costs has exceeded the rate of inflation. This cost escalation concerns many in the Navy and the government. The real growth in Navy ship costs means that ships are becoming more expensive and outstripping the Navy's ability to pay for them. Given current budget constraints, the Navy is unlikely to see an increase in its shipbuilding budget. Therefore, unless some way is found to get more out of a fixed shipbuilding budget, ship cost escalation means that the size of the Navy will inevitably shrink. In fact, by some estimates, even boosting the shipbuilding budget from $10 billion annually to $12 billion would only help the Navy achieve a fleet of 260 ships by the year 2035 rather than the nearly 290 it now has (CBO, 2005). To better understand the magnitude of ship cost escalation and its implications, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations asked the RAND Corporation to explore several questions. These include the magnitude of cost escalation, how ship cost escalation compares with other areas of the economy and other weapon systems, the sources of cost escalation, and what might be done to reduce or minimize ship cost escalation.
Updated 12/10/2020: In December 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that callsfor achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers. The 355-shipgoal was made U.S. policy by Section 1025 of the FY2018 National Defense AuthorizationAct (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115- 91 of December 12, 2017). The Navy and the Department of Defense(DOD) have been working since 2019 to develop a successor for the 355-ship force-level goal.The new goal is expected to introduce a new, more distributed fleet architecture featuring asmaller proportion of larger ships, a larger proportion of smaller ships, and a new third tier oflarge unmanned vehicles (UVs). On December 9, 2020, the Trump Administration released a document that can beviewed as its vision for future Navy force structure and/or a draft version of the FY202230-year Navy shipbuilding plan. The document presents a Navy force-level goal that callsfor achieving by 2045 a Navy with a more distributed fleet architecture, 382 to 446 mannedships, and 143 to 242 large UVs. The Administration that takes office on January 20, 2021,is required by law to release the FY2022 30-year Navy shipbuilding plan in connection withDOD's proposed FY2022 budget, which will be submitted to Congress in 2021. In preparingthe FY2022 30-year shipbuilding plan, the Administration that takes office on January 20,2021, may choose to adopt, revise, or set aside the document that was released on December9, 2020. The Navy states that its original FY2021 budget submission requests the procurement ofeight new ships, but this figure includes LPD-31, an LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ship thatCongress procured (i.e., authorized and appropriated procurement funding for) in FY2020.Excluding this ship, the Navy's original FY2021 budget submission requests the procurementof seven new ships rather than eight. In late November 2020, the Trump Administrationreportedly decided to request the procurement of a second Virginia-class attack submarinein FY2021. CRS as of December 10, 2020, had not received any documentation from theAdministration detailing the exact changes to the Virginia-class program funding linesthat would result from this reported change. Pending the delivery of that information fromthe administration, this CRS report continues to use the Navy's original FY2021 budgetsubmission in its tables and narrative discussions.
CSIS senior adviser Mark Cancian annually produces a series of white papers on U.S. military forces, including their composition, new initiatives, long-term trends, and challenges. This report is a compilation of these papers and takes a deep look at each of the military services, the new Space Force, special operations forces, DOD civilians, and contractors in the FY 2021 budget. This report further includes a foreword regarding how the Biden administration might approach decisions facing the military forces, drawing on insights from the individual chapters.
From a broad, historical perspective, the dreadnought represents an archetype, and its history a kind of moral tale. Its awesome size, its formidable presence, and its immense power have gained it tremendous respect, loyalty, and, as Robert O'Connell shows in this myth-shattering book, unwarranted longevity as well. With provocative insight and wit he offers us an irreverent history of the modern battleship and its place in American history, from the sinking of the coal-fueled Maine in 1898 to the deployment of the cruise missile-armed Missouri in the Persian Gulf War of 1991. The modern navies were the first of the armed services faced with fundamental and abrupt technological change. The wooden sailing ships that had fought sea battles for nearly two centuries were, in only a few years, rendered obsolete by a veritable tidal wave of innovation. With the deployment of the revolutionary HMS Dreadnought in 1903, the new technology reached its full fruition: the gigantic sleek, steel-clad, many-gunned vessel that would rule the seas (or at least the minds of Naval commanders) for years to come. O'Connell shows how other nations raced to emulate this new prototype (much in the fashion of the nuclear arms race of later decades), usually at the expense of much more effective forms of naval force. He also demonstrates compellingly the dashed expectations for the battleship occasioned by the outbreak of war in 1914. While many anticipated a massive twentieth-century Trafalgar, in actuality dreadnoughts everywhere avoided battle, and when they did fight, the results were most often inconclusive or even irrelevant. With the Battle of Jutland in 1916--the only real naval showdown of the war--the ineffectiveness of the battleship as the pre-eminent weapon of war was made abundantly clear: the German navy scored on only 120 hits out of 3,597 heavy shells fired while the British had an even more dismal showing--100 out of 4,598, or a hit ratio of 2.17%. Yet, in spite of this display of impotence, the world's great naval yards continued to turn out the huge vessels. O'Connell observes that even after the heart of the American fleet was sunk by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, the almost superstitious faith in the battleship insured its survival. While they have never played a decisive role in the outcome of any modern war, they have continued to be resurrected and refurbished--even equipped with cruise missles--right up to the present day. Sacred Vessels is more than the unmasking of a false idol of naval history. It is a cautionary tale about the often unacknowledged influence of human faith, culture, and tradition on the exceedingly important, costly, and suppossedly rational process of national defense. Not only is it a gripping tale well-told, it is essential reading for anyone hoping to understand the dynamics involved in the arming of nations.
Discusses the challenges that the Navy is facing in its plans for building its future fleet. This testimony examined these matters: (1) the Navy¿s draft shipbuilding plan for fiscal year 2011; (2) the effect that replacing Ohio class submarines with a new class of submarines will have on the Navy¿s shipbuilding program; and (3) the number of ships that may be needed to support ballistic missile defense from the sea. Before discussing those issues, the author briefly recaps an analysis of the 2009 shipbuilding plan as a point of departure for examining the draft 2011 plan. Charts and tables.
The U.S. academic research fleet is an essential national resource, and it is likely that scientific demands on the fleet will increase. Oceanographers are embracing a host of remote technologies that can facilitate the collection of data, but will continue to require capable, adaptable research vessels for access to the sea for the foreseeable future. Maintaining U.S. leadership in ocean research will require investing in larger and more capable general purpose Global and Regional class ships; involving the scientific community in all phases of ship design and acquisition; and improving coordination between agencies that operate research fleets.
The Navy¿s FY 2011-2015 shipbuilding plan calls for procuring an 11th and final San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship in FY 2012. The Navy estimates the procurement cost of this ship at $2 billion. The ship received $184 million in FY 2010 advance procurement funding, and the Navy plans to request the remaining $1.9 billion of the cost in the FY 2012 budget. Accordingly, the Navy¿s proposed FY 2011 budget does not request any procurement funding for the LPD-17 program. Contents of this report: (1) Intro.; (2) Amphibious Ships in General; LPD-17 Program; (3) Issues for Congress. Appendix A. Amphibious Lift Goal; Appendix B. LPD-17 Cost Growth and Construction Problems. Illus. This is a print on demand report.
In 2015, the Australian government will produce a new Defence White Paper to outline revised and refined defense objectives. As it prepares the new report, a basic question facing the government is whether Australia should buy ships from foreign shipbuilders or support a domestic naval shipbuilding industry. This question is complex, containing many facets and issues that often center on cost trade-offs and economic considerations, but that also touch upon important national and strategic concerns.
