Discusses morals' functions and natures that affect the legislation in general. Bases the discussions on pain and pleasure as basic principle of law embodiment. Mentions of the circumstance influencing sensibility, general human actions, intentionality, conciousness, motives, human dispositions, consequencess of mischievous act, case of punishment, and offences' division.
This volume provides a reading of Hume's Treatise as a whole, foregrounding Hume's understanding of custom and its role in the Treatise. It shows that Hume grounds his understanding of custom in its usage in English legal theory, and that he takes custom to be the foundation for normativity in all of its guises, whether moral, epistemic, or social. The book argues that Hume's project in the Treatise is to provide a socially inflected cognitive science--to understand how persons are constituted through an interaction of individual psychology and their social matrix--and that custom provides the ligature that ties together Hume's naturalism and skepticism. In doing so, it shows that Hume is a consistent Pyrrhonian skeptic, but that he takes the positive part of the skeptical program seriously, showing not only that our practices have no foundation, but that they need none, and that custom alone serves to explain and to justify our practices. (Resumen editorial).
Origen’s On First Principles is a foundational work in the development of Christian thought and doctrine: it is the first attempt in history at a systematic Christian theology. For over a decade it has been out of print with only expensive used copies available; now it is available at an affordable price and in a more accessible format. On First Principles is the most important surviving text written by third-century Church father, Origen. Origen wrote in a time when fundamental doctrines had not yet been fully articulated by the Church, and contributed to the very formation of Christianity. Readers see Origen grappling with the mysteries of salvation and brainstorming how they can be understood. This edition presents G. W. Butterworth’s trusted translation in a new, more readable format, retains the introduction by Henri de Lubac, and includes a new foreword by John C. Cavadini. As St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Doctor of the Church, wrote: “Origen is the stone on which all of us were sharpened.”
George Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge is a crucial text in the history of empiricism and in the history of philosophy more generally. Its central and seemingly astonishing claim is that the physical world cannot exist independently of the perceiving mind. The meaning of this claim, the powerful arguments in its favour, and the system in which it is embedded, are explained in a highly lucid and readable fashion and placed in their historical context. Berkeley's philosophy is, in part, a response to the deep tensions and problems in the new philosophy of the early modern period and the reader is offered an account of this intellectual milieu. The book then follows the order and substance of the Principles whilst drawing on materials from Berkeley's other writings. This volume is the ideal introduction to Berkeley's Principles and will be of great interest to historians of philosophy in general.
A landmark of enlightenment though, HUme's An Enquiry Concerning Human understanding is accompanied here by two shorter works that shed light on it: A Letter from a Gentlemen to His Friend in Edinburgh, hume's response to those accusing him of atheism, of advocating extreme scepticism, and of undermining the foundations of morality; and his Abstract of A Treatise of HUman Nature, which anticipates discussions developed in the Enquiry. In his concise Introduction, Eric Steinberg explores the conditions that led to write the Enquiry and the work's important relationship to Book 1 of Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature.
