Over the past several decades, increases in acquisition costs for U.S. Navy combatants have outpaced the rate of inflation. To understand why, the authors of this book examined two principal source categories of ship cost escalation (economy-driven factors and customer-driven factors) and interviewed various shipbuilders. Based on their analysis, the authors propose some ways the Navy might reduce ship costs in the future.
Over the past four decades, the growth of U.S. Navy ship costs has exceeded the rate of inflation. This cost escalation concerns many in the Navy and the government. The real growth in Navy ship costs means that ships are becoming more expensive and outstripping the Navy's ability to pay for them. Given current budget constraints, the Navy is unlikely to see an increase in its shipbuilding budget. Therefore, unless some way is found to get more out of a fixed shipbuilding budget, ship cost escalation means that the size of the Navy will inevitably shrink. In fact, by some estimates, even boosting the shipbuilding budget from $10 billion annually to $12 billion would only help the Navy achieve a fleet of 260 ships by the year 2035 rather than the nearly 290 it now has (CBO, 2005). To better understand the magnitude of ship cost escalation and its implications, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations asked the RAND Corporation to explore several questions. These include the magnitude of cost escalation, how ship cost escalation compares with other areas of the economy and other weapon systems, the sources of cost escalation, and what might be done to reduce or minimize ship cost escalation.
The cost of U.S. Navy ships has risen faster than inflation indexes in recent decades. These cost increases are similar to those for other weapon systems and are driven in part by increasing complexity of ships. To reduce costs, the Navy may wish to consider stable or modular designs, slower increases in complexity, or mission-focused ships, or even to change how it purchases ships (e.g., make multiyear buys). Some manufacturing investments for greater efficiency in production can help reduce costs as well.
Since the end of the Cold War, the perceived need for Navy ships has dropped, and so the shipbuilding budget has dropped. Seemingly coincidental with this budgetary pressure, and perversely aggravating the problem, ship costs began to rise steeply. We will set aside that ships have grown in weight by about three percent per year since World War II and that ever- more weapon systems are being put into them, and confine ourselves to discussions of costs rising for ships beyond the increase in content. We will also set aside rises due to commodity prices and inflation and that fewer ships, divided among a fixed industrial base, reduce the base for overhead and reduce opportunity for the effects of quantity-driven learning; these effects are well understood, and yet cost growth in ships exceeds that which they explain. This paper will show two additional effects, each of which causes ship direct labor to rise in a way that has never been adequately modeled. The paper will demonstrate, via a statistically significant model, cost growth both from loss of learning due to increased time between ship starts as well as from the lessening of efficiency due to inexperienced labor caused by fluctuating demand.
The Navy¿s FY 2011-2015 shipbuilding plan calls for procuring an 11th and final San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship in FY 2012. The Navy estimates the procurement cost of this ship at $2 billion. The ship received $184 million in FY 2010 advance procurement funding, and the Navy plans to request the remaining $1.9 billion of the cost in the FY 2012 budget. Accordingly, the Navy¿s proposed FY 2011 budget does not request any procurement funding for the LPD-17 program. Contents of this report: (1) Intro.; (2) Amphibious Ships in General; LPD-17 Program; (3) Issues for Congress. Appendix A. Amphibious Lift Goal; Appendix B. LPD-17 Cost Growth and Construction Problems. Illus. This is a print on demand report.