This ambitious work presents a critique of traditional welfare theory and proposes a new approach to it. Radical economists Robin Hahnel and Michael Albert argue that an improved theory of social welfare can consolidate and extend recent advances in microeconomic theory, and generate exciting new results as well. The authors show that once the traditional "welfare paradigm" is appropriately modified, a revitalized welfare theory can clarify the relationship between individual and social rationalitya task that continues to be of interest to mainstream and nonmainstream economists alike. Hahnel and Albert show how recent work in the theory of the labor process, externalities, public goods, and endogenous preferences can advance research in welfare theory. In a series of important theorems, the authors extend the concept of Pareto optimality to dynamic contexts with changing preferences and thus highlight the importance of institutional bias. This discussion provides the basis for further analysis of the properties and consequences of private and public enterprise and of markets and central planning. Not surprisingly, Hahnel and Albert reach a number of conclusions at odds with conventional wisdom. Originally published in 1990. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
The Welfare Economics of Public Policy is a great book that should be of interest to all economists interested in applied welfare analysis. It is a good reference book for economists studying the effects of public policy. Finally, it should be a useful textbook for students studying economic policy and applied welfare economics. Jean-Paul Chavas, American Journal of Agricultural Economics . . . a very comprehensive overview of the state of the art in welfare economics. It can be used as a teaching book for advanced students as well as a reference volume for researchers. This duality of possible uses is supported by the fact that very complex issues are presented in an easily readable manner. More technical aspects are then outlined in the appendices of the relevant chapters, offering colleagues the option to study formal considerations in more detail. . . a welcome addition to and expression of the knowledge base of agricultural economics. Stefan Mann, Journal of Agricultural Economics I am absolutely delighted that the authors have revised and republished this text. I have used the previous version for years in my graduate environmental economics course; usually I had to share the one copy I have with students and I felt it was a shame that these students did not have the opportunity to purchase the book since every serious environmental economist should have this volume on their shelf. It has been a continuous reference volume for me over the years and I am sure this is true of many others in the discipline. In the field of applied welfare analysis (spanning environmental economics, international trade, agricultural policy, etc.) there is no need for further elaboration when Just, Hueth and Schmitz is referenced. Everyone knows the book that is being referred to: the bible of applied welfare economics. Catherine Kling, Iowa State University, US For the record, I am one of the people who requested that the authors revise and re-issue their textbook. It is an extremely valuable book for applied economists; as with the previous edition, I will use it extensively in two of my courses and consult it frequently in my own research endeavors. Richard Adams, Oregon State University, US The original book is very well known in our profession and is still used in many classes. It will be wonderful to have a revised edition of this classic book. Colin Carter, University of California, Davis, US This outstanding text, a follow-up to the authors award-winning 1982 text, provides a thorough treatment of economic welfare theory and develops a complete theoretical and empirical framework for applied project and policy evaluation. The authors illustrate how this theory can be used to develop policy analysis from both theory and estimation in a variety of areas including: international trade, the economics of technological change, agricultural economics, the economics of information, environmental economics, and the economics of extractive and renewable natural resources. Building on willingness-to-pay (WTP) measures as the foundation for applied welfare economics, the authors develop measures for firms and households where households are viewed as both consumers and owner/sellers of resources. Possibilities are presented for (1) approximating WTP with consumer surplus, (2) measuring WTP exactly subject to errors in existing econometric work, and (3) using duality theory to specify econometric equations consistent with theory. Later chapters cover specific areas of welfare measurement under imperfect competition, uncertainty, incomplete information, externalities, and dynamic considerations. Applications are considered explicitly for policy issues related to information, international trade, the environment, agriculture, and other natural resource issues. The Welfare Economics of Public Policy is ideal for graduate and undergraduate courses in applied welfare economics, public policy, agricultural policy, and environmental economi
This book covers the main topics of welfare economics — general equilibrium models of exchange and production, Pareto optimality, un certainty, externalities and public goods — and some of the major topics of social choice theory — compensation criteria, fairness, voting. Arrow's Theorem, and the theory of implementation. The underlying question is this: "Is a particular economic or voting mechanism good or bad for society?" Welfare economics is mainly about whether the market mechanism is good or bad; social choice is largely about whether voting mechanisms, or other more abstract mechanisms, can improve upon the results of the market. This second edition updates the material of the first, written by Allan Feldman. It incorporates new sections to existing first-edition chapters, and it includes several new ones. Chapters 4, 6, 11, 15 and 16 are new, added in this edition. The first edition of the book grew out of an undergraduate welfare economics course at Brown University. The book is intended for the undergraduate student who has some prior familiarity with microeconomics. However, the book is also useful for graduate students and professionals, economists and non-economists, who want an overview of welfare and social choice results unburdened by detail and mathematical complexity. Welfare economics and social choice both probably suffer from ex cessively technical treatments in professional journals and monographs.
The papers here range from description and analysis of how our political economy allocates its inventive effort, to studies of the decision making process in specific industrial laboratories. Originally published in 1962. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
This book examines the implications of The General Theory of Second Best for analyzing the economic efficiency of non-government conduct or government policies in an economically efficient way. It develops and legitimates an economically efficient economic-efficiency-analysis protocol with three unique characteristics: First, the protocol focuses separately on each of a wide variety of categories of economic inefficiency, many of which conventional analyses ignore. Second, it analyzes the impact of conduct or policies on each of these categories of economic inefficiency, primarily by predicting the respective conduct’s/policy’s impact on the distortion that the economy’s various Pareto imperfections generate in the profits yielded by the resource allocations associated with the individual categories of economic inefficiency—i.e., on the difference between their profitability and economic efficiency. And third, it is third-best—i.e., it instructs the analyst to execute a theoretical or empirical research project if and only if the economic-efficiency gains the project is expected to generate by increasing the accuracy of economic-efficiency conclusions exceed the predicted allocative cost of its execution and public financing. The book also uses the protocol to analyze the economic efficiency of specific policies so as to illustrate both how it differs from the protocols that most applied welfare economists continue to use and how its conclusions differ from those produced by standard analysis.
Economists have a bad reputation. Not only do they assume that everyone is self-interested and amoral, they are almost always cheerleaders for the free market. As a result, most people who do not already share their beliefs ignore everything that economists have to say. This is a problem. Even among the highly educated, economics is a minefield of fallacies and errors. Among those who know little about the subject—a group that includes the average taxpayer and consumer, as well as most journalists, political activists and politicians—almost every widely held belief is false. The level of economic illiteracy is stunning. Filthy Lucre aims to level the playing field and, in this time of enormous market volatility and unprecedented instability, raise our level of economic literacy. Drawing on everyday examples to skewer the six favourite economic fallacies of the right and then the left, we learn why the right wing so wrongly believes that capitalism is the natural order of things, that any tax cut is a good tax cut, and that personal responsibility can solve any problem. And, contrary to how the left feels, why we must resist the urge to fiddle with prices, why the pursuit of profit is not such a bad thing, and why, despite efforts to improve or even fix wages, some jobs will always suck.
This clear and balanced introduction to welfare economics reflects the most recent advances in the field. Designed for third-year undergraduate and graduate courses, it offers an extensive treatment of both the theory of welfare economics and the techniques for applying that theory to real problems. The first part of the book presents a synthesis of the theory. Starting from the premise that the purpose of theory is to provide criteria for ordering alternative economic states, the authors analyse the relationship between individual and social orderings. They discuss the conditions of Pareto efficiency and optimality as well as the ways in which market economies may fail to achieve a Pareto optimal allocation of resources. They go on to evaluate the theory of social welfare functions, paying particular attention to recent developments. The second part of the book considers the principles of applied welfare economics. Developing the use of the compensating variation as their main tool, the authors discuss welfare change measurement in single-person and many-person economies. In the final chapter they survey the recent literature on cost-benefit analysis.
Psychologists, economists, historians, computer scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and legal scholars explore the conscious choice not to seek information. The history of intellectual thought abounds with claims that knowledge is valued and sought, yet individuals and groups often choose not to know. We call the conscious choice not to seek or use knowledge (or information) deliberate ignorance. When is this a virtue, when is it a vice, and what can be learned from formally modeling the underlying motives? On which normative grounds can it be judged? Which institutional interventions can promote or prevent it? In this book, psychologists, economists, historians, computer scientists, sociologists, philosophers, and legal scholars explore the scope of deliberate ignorance.