Deterrence--a central feature of counterterrorism security systems and a major factor in the cost-effectiveness of many security programs--is not well understood or measured. This paper offers a framework for understanding how security systems may deter or displace attacks and how to measure the relative deterrent value of alternative systems. This framework may aid in attempts to achieve increased security benefits with limited resources.
During the Cold War, deterrence theory was the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, popular wisdom dictated that terrorist organizations and radical fanatics could not be deterred—and governments shifted their attention to combating terrorism rather than deterring it. This book challenges that prevailing assumption and offers insight as to when and where terrorism can be deterred. It first identifies how and where theories of deterrence apply to counterterrorism, highlighting how traditional and less-traditional notions of deterrence can be applied to evolving terrorist threats. It then applies these theoretical propositions to real-world threats to establish the role deterrence has within a dynamic counterterrorism strategy—and to identify how metrics can be created for measuring the success of terrorism deterrence strategies. In sum, it provides a foundation for developing effective counterterrorism policies to help states contain or curtail the terrorism challenges they face.
It may not be possible to deter fanatical terrorists, but members of terrorist systems may be amenable to influence. The U.S. counterterrorism strategy should therefore include political warfare, placing at risk things the terrorists hold dear, a credible threat of force against states or groups that support acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and maintaining cooperation with other nations engaged in the war on terror, while also preserving core American values.
"Deterrence by Denial: Theory and Practice is the first study to focus exclusively on contemporary denial, bridging the theoretical gap that persists between classical deterrence theory and contemporary insecurity. The book significantly advances the scholarship on deterrence by denial with empirically driven and policy-relevant contributions written by leading international scholars of conventional military aggression, missile defense, terrorism and militancy, crime, and cybersecurity. Deterrence by Denial: Theory and Practice is an important and unique book, of interest to scholars of international relations, political science, terrorism and intelligence studies, and cybersecurity, as well as to policy analysts, practitioners, and members of the armed forces and intelligence community"--
With many scholars and analysts questioning the relevance of deterrence as a valid strategic concept, this volume moves beyond Cold War nuclear deterrence to show the many ways in which deterrence is applicable to contemporary security. It examines the possibility of applying deterrence theory and practice to space, to cyberspace, and against non-state actors. It also examines the role of nuclear deterrence in the twenty-first century and reaches surprising conclusions.
Through the examination of different themes and subjects the book provides an in depth analysis of the concept of deterrence and its utility in dealing effectively with current threats. Although the concept of deterrence precedes the Cold War, in modern times and in its traditional form deterrence is seen as the product of the Cold War, which transformed 'narrow' deterrence approaches into widespread orthodoxy. Increasingly however emerging threats and challenges call into question the traditional concept of deterrence. There are many elements that challenge the concept of deterrence and its effectiveness. For instance it is not just that the concept can be ambiguous and broad, but also there have to be a number of conditions for it to be successfully implemented. This collection contributes to a growing field of research in a relatively under-studied area of interrogating the concept of deterrence itself through a multi-disciplinary approach. Through the use of primary and secondary sources, as well as interviews, this book covers a wide range of disciplinary approaches on deterrence and the contributors cover a broad array of subjects. The research assembled here focuses on deterring extremism, conflict resolution and diplomacy, investigating technological developments, effects of globalisation, social movements, economics, the relationship of resilience to effective deterrence, and the associated complexity of contemporary interdependencies to create a contextualised concept of modern deterrence. Social science and historical methodologies are utilized to gain a comprehensive cross-section of analysis that will reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the use of deterrence as a national security strategy, as well as highlighting the various types of power available for use by the state to create multi-faceted deterrence in order to deal effectively and efficiently with complex emerging challenges.
Emphasizing a positive approach to dealing with terrorism (the carrot), this book provides a critique of deterrence policy (the stick) which can be ineffective and even counterproductive, and proposes three alternative and effective anti-terrorist policies: Decentralization reduces vulnerability to terrorist attacks. A system with many different centers is more stable due to its diversity, enabling one part to substitute for another. Positive incentives can be offered to actual and prospective terrorists not to engage in violent acts. Incentives include: reintegrating terrorists into society, welcoming repentents and offering them valued opportunities. Diverting attention by naming several terrorist groups potentially responsible for a particular terrorist act. The government thus supplies more information than the terrorist responsible would wish.
It can be easy to forget the critical role that maritime transport plays in the global economy, but international maritime transportation is still responsible for around 90% of global trade. Protecting the maritime infrastructure essential for this trade from terrorism is a major concern for the international community. This book originates from the NATO Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) Counter-Terrorism Lessons from Maritime Piracy and Narcotics Interdiction, held in Copenhagen, Denmark, in May 2019. Participants in the three-day workshop included policymakers, senior military officers, and academics from NATO member states, international organizations, and two partner nations: Colombia and Israel. Their extensive discussions focused on methods for protecting critical maritime infrastructure, such as ports, supplies, and personnel, from seaborne terrorist attacks. Presentations and roundtables also addressed the human and social factors that contribute to the defense against terrorism in the maritime domain. The book is divided into three sections: organized crime and narcotrafficking; maritime piracy; and terrorism, and aims to bridge the gaps between these three substantive areas of maritime security research. These have remained largely separate areas of research in the past, with the result that valuable maritime security lessons from counter-piracy and counter-narcotics operations have not been fully incorporated into counter-terrorism best practice. The book facilitates the transmission of lessons learned from counter-piracy and counter-narcotic operations to formulate recommendations for best practice and technological innovations to manage maritime terrorism, and will be of interest to all those working in the field.
