Presents a critique of the Bush Administration's Iraq policy, arguing that it stemmed from misconceptions about the realities of the situation in Iraq and a squandering of the goodwill of American allies following September 11th.
This monograph incorporates a series of essays on the opportunities and challenges for U.S. military space strategy in the 21st century. Each chapter takes a different approach to exploring the possibilities for U.S. space strategy. The issues considered here include the military space requirements for broader competition, the unique value space provides for militaries, the human capital required to build space strategy, the comparative advantages of U.S. allies in space, the role of space strategy for our competitors, and how to think about integrating space into broader defense strategy. We have found many signs of progress in identifying new strategic challenges in space and developing new strategic thought. There has been good progress in linking U.S. military strategy to the broader imperatives of an era of strategic rivalry and competition among major powers. But progress is not success. And the latter appears to be a long way off. Among the expert community we have found substantial dissatisfaction with the rate of progress relative to the rate of change and to the need for ideas well founded in current realities. This small volume is intended to help catalyze and inform thinking about these challenges. It draws on work at CGSR and elsewhere exploring the links between competitive strategies and the U.S. military space enterprise. It also draws on discussions from a workshop we convened in December 2019.
Against the backdrop of China’s mounting influence and North Korea’s growing nuclear capability and expanding missile arsenal, South Korea faces a set of strategic choices that will shape its economic prospects and national security. In South Korea at the Crossroads, Scott A. Snyder examines the trajectory of fifty years of South Korean foreign policy and offers predictions—and a prescription—for the future. Pairing a historical perspective with a shrewd understanding of today’s political landscape, Snyder contends that South Korea’s best strategy remains investing in a robust alliance with the United States. Snyder begins with South Korea’s effort in the 1960s to offset the risk of abandonment by the United States during the Vietnam War and the subsequent crisis in the alliance during the 1970s. A series of shifts in South Korean foreign relations followed: the “Nordpolitik” engagement with the Soviet Union and China at the end of the Cold War; Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy,” designed to bring North Korea into the international community; “trustpolitik,” which sought to foster diplomacy with North Korea and Japan; and changes in South Korea’s relationship with the United States. Despite its rise as a leader in international financial, development, and climate-change forums, South Korea will likely still require the commitment of the United States to guarantee its security. Although China is a tempting option, Snyder argues that only the United States is both credible and capable in this role. South Korea remains vulnerable relative to other regional powers in northeast Asia despite its rising profile as a middle power, and it must balance the contradiction of desirable autonomy and necessary alliance.
The U.S.-Israel partnership is under unprecedented strain. The relationship is deep and cooperation remains robust, but the challenges to it now are more profound than ever. Growing differences could undermine the national security of both the United States and Israel, making strong cooperation uncertain in an increasingly volatile and unpredictable Middle East. This volume explores the partnership between the United States and Israel and analyzes how political and strategic dynamics are reshaping the relationship. Drawing on original research and dozens of interviews with U.S. and Israeli officials and former officials, the study traces the development of the U.S.-Israel relationship, analyzes the sources of current tension, and suggests ways forward for policymakers in both countries. The author weaves together historical accounts with current analysis and debates to provide insight into this important yet changing relationship. It is a sobering and keen analysis for anyone concerned with the future of the U.S.-Israel partnership and the broader Middle East.
For centuries the world’s Great Powers, along with their fleets, armies, and intelligence services, have been drawn to the Persian Gulf region. Lying at the junction of three great continents – Asia, Europe, and Africa – and sitting athwart the oceanic trade routes that link the cities of the world, the Gulf, like a magnet, has pulled superpowers into the shallow waters and adjacent lands of the 600 mile long appendage of the Indian Ocean. An observer at Hormuz at the mouth of the Gulf would alternately have watched pass in the 15th century the treasure ships of Chinese Admiral Zheng He, in the 16th century the caravels of Portuguese Admiral Afonso de Albuquerqe, in the 17th century the merchant ships of the Dutch East India Company, in the 18th to the 20th centuries the frigates and steamships of the British, and finally in the late 20th century to today, the cruisers and aircraft carriers of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. Perhaps in the future, Americans may be supplanted by the Indians, or perhaps the Chinese. In the Great Powers’ comings and goings since the 1400s, several consistent broad interests emerged. For the majority of this time, for example, the superpowers entered the Gulf region not to colonize, as the Europeans did in other places, but rather to further trade, which in the 20th century increasingly included oil. They also sought a military presence in the Gulf to protect seaborne flanks to colonial possessions further east on the Indian sub-continent and beyond (India, in fact, has long cast a shadow over the Gulf, given its historic trade and cultural ties to the Gulf region, strong ties that continue today). In their geo-political jockeying, furthermore, the Great Powers sought to deprive their rivals access to the states bordering the Gulf region. In tending to these enduring interests inside the Strait of Hormuz, the Great Powers through history concentrated their trade, political, and military presence along the littorals. Not surprisingly, their navies have played a substantive role. Imperial Crossroads: The Great Powers and the Persian Gulf is a collection of connected chapters, each of which investigates a different perspective in the broader subject of the Great Powers and their involvement with the states of the Persian Gulf. This volume concentrates on four western nations – Portugal, Holland, Britain, and the United States – and concludes with a look at the possible future involvement of two rising Asian powers – China and India.
Baserap, who served in the U.S. Secret Service at the White House and Foreign Missions Branches and currently works at the Pentagon, strips away partisan arguments of issues like the Patriot Act and the War on Terror to show that somewhere between Right and Left lies a common ground that is essential for winning the War on Terror.
In Crossroads of Intervention, Todd Greentree argues that there are many valuable lessons to be learned about the nature of irregular warfare from the experiences of the United States in Central America during the final decade of the Cold War. This first comprehensive Strategy and policy analysis of U.S. intervention in Central America examines the origins, dynamics, and termination of the Sandinista insurrection in Nicaragua, the Salvadoran government's decade-long Conuterinsurgency against the FMLN, and the Contra insurgency against the Sandinistas. Greentree establishes the historical, political, and conceptual relationship between U.S. involvement in the Central American, wars, the Vietnam War and the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, while laying the foundation for an expanded understanding of the fundamental and recurring nature of insurgency, and intervention. U.S. involvement in Central America during the 1280s clearly demonstrates the costs, risks, and limits of intervention and the use of force in internal conflicts. The consequences of such involvement, he warns, must not be forgotten. Hispanic Heritage Month Reading List.
This book studies a significant event in US relations with Latin America, shedding light on the role of dependent states and their foreign policy agency in the process by which local concerns become intertwined with the dominant state’s foreign policy. Plan Colombia was a large-scale foreign aid programme through which the US intervened in the internal affairs of Colombia, by invitation. It proved to be one of the major successes of US foreign policy, and has been credited with stemming a potentially catastrophic security failure of the Colombian state. This book discusses the strategies and practices deployed by the Colombian government to influence US foreign policy decision making at the bureaucratic, legislative and executive levels, and is a distinctive contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of small power agency. Giving a clearer insight into the decision making processes in both the US and Colombia, this book founds its argument on solid empirical analysis assembled from interviews of the major players in the events including: Andres Pastrana, President of Colombia; Thomas Pickering, US State Department; Arturo Valenzuela, Senior Director for Inter-American Affairs at the NSA; General Barry McCaffrey, the US ‘Drug Czar’; and Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the US House of Representatives. Approaching the events in question from a bottom-up theoretical perspective that puts the emphasis on the facts of the case, this book will be of great interest to academics, students and policy makers in the field of foreign policy analysis, US foreign policy studies, and Latin American studies.
In this volume, prominent civilian and military experts in defense, representing the maritime-continental coalition, military reform, and noninterventionist schools of thought, outline the changes in military strategy, policy, and force structure that they believe the United States must adopt if it is to cope successfully with threats to national security in the 1980s and 1990s. The authors analyze US interests and objectives, the changing strategic environment, and the major security threats facing the United States in the coming decades. They also discuss what they believe is the proper mix of political, economic, and military instruments for dealing with fixture threats. The alternative strategies they present are wide-ranging and comprehensive, running the gamut from a strategic withdrawal from global commitments to proposals for increasing US power projection and forcible entry capabilities in the Third World. In many ways the chapters are critical of current and past approaches to military strategy. The authors believe it is essential that strategists understand the existing critiques of current U.S. military strategy in order to make the correct policy decisions for the future.
This book examines the long, complex experience of American involvement in irregular warfare. It begins with the American Revolution in 1776 and chronicles big and small irregular wars for the next two and a half centuries. What is readily apparent in dirty wars is that failure is painfully tangible while success is often amorphous. Successfully fighting these wars often entails striking a critical balance between military victory and politics. America's status as a democracy only serves to make fighting - and, to a greater degree, winning - these irregular wars even harder. Rather than futilely insisting that Americans should not or cannot fight this kind of irregular war, Russell Crandall argues that we would be better served by considering how we can do so as cleanly and effectively as possible.