Iraq and Vietnam
Author: Jeffrey Record
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
Published: 2004
Total Pages: 76
ISBN-13: 1428910387
DOWNLOAD EBOOKRead and Download eBook Full
Author: Jeffrey Record
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
Published: 2004
Total Pages: 76
ISBN-13: 1428910387
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: David Ryan
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2007-01-24
Total Pages: 458
ISBN-13: 1134135270
DOWNLOAD EBOOKMore than most post-1970 conflicts involving US forces, the conflict in Iraq has been fought out against a background of frequently invoked memories from the era of the Vietnam War. The essays in this book offer a series of perspectives on connections and parallels between the Vietnam War and the 2003 invasion of, and conflict in, Iraq. The contributors particularly examine the impact of the Vietnam analogy on the War in Iraq, assessing the military tactical lessons learned from the Vietnam War and exploring the influence and persistence of its legacy in US politics, culture and diplomacy. The volume holds up to original interrogation some commonly held assumptions about historical analogy, and several distinguished authorities on the Vietnam War era, in particular, offer their thoughts on the value and applicability of Vietnam-Iraq parallels. If most contributions point out some obvious dissimilarities between the two eras, notably the transformed post-Cold War international environment, the similarities, particularly those relating to the problems of cultural misunderstanding, are also apparent. Vietnam in Iraq will be of great interest for all students and researchers of the Iraq War, strategic studies, international relations and American politics.
Author: Lloyd C. Gardner
Publisher: New Press, The
Published: 2008-06-01
Total Pages: 336
ISBN-13: 1595583459
DOWNLOAD EBOOKFrom the launch of the "Shock and Awe" invasion in March 2003 through President George W. Bush's declaration of "Mission Accomplished" two months later, the war in Iraq was meant to demonstrate definitively that the United States had learned the lessons of Vietnam. This new book makes clear that something closer to the opposite is true--that U.S. foreign policy makers have learned little from the past, even as they have been obsessed with the "Vietnam Syndrome." Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam brings together the country's leading historians of the Vietnam experience. Examining the profound changes that have occurred in the country and the military since the Vietnam War, celebrated historians Marilyn B. Young and Lloyd Gardner have assembled a distinguished group to consider how America has again found itself in the midst of a war in which there is no chance of a speedy victory or a sweeping regime change. Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam explores how the "Vietnam Syndrome" fits into the contemporary debate about the purpose and exercise of American power in the world. With contributions from some of the most renowned analysts of American history and foreign policy, this is an essential recovery of the forgotten and misbegotten lessons of Vietnam. Contributors: Christian G. Appy Andrew J. Bacevich David Elliott Alex Danchev Elizabeth L. Hillman Gabriel Kolko Walter LaFeber Wilfried Mausbach Alfred W. McCoy Gareth Porter John Prados Marilyn B. Young
Author: Teddy Bitner
Publisher: Lulu.com
Published: 2007-03-01
Total Pages: 228
ISBN-13: 1411656369
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis book reviews America's journey from Vietnam to the War on Terror. Bitner assesses the myths of Vietnam and Iraq, the impact of the "Reagan Doctrine" on the end of the Cold War, and surveys America's wars of the 1990's.
Author: Lloyd C. Gardner
Publisher: The New Press
Published: 2011-07-19
Total Pages: 479
ISBN-13: 1595587373
DOWNLOAD EBOOKEssays by Christian G. Appy, Andrew J. Bacevich, John Prados, and others offer “history at its best, meaning, at its most useful.” —Howard Zinn From the launch of the “Shock and Awe” invasion in March 2003 through President George W. Bush’s declaration of “Mission Accomplished” two months later, the war in Iraq was meant to demonstrate definitively that the United States had learned the lessons of Vietnam. This new book makes clear that something closer to the opposite is true—that US foreign policy makers have learned little from the past, even as they have been obsessed with the “Vietnam Syndrome.” Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam brings together the country’s leading historians of the Vietnam experience. Examining the profound changes that have occurred in the country and the military since the Vietnam War, this book assembles a distinguished group to consider how America found itself once again in the midst of a quagmire—and the continuing debate about the purpose and exercise of American power. Also includes contributions from: Alex Danchev * David Elliott * Elizabeth L. Hillman * Gabriel Kolko * Walter LaFeber * Wilfried Mausbach * Alfred W. McCoy * Gareth Porter “Essential.” —Bill Moyers
Author: Andrew Hoskins
Publisher: A&C Black
Published: 2004-06-15
Total Pages: 164
ISBN-13: 9780826473066
DOWNLOAD EBOOKOur relationship with the past-whether judgment, celebration, commemoration or denial—has become an important part of public culture. This book explores the relationship between televisual communication and memory—focusing on the conflicts that have disrupted and changed our world over the past 50 years—with particular reference to the current war in Iraq. Case studies cover the Holocaust, Vietnam, both Gulf Wars and Kosovo. Though the Vietnam War was extensively televised, it was framed within a domestic U.S. context. By the time of the latest Gulf War and Kosovo the coverage of warfare was both more immediate and more global. Hoskins illustrates this with a comparative critique of individual countries' national media framing of war (including Middle Eastern perspectives) in contrast to the so-called "global" viewpoint of satellite news networks such as CNN. Televising War examines the intertwining of self, society and media that influences our understanding of both past and present.
Author: Christine Sylvester
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2019-03-04
Total Pages: 240
ISBN-13: 0190840579
DOWNLOAD EBOOKWe have long saved--and curated--objects from wars to commemorate the war experience. These objects appear at national museums and memorials and are often mentioned in war novels and memoirs. Through them we institutionalize narratives and memories of national identity, as well as international power and purpose. While people interpret war in different ways, and there is no ultimate authority on the experiences of any war, curators of war objects make different choices about what to display or write about, none of which are entirely problematic, good, or accurate. This book asks whose vantage points on war are made available, and where, for public consumption; it also questions whose war experiences are not represented, are minimized, or ignored in ways that advantage contemporary militarism. Christine Sylvester looks at four sites of war memory-the National Museum of American History, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Arlington National Cemetery, and selected novels and memoirs of the American wars in Vietnam and Iraq-to consider the way war knowledge is embedded in differing sites of memory and display. While the museum shows war aircraft and a laptop computer used by a journalist covering the American war in Iraq, visitors to the Vietnam Memorial or Arlington Cemetery find more prosaic and civilian items on view, such as baby pictures, slices of birthday cake, or even car keys. In addition, memoirs and novels of these wars tend to curate ghastly horrors of wars as experienced by soldiers or civilians. For Sylvester, these sites of war memory and curation provide ways to understand dispersed war authority and interpretation and to consider which sites invite viewers to revere a war and which reflect personal experiences that show the undersides of these wars. Sylvester shows that scholars, policymakers, and other citizens need to consider different types of situated memory and knowledge in order to fully grasp war, rather than idealize it.
Author: James H. Lebovic
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2019-03-07
Total Pages: 240
ISBN-13: 0190935332
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe United States national-security establishment is vast, yet the United States has failed to meet its initial objectives in almost every one of its major, post-World War II conflicts. Of these troubled efforts, the US wars in Vietnam (1965-73), Iraq (2003-11), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and miscalculated decisions. Because overarching policy goals are distant and open to interpretation, policymakers ground their decisions in the immediate world of short-term objectives, salient tasks, policy constraints, and fixed time schedules. As a consequence, they exaggerate the benefits of their preferred policies, ignore the accompanying costs and requirements, and underappreciate the benefits of alternatives. In Planning to Fail, James H. Lebovic argues that a profound myopia helps explain US decision-making failures. In each of the wars explored in this book, he identifies four stages of intervention. First and foremost, policymakers chose unwisely to go to war. After the fighting began, they inadvisably sought to extend or expand the mission. Next, they pursued the mission, in abbreviated form, to suboptimal effect. Finally, they adapted the mission to exit from the conflict. Lebovic argues that US leaders were effectively planning to fail whatever their hopes and thoughts were at the time the intervention began. Decision-makers struggled less than they should have, even when conditions allowed for good choices. Then, when conditions on the ground left them with only bad choices, they struggled furiously and more than could ever matter. Policymakers allowed these wars to sap available capabilities, push US forces to the breaking point, and exhaust public support. They finally settled for terms of departure that they (or their predecessors) would have rejected at the start of these conflicts. Offering a far-ranging and detailed analysis, this book identifies an unmistakable pattern of failure and highlights lessons we can learn from it.
Author: Robert K. Brigham
Publisher: PublicAffairs
Published: 2006-08-28
Total Pages: 224
ISBN-13: 9781586484132
DOWNLOAD EBOOKSince the first days of the Iraqi invasion, supporters of the war have cautioned the public not to view this conflict as another Vietnam. They rightfully point to many important distinctions. There is no unified resistance in Iraq. No political or religious leader has been able to galvanize opposition to U.S. intervention the way that Ho Chi Minh did in Vietnam. And it is not likely that 580,000 American troops will find their way to Iraq. However, there are two similarities that may dwarf the thousands of differences. First, in Iraq, like Vietnam, the original rationale for going to war has been discredited and public support has dwindled. Second, in both cases the new justification became building stable societies. There are enormous pitfalls in America's nation building efforts in Iraq as there were in Vietnam. But it is the business we now find ourselves in, and there is no easy retreat from it morally. As American frustration increases, some policy makers are making the deadly mistake of approaching problems in Iraq as if we are facing them for the first time. It is crucial that we apply the lessons of Vietnam wisely and selectively.
Author: Jeffrey Record
Publisher:
Published: 2004-05
Total Pages: 78
ISBN-13: 9781423516033
DOWNLOAD EBOOKUnfolding events in Iraq have prompted some observers to make analogies to the American experience in the Vietnam War. The United States has, they argue, stumbled into another overseas "quagmire" from which there is no easy or cheap exit. Reasoning by historical analogy is an inherently risky business because no two historical events are completely alike and because policymakers' knowledge and use of history are often distorted by ignorance and political bias. In the case of Iraq and Vietnam, extreme caution should be exercised in comparing two wars so far apart in time, locus, and historical circumstances. In fact, a careful examination of the evidence reveals that the differences between the two conflicts greatly outnumber the similarities. This is especially true in the strategic and military dimensions of the two wars. There is simply no comparison between the strategic environment, the scale of military operations, the scale of losses incurred, the quality of enemy resistance, the role of enemy allies, and the duration of combat. Such an emphatic judgment, however, may not apply to at least two aspects of the political dimensions of the Iraq and Vietnam wars: attempts at state-building in an alien culture, and sustaining domestic political support in a protracted war against an irregular enemy. It is, of course, far too early predict whether the United States will accomplish its policy objectives in Iraq and whether public support will "stay the course" on Iraq. But policymakers should be mindful of the reasons for U.S. failure to create a politically legitimate and militarily viable state in South Vietnam, as well as for the Johnson and Nixon administrations' failure to sustain sufficient domestic political support for the accomplishment of U.S. political objectives in Indochina. Repetition of those failures in Iraq could have disastrous consequences for U.S. foreign policy.