Contents: (1) Overview of U.S. Policy: Coop. in the Cold War; Suspensions after Tiananmen Crackdown; Re-engagement; Re-eval.; Cong. Oversight; (2) Issues for Congress: (a) Congress. Oversight: Arms Sales; Joint Defense Conversion Comm.; Past Reporting Require.; Exchange Programs; Restrictions in the FY 2000 NDAA; Required Reports and Classification; Procurement Prohibition; (b) Leverage to Pursue U.S. Security Objectives: Debate; Perspectives; (c) U.S. Security Interests: Commun., Conflict Avoidance, and Crisis Manage.; Transparency, Reciprocity, and Info.-Exchange; Tension over Taiwan; Weapons Nonprolif.; Strategic Nuclear and Space Talks; Counterterrorism and Olympic Security; Accounting for POW/MIAs. Map.
This CRS report, updated as warranted, discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts and crises since 1993.
China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has embarked on its most wide-ranging and ambitious restructuring since 1949, including major changes to most of its key organizations. The restructuring reflects the desire to strengthen PLA joint operation capabilities- on land, sea, in the air, and in the space and cyber domains. The reforms could result in a more adept joint warfighting force, though the PLA will continue to face a number of key hurdles to effective joint operations, Several potential actions would indicate that the PLA is overcoming obstacles to a stronger joint operations capability. The reforms are also intended to increase Chairman Xi Jinping's control over the PLA and to reinvigorate Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organs within the military. Xi Jinping's ability to push through reforms indicates that he has more authority over the PLA than his recent predecessors. The restructuring could create new opportunities for U.S.-China military contacts.
This CRS Report discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, the Clinton Administration began to re-engage the PRC leadership up to the highest level and including China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral relations have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, and the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001. Since 2001, the Bush Administration has continued the policy of engagement with China, while the Pentagon has skeptically reviewed and cautiously resumed a program of mil-to-mil exchanges. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in 2002, resumed the Defense Consultative Talks with the PLA and, in 2003, hosted General Cao Gangchuan, a Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Defense Minister. General Richard Myers (USAF), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited China in Jan 2004, as the highest ranking U.S. military officer to do so since Nov 2000. In Sep 2005, Admiral William Fallon sought to advance mil-to-mil contacts, including combined exercises. In June 2006, Fallon invited PLA observers to the U.S. "Valiant Shield" exercise that brought three aircraft carriers to waters off Guam. Issues for the 110th Congress include whether the Administration has complied with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and has determined a program of contacts with the PLA that advances U.S. security interests.
China’s emergence as a global economic superpower, and as a major regional military power in Asia and the Pacific, has had a major impact on its relations with the United States and its neighbors. China was the driving factor in the new strategy the United States announced in 2012 that called for a “rebalance” of U.S. forces to the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, China’s actions on its borders, in the East China Sea, and in the South China Sea have shown that it is steadily expanding its geopolitical role in the Pacific and having a steadily increasing impact on the strategy and military developments in other Asian powers.
This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and records major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, President Clinton reengaged with the top PRC leadership, including China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic alignment against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral engagement have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and the PLA's aggressive maritime and air confrontations. Issues for Congress include whether the Administration complies with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and pursues contacts with the PLA that advance a prioritized set of U.S. security interests, especially the operational safety of U.S. military personnel. Oversight legislation includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991 (P.L. 101-246) and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65). A particular issue is whether the President is required to issue waivers of sanctions. Skeptics and proponents of military exchanges with the PRC have debated whether the contacts achieve results in U.S. objectives and whether the contacts contribute to the PLA's warfighting capability that might harm U.S. and allied security interests. Some have argued about whether the value that U.S. officials place on the contacts overly extends leverage to the PLA. Some believe talks can serve U.S. interests that include risk-reduction or conflict-avoidance; military-civilian coordination; transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; talks on nuclear, missile, space, and/or cyber domains; counterterrorism; and POW/MIA accounting. Policy makers could review the approach to mil-to-mil contacts, given concerns about potential crises and conflicts. U.S. officials have faced challenges in gaining cooperation from the PLA. The PLA has tried to use its suspensions of exchanges while blaming U.S.-only "obstacles" (including arms sales to Taiwan, FY2000 NDAA, and air and naval reconnaissance operations). The PRC's harassment of U.S. ships and increasing assertiveness in maritime disputes showed some limits to mil-to-mil engagement, similar views, and PLA restraint. The U.S. articulations in 2011-2012 of a strategic "rebalancing" to the Asia-Pacific raised an issue of how to deal with China's challenges. The Administration's "rebalance" entails not only expanded engagement with the PLA, but also increasing exercises. The PLA Navy's invited participation for the first time in the U.S. Navy-led multinational exercise, RIMPAC, based at Hawaii in summer 2014 raised concerns in Congress and elsewhere. The U.S. Navy has increased some "interoperability" with the PLA Navy. The Defense Secretary issued the latest required annual report on June 5, 2014, concerning military and security developments involving the PRC, cooperation, and military-to-military contacts. The report noted that the PLA uses combined exercises to improve capabilities by learning from more advanced militaries and asserted that the Defense Department complies with the FY2000 NDAA in all military contacts with China. The U.S. Pacific Air Forces Commander sent a C-17 transport aircraft to China's Zhuhai Air Show in November 2014.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China
