Two-Player Stochastic Games with Perfect and Zero Information

Two-Player Stochastic Games with Perfect and Zero Information

Author: Edon Kelmendi

Publisher:

Published: 2016

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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We consider stochastic games that are played on finite graphs. The subject of the first part are two-player stochastic games with perfect information. In such games the two players take turns choosing actions from a finite set, for an infinite duration, resulting in an infinite play. The objective of the game is given by a Borel-measurable and bounded payoff function that maps infinite plays to real numbers. The first player wants to maximize the expected payoff, and the second player has the opposite objective, that of minimizing the expected payoff. We prove that if the payoff function is both shift-invariant and submixing then the game is half-positional. This means that the first player has an optimal strategy that is at the same time pure and memoryless. Both players have perfect information, so the actions are chosen based on the whole history. In the second part we study finite-duration games where the protagonist player has zero information. That is, he gets no feedback from the game and consequently his strategy is a finite word over the set of actions. Probabilistic finite automata can be seen as an example of such a game that has only a single player. First we compare two classes of probabilistic automata: leaktight automata and simple automata, for which the value 1 problem is known to be decidable. We prove that simple automata are a strict subset of leaktight automata. Then we consider half-blind games, which are two player games where the maximizer has zero information and the minimizer is perfectly informed. We define the class of leaktight half-blind games and prove that it has a decidable maxmin reachability problem.


Stochastic Multiplayer Games

Stochastic Multiplayer Games

Author: Michael Ummels

Publisher: Amsterdam University Press

Published: 2010-12

Total Pages: 174

ISBN-13: 9085550408

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Stochastic games provide a versatile model for reactive systems that are affected by random events. This dissertation advances the algorithmic theory of stochastic games to incorporate multiple players, whose objectives are not necessarily conflicting. The basis of this work is a comprehensive complexity-theoretic analysis of the standard game-theoretic solution concepts in the context of stochastic games over a finite state space. One main result is that the constrained existence of a Nash equilibrium becomes undecidable in this setting. This impossibility result is accompanied by several positive results, including efficient algorithms for natural special cases.


Stochastic Games and Related Concepts

Stochastic Games and Related Concepts

Author: T. Parthasarathy

Publisher: Springer Nature

Published: 2020-12-08

Total Pages: 127

ISBN-13: 9811565775

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This book discusses stochastic game theory and related concepts. Topics focused upon in the book include matrix games, finite, infinite, and undiscounted stochastic games, n-player cooperative games, minimax theorem, and more. In addition to important definitions and theorems, the book provides readers with a range of problem-solving techniques and exercises. This book is of value to graduate students and readers of probability and statistics alike.


A Course in Stochastic Game Theory

A Course in Stochastic Game Theory

Author: Eilon Solan

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2022-05-26

Total Pages: 279

ISBN-13: 1316516334

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This book for beginning graduate students presents a course on stochastic games and the mathematical methods used in their analysis.


Stochastic Games and Applications

Stochastic Games and Applications

Author: Abraham Neyman

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2012-12-06

Total Pages: 466

ISBN-13: 9401001898

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This volume is based on lectures given at the NATO Advanced Study Institute on "Stochastic Games and Applications," which took place at Stony Brook, NY, USA, July 1999. It gives the editors great pleasure to present it on the occasion of L.S. Shapley's eightieth birthday, and on the fiftieth "birthday" of his seminal paper "Stochastic Games," with which this volume opens. We wish to thank NATO for the grant that made the Institute and this volume possible, and the Center for Game Theory in Economics of the State University of New York at Stony Brook for hosting this event. We also wish to thank the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, for providing continuing financial support, without which this project would never have been completed. In particular, we are grateful to our editorial assistant Mike Borns, whose work has been indispensable. We also would like to acknowledge the support of the Ecole Poly tech nique, Paris, and the Israel Science Foundation. March 2003 Abraham Neyman and Sylvain Sorin ix STOCHASTIC GAMES L.S. SHAPLEY University of California at Los Angeles Los Angeles, USA 1. Introduction In a stochastic game the play proceeds by steps from position to position, according to transition probabilities controlled jointly by the two players.


Game Theory: Breakthroughs in Research and Practice

Game Theory: Breakthroughs in Research and Practice

Author: Management Association, Information Resources

Publisher: IGI Global

Published: 2017-06-19

Total Pages: 515

ISBN-13: 1522525955

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Developments in the use of game theory have impacted multiple fields and created opportunities for new applications. With the ubiquity of these developments, there is an increase in the overall utilization of this approach. Game Theory: Breakthroughs in Research and Practice contains a compendium of the latest academic material on the usage, strategies, and applications for implementing game theory across a variety of industries and fields. Including innovative studies on economics, military strategy, and political science, this multi-volume book is an ideal source for professionals, practitioners, graduate students, academics, and researchers interested in the applications of game theory.


Algorithms and Computation

Algorithms and Computation

Author: Ying Fei Dong

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2009-11-24

Total Pages: 1246

ISBN-13: 3642106307

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This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 20th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation, ISAAC 2009, held in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA in December 2009. The 120 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 279 submissions for inclusion in the book. This volume contains topics such as algorithms and data structures, approximation algorithms, combinatorial optimization, computational biology, computational complexity, computational geometry, cryptography, experimental algorithm methodologies, graph drawing and graph algorithms, internet algorithms, online algorithms, parallel and distributed algorithms, quantum computing and randomized algorithms.


Dynamic Games in Economics

Dynamic Games in Economics

Author: Josef Haunschmied

Publisher: Springer

Published: 2014-07-08

Total Pages: 321

ISBN-13: 3642542484

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Dynamic game theory serves the purpose of including strategic interaction in decision making and is therefore often applied to economic problems. This book presents the state-of-the-art and directions for future research in dynamic game theory related to economics. It was initiated by contributors to the 12th Viennese Workshop on Optimal Control, Dynamic Games and Nonlinear Dynamics and combines a selection of papers from the workshop with invited papers of high quality.


Adversarial Machine Learning

Adversarial Machine Learning

Author: Aneesh Sreevallabh Chivukula

Publisher: Springer Nature

Published: 2023-03-06

Total Pages: 316

ISBN-13: 3030997723

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A critical challenge in deep learning is the vulnerability of deep learning networks to security attacks from intelligent cyber adversaries. Even innocuous perturbations to the training data can be used to manipulate the behaviour of deep networks in unintended ways. In this book, we review the latest developments in adversarial attack technologies in computer vision; natural language processing; and cybersecurity with regard to multidimensional, textual and image data, sequence data, and temporal data. In turn, we assess the robustness properties of deep learning networks to produce a taxonomy of adversarial examples that characterises the security of learning systems using game theoretical adversarial deep learning algorithms. The state-of-the-art in adversarial perturbation-based privacy protection mechanisms is also reviewed. We propose new adversary types for game theoretical objectives in non-stationary computational learning environments. Proper quantification of the hypothesis set in the decision problems of our research leads to various functional problems, oracular problems, sampling tasks, and optimization problems. We also address the defence mechanisms currently available for deep learning models deployed in real-world environments. The learning theories used in these defence mechanisms concern data representations, feature manipulations, misclassifications costs, sensitivity landscapes, distributional robustness, and complexity classes of the adversarial deep learning algorithms and their applications. In closing, we propose future research directions in adversarial deep learning applications for resilient learning system design and review formalized learning assumptions concerning the attack surfaces and robustness characteristics of artificial intelligence applications so as to deconstruct the contemporary adversarial deep learning designs. Given its scope, the book will be of interest to Adversarial Machine Learning practitioners and Adversarial Artificial Intelligence researchers whose work involves the design and application of Adversarial Deep Learning.