UNITY OF COMMAND IN AFGHANISTAN: A FORSAKEN PRINCIPLE OF WAR.
Author: Ian Hope
Publisher:
Published: 2022
Total Pages: 0
ISBN-13:
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Unity of Command in Afghanistan
Author: Ian Hope
Publisher:
Published: 2015-02-16
Total Pages: 30
ISBN-13: 9781297048180
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Unity of Command in Afghanistan
Author: Ian Hope
Publisher: War College Series
Published: 2015-02-16
Total Pages: 30
ISBN-13: 9781298047977
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis is a curated and comprehensive collection of the most important works covering matters related to national security, diplomacy, defense, war, strategy, and tactics. The collection spans centuries of thought and experience, and includes the latest analysis of international threats, both conventional and asymmetric. It also includes riveting first person accounts of historic battles and wars.Some of the books in this Series are reproductions of historical works preserved by some of the leading libraries in the world. As with any reproduction of a historical artifact, some of these books contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. We believe these books are essential to this collection and the study of war, and have therefore brought them back into print, despite these imperfections.We hope you enjoy the unmatched breadth and depth of this collection, from the historical to the just-published works.
Unity of Effort
Author: Christopher Jon Lamb
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
Published: 2009
Total Pages: 12
ISBN-13: 1437929478
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis study ascribes the lack of progress in Afghanistan more to forces and donors working at cross-purposes than to insufficient resources. The authors call for an indirect approach that emphasizes working through indigenous forces. They cite U.S. special operations forces (SOF) failure to support counterinsurgency objectives as an example of military units working at cross-purposes. The authors recommend three ways to improve unity of effort: all Operation ¿Enduring Freedom¿ forces (except SOF) should be merged into one common mission with international forces; decisionmaking authority between U.S. military and civilian leaders should be clarified; and SOF operations must focus on the indirect approach. Illustrations.
Special Operations and Conventional Forces
Author: Maj Grant M. Martin
Publisher: CreateSpace
Published: 2013-03-07
Total Pages: 64
ISBN-13: 9781482375756
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe purpose of this monograph is to offer some practical solutions to building unity of effort between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and conventional forces using operations in Afghanistan from 2001 until 2009 as a case study. In researching U.S. legal code and U.S. Armed Forces doctrine, it is clear that both the U.S. Congress and the various services intended all forces to work together towards a common end during operations. In the case of Afghanistan, it is apparent that three things complicated unity of effort between SOF and conventional forces: the lack of an Afghanistan campaign plan by USCENTCOM, the assignment of SOF under the operational control of the conventional force Joint Task Force from 2002 until 2006, and the difficulties of a transition to a NATO command structure in 2006. These complications affected both the activities on the battlefield and the synchronization of operational and strategic plans. This led to problems that included an atmosphere of mistrust and misunderstanding, support issues, conventional forces struggling to command and control SOF, unneeded restrictions on SOF, and personality conflicts that affected operations and synchronization. Several different possible solutions to improve unity of effort exist. They are: changing the command and control structure between SOF and conventional forces, nesting SOF operations and plans with the overall campaign plan, attempting to align the proper personalities with certain tasks and positions, educating and integrating SOF and conventional forces, aligning and empowering liaison officers more appropriately, and aligning SOF headquarters with conventional force headquarters as appropriate. The conclusion is that there are three imperatives to ensuring unity of effort between SOF and conventional forces. The first is to ensure that SOF operations and plans are nested with the overall theater campaign plan and if there is no overall theater campaign plan that SOF take the lead in its development. The second imperative is to use liaison officers that are the commander's representative and are value-added to the headquarters they liaise with. The third imperative is to ensure a command and control relationship between SOF and conventional forces which is flexible, allowing for the most robust support SOF can provide, while at the same time ensuring that forces are not working at cross-purposes. A more long-term and multi-faceted imperative that will take institutional change is that of the education of SOF and conventional forces about their respective branches, as well as prioritizing the integration of these forces during training and operations. Lastly, matching up personalities to staff positions wherein conventional forces and SOF interaction is high, as well as aligning SOF and conventional forces headquarters where appropriate are also areas in which unity of effort can be increased.
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan: Is Unity of Effort Good Enough?.
Author:
Publisher:
Published: 2009
Total Pages: 27
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe conflict in Afghanistan is currently in its eighth year and the United States Government and its NATO/ISAF partners are in the process of rethinking their entire strategy. Eight years of counterinsurgency, counterterrorist, and stabilization operations have thus far resulted in an ever steady increase in the level of violence, an unprecedented resurgence of Taliban control and Al Qaeda operations across the entire country, and has arguably brought the entire US and NATO/ISAF effort to the precipice of mission failure. At the forefront of efforts in Afghanistan are US/OEF and NATO/ISAF Special Operation Forces (SOF). The organizational command and control structure for SOF in Afghanistan is a major shortcoming in SOF effectiveness, and does not follow the Principal of War Unity of Command, and only vaguely supports the idea of Unity of Effort. In spite of the similarity of mission, operational focus and capabilities, within the confines of the theater command and control architecture, US/OEF and NATO/ISAF SOF and their mandates are separate and distinct and essentially operate independently of one another. Arguably the most flexible, dynamic and productive force in Afghanistan, changes to the SOF organizational command and control structure could yield significant results.
Shades of CORDS in the Kush
Author: Henry Nuzum
Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute
Published: 2010
Total Pages: 111
ISBN-13: 158487435X
DOWNLOAD EBOOK"Counterinsurgency (COIN) requires an integrated military, political, and economic program best developed by teams that field both civilians and soldiers. These units should operate with some independence but under a coherent command. In Vietnam, after several false starts, the United States developed an effective unified organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), to guide the counterinsurgency. CORDS had three components absent from our efforts in Afghanistan today: sufficient personnel (particularly civilian), numerous teams, and a single chain of command that united the separate COIN programs of the disparate American departments at the district, provincial, regional, and national levels. This paper focuses on the third issue and describes the benefits that unity of command at every level would bring to the American war in Afghanistan. The work begins with a brief introduction to counterinsurgency theory, using a population-centric model, and examines how this warfare challenges the United States. It traces the evolution of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the country team, describing problems at both levels. Similar efforts in Vietnam are compared, where persistent executive attention finally integrated the government's counterinsurgency campaign under the unified command of the CORDS program. The next section attributes the American tendency towards a segregated response to cultural differences between the primary departments, executive neglect, and societal concepts of war. The paper argues that, in its approach to COIN, the United States has forsaken the military concept of unity of command in favor of 'unity of effort' expressed in multiagency literature. The final sections describe how unified authority would improve our efforts in Afghanistan and propose a model for the future."--Page iii.
Special Forces Command And Control In Afghanistan
Author: Major Richard G. Rhyne
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
Published: 2015-11-06
Total Pages: 90
ISBN-13: 1786253119
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe purpose of this study is to examine the nature of the command and control relationship between Special Forces and conventional forces. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan serves as a case study in practice and doctrinal application. Against the backdrop of World War II, Operations in Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this thesis provides an analysis of the complex issues arising from the necessity to fight jointly.
A Year in Command in Afghanistan
Author: Michael J. Forsyth
Publisher: McFarland
Published: 2016-11-30
Total Pages: 363
ISBN-13: 0786472871
DOWNLOAD EBOOKDuring his 2009-2010 combat tour in Afghanistan, battalion commander Lt. Col. Michael J. Forsyth kept a daily journal. In it he candidly wrote about his daily interactions with the Afghan government, citizens, security forces, and his intermittent conflict with the enemy. As the deployment progressed, the journal reveals that his initial expectations for peace in Afghanistan were tempered by his experiences and encounters. In the process, Col. Forsyth learned critical lessons in leadership and changed his thinking about realistic goals that can be accomplished in Afghanistan. The journal, and its subsequent annotations, also provides a glimpse into how the U.S. Army functions at the unit level and what America's soldiers do on a daily basis.
NATO in Afghanistan
Author: David P. Auerswald
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2014-01-05
Total Pages: 278
ISBN-13: 0691159386
DOWNLOAD EBOOKModern warfare is almost always multilateral to one degree or another, requiring countries to cooperate as allies or coalition partners. Yet as the war in Afghanistan has made abundantly clear, multilateral cooperation is neither straightforward nor guaranteed. Countries differ significantly in what they are willing to do and how and where they are willing to do it. Some refuse to participate in dangerous or offensive missions. Others change tactical objectives with each new commander. Some countries defer to their commanders while others hold them to strict account. NATO in Afghanistan explores how government structures and party politics in NATO countries shape how battles are waged in the field. Drawing on more than 250 interviews with senior officials from around the world, David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman find that domestic constraints in presidential and single-party parliamentary systems--in countries such as the United States and Britain respectively--differ from those in countries with coalition governments, such as Germany and the Netherlands. As a result, different countries craft different guidelines for their forces overseas, most notably in the form of military caveats, the often-controversial limits placed on deployed troops. Providing critical insights into the realities of alliance and coalition warfare, NATO in Afghanistan also looks at non-NATO partners such as Australia, and assesses NATO's performance in the 2011 Libyan campaign to show how these domestic political dynamics are by no means unique to Afghanistan.
