This book charts the course of monetary policy in the UK from 1967 to 1982. It shows how events such as the 1967 devaluation, the collapse of Bretton Woods, the stagflation of the 1970s, and the IMF loan of 1976 all shaped policy. It shows that the 'monetarist' experiment of the 1980s was based on a fundamental misreading of 1970s monetary policy.
British monetary policy was reactivated in 1951 when short-term interest rates were increased for the first time in two decades. The book explores the politics of formulating monetary policy in the 1950s and the techniques of implementing it, and discusses the parallels between the present monetary situation and that of 1951.
How did the Bank of England manage sterling crises? This book steps into the shoes of the Bank's foreign exchange dealers to show how foreign exchange intervention worked in practice. The author reviews the history of sterling over half a century, using new archives, data and unseen photographs. This book traces the sterling crises from the end of the War to Black Wednesday in 1992. The resulting analysis shows that a secondary reserve currency such as sterling plays an important role in the stability of the international system. The author goes on to explore the lessons the Bretton Woods system on managed exchange rates has for contemporary policy makers in the context of Brexit. This is a crucial reference for scholars in economics and history examining past and current prospects for the international financial system. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This authoritative guide to the transformation of the Bank of England into a modern inflation-targeting independent central bank examines a revolution in monetary and economic policy and the modernization of British institutions in the late twentieth century.
The one bad apple spoiling the whole barrel has become a common metaphor used with reference to risk culture in organisations. This “inside-out” perspective begins with the individual as the unit of analysis and follows with inferences to the broader environment. Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008, risk culture for many has become the explanation for shortcomings, poor decisions, and moral failures in organisations. This volume presents an institutional perspective of the forces that shape risk culture, and culture more generally, in organisations through a multi-disciplinary examination from a variety of leading academics and subject specialists. The authors demonstrate that firms play a role as manufacturers and managers of risk and they challenge common conceptions that attribute risk to chance circumstances or rogue behaviours. The foundational concepts needed for an institutional view of risk culture are highlighted with subsequent links to significant developments within society and firms.
The financial collapse of 2007–8 has questioned our assumptions about the underlying basis for stability in the financial system, and Anthony Hotson here offers an important reassessment of the development of London's money and credit markets since the great currency crisis of 1695. He shows how this period has seen a series of intermittent financial crises interspersed with successive attempts to find ways and means of stabilizing the system. He emphasises, in particular, the importance of various principles of sound banking practice, developed in the late nineteenth century, that helped to stabilize London's money and credit markets. He shows how these principles informed a range of market practices that limited aggressive forms of funding, and discouraged speculative lending. A tendency to downplay the importance of these regulatory practices encouraged a degree of complacency about their removal, with consequences right through to the present day.
This book is the first of two volumes that aim to provide an up-to-date overview of the key data and techniques necessary for analysing the historical behaviour of business and financial cycles in the United Kingdom. Drawing on an extensive secondary literature and the considerable body of historical macroeconomic and financial time series data that exist for the United Kingdom, the two volumes will review the key features of historical recessions and recoveries over the course of three and a half centuries. Volume 1 provides an overview of UK business cycles since 1660. The first part of the book considers old and new theories of the business cycle, looking at the impulses that generate business cycles and the propagation mechanisms that determine their duration and amplitude. The second part of the book uses the latest historical estimates of GDP to look at different ways of measuring and estimating business cycle fluctuations within a simple univariate framework. Finally, the book provides a narrative of UK economic fluctuations since 1660 using a whole range of economic data to shed light on the main drivers of cyclical behaviour. It concludes by highlighting areas for future research especially with regard to the link between business and financial cycles, some of which will be explored in Volume 2.
Nobody doubts that politicians ought to fulfil their promises – what people cannot agree about is what this means in practice. The purpose of this book is to explore this issue through a series of case studies. It shows how the British model of politics has changed since the early twentieth century when electioneering was based on the articulation of principles which, it was expected, might well be adapted once the party or politician that promoted them took office. Thereafter manifestos became increasingly central to electoral politics and to the practice of governing, and this has been especially the case since 1945. Parties were now expected to outline in detail what they would do in office and explain how the policies would be paid for. Brexit has complicated this process, with the ‘will of the people’ as supposedly expressed in the 2016 referendum result clashing with the conventional role of the election manifesto as offering a mandate for action.
This book explores the way in which banks were regulated in the UK in the period from 1946 until 1971. It focuses upon a group of 11 banks known as the London clearing banks. These banks included the ‘Big Five’ – Barclays, Lloyds, Midland, National Provincial and Westminster – and were the equivalent to today’s retail banks. The time period in question is an intriguing one in the history of banking and bank regulation in that the banking system was very stable, but the regulatory framework was less dependent upon codified forms of regulation than it is today. Having explored the nature of clearing bank regulation, Arch goes on to consider the rationale behind it, as well as its consequences. She concludes by reflecting upon the nature of bank regulation since the global financial crisis. This title is essential reading for academics with an interest in banking history and bank regulation, for practicing bank regulators and for regulatory policymakers.
