Market Structure, Strike Activity, and Union Wage Settlements
Market Structure, Strike Activity, and Union Wage Settlements

Author: John M. Abowd

Publisher:

Published: 1988

Total Pages: 72

ISBN-13:

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We attempt a synthesis of the industrial relations market structure hypothesis with the modern asymmetric information theory of wage and strike outcomes The industrial relations literature contains a variety of arguments indicating that wage settlements should be positively related to the degree of product market sales concentration and the degree of product market coverage by the union. An asymmetric information bargaining model is specified that relates these same variables to strike probabilities as well as wage settlements. Our empirical analysis is conducted for :he periods from 1970-1380 (strikes) and 1976-1980 (wages). We find that the relation between trade-adjusted sales concentration and wage settlements is positive at low levels of concentration but negative at high levels of concentration. The relation is always negative for strike probabilities. We also find that the relation between the trade-adjusted percent of the product market covered by the same union and the percentage covered by other union are positively related to both wage settlements and strike probabilities. Our empirical analysis includes a rich set of controls including unrestricted time and industry effects, which do not affect the major conclusions.

United States Code
United States Code

Author: United States

Publisher:

Published: 2013

Total Pages: 1506

ISBN-13:

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"The United States Code is the official codification of the general and permanent laws of the United States of America. The Code was first published in 1926, and a new edition of the code has been published every six years since 1934. The 2012 edition of the Code incorporates laws enacted through the One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session, the last of which was signed by the President on January 15, 2013. It does not include laws of the One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, enacted between January 2, 2013, the date it convened, and January 15, 2013. By statutory authority this edition may be cited "U.S.C. 2012 ed." As adopted in 1926, the Code established prima facie the general and permanent laws of the United States. The underlying statutes reprinted in the Code remained in effect and controlled over the Code in case of any discrepancy. In 1947, Congress began enacting individual titles of the Code into positive law. When a title is enacted into positive law, the underlying statutes are repealed and the title then becomes legal evidence of the law. Currently, 26 of the 51 titles in the Code have been so enacted. These are identified in the table of titles near the beginning of each volume. The Law Revision Counsel of the House of Representatives continues to prepare legislation pursuant to 2 U.S.C. 285b to enact the remainder of the Code, on a title-by-title basis, into positive law. The 2012 edition of the Code was prepared and published under the supervision of Ralph V. Seep, Law Revision Counsel. Grateful acknowledgment is made of the contributions by all who helped in this work, particularly the staffs of the Office of the Law Revision Counsel and the Government Printing Office"--Preface.

The Effects of Product Market Competition on Collective Bargaining Agreements
The Effects of Product Market Competition on Collective Bargaining Agreements

Author: John M. Abowd

Publisher:

Published: 1991

Total Pages: 25

ISBN-13:

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In this paper we study the connections between product .market conditions. negotiated wage settlements. and union employment in the presence of foreign competition shocks. We exploit the fact that in a small open economy such as Canada the price of imports and exports should represent pure demand shocks. We specify wage and employment determination equations for a sample of collective bargaining agreements from 1965 to 1983. Our estimation strategy consists of specifying the wage as a function of firm-specific value added per worker instrumented with the price of imports and the price of exports in the industry. The OLS specification is rejected in favor of the instrumental variables specification using standard specification tests. The instrumental variables estimates imply that a 1% change in value-added per worker increases the negotiated wage settlements by 0.25%. Similarly, we specify union employment as a function of firm-specific sales instrumented by the price of imports and exports in the industry. The instrumental variables estimates are imprecise and the specification test fails to reject the OLS specification. The OLS estimates imply that a 1% change in firm-specific sales increases employment by 0.19%. We use our estimates to trace the effects of foreign competition on the industry and firm-level sales and value-added measures.