On cover: Government responses. The reports published as HC 801 (ISBN 9780215556448); HC 764 (ISBN 9780215559258); HC 833 (ISBN 9780215559760); HC 1035 (ISBN 9780215560407); HC 1050 (ISBN 9780215560346); HC 1036 (9780215560506). Dated September 2011
This report is a follow-up to the Committee's report on Accountability for Public Money (HC 740, session 2010-11 (ISBN 9780215559029)) an issue at the core of the relationship between Parliament and government. Accounting Officers remain accountable to Parliament for funds voted to their departments but the policy intention is that local bodies will have significant discretion over the services they deliver. In the Government's response, 'Accountability: Adapting to Decentralisation', Sir Bob Kerslake drew a distinction between those services that government delivers directly and those that it may fund but are delivered in more decentralised arrangements. He proposed that Accounting Officers set out, in Accountability System Statements, the arrangements they have in place to provide assurance about the probity and value for money of funds spent through devolved systems. All departments are expected to produce Statements by summer 2012. Departments have made a genuine effort to develop arrangements which reconcile accountability and localism but the Statements so far are unwieldy and considerably more needs to be done to improve their clarity, consistency and completeness. There is concern that accountability frameworks must drive value for money and, critically, are sufficiently robust to address the operational or financial failure of service providers. Departments are placing increasing reliance on market mechanisms such as user choice to drive up performance and value for money, but there are limits to what these mechanisms can achieve. The Treasury needs to take ownership of the system and ensure that the Comptroller and Auditor General has the necessary powers and rights of access to examine the value for money of funds spent through devolved systems
In November 2011, HM Treasury published the first audited Whole of Government Accounts (WGA), covering the year 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2010 (HC 1601, ISBN 9780102975192). The Committee welcomes this major step forward in improving transparency and accountability and highlights some of the information it contains: at 31 March 2010 the government's public service pensions liability was around £1,132 billion; the present value of its future commitments under PFI schemes was £131.5 billion; the government wrote off £10.9 billion in unpaid taxes and expected to have to pay £15.7 billion for outstanding clinical negligence claims; cost of future nuclear decommissioning (£56.7 billion); the need for stronger accountability systems to secure effective responsibility for cost and value for money at local levels - academies, Free Schools, Foundation Trusts and GP consortia. But the WGA will only serve its purpose- showing what the government owns, owes, spends and receives - if it is timely and robust. The figures in the first audited WGA are too dated because Treasury took 20 months to prepare and publish the report. Treasury must address the issues that led the Comptroller and Auditor General to qualify his audit opinion on the WGA 2009-10. A key issue is Treasury's decision to deviate from accounting standards, by omitting Network Rail, the publicly owned banks, and various other government-controlled or owned bodies from the WGA. The Committee sets out a set of principles that future accounts should follow.
The Committee of Public Accounts scrutinises the reasons behind individual Departments exceeding their allocated resources, and reports to the House of Commons on whether it has any objection to the amounts needed to rectify the reported excesses. The Committee may also make recommendations to Departments concerning the causes of these excesses. In 2010-11, two bodies breached their expenditure limits: The Department for Transport breached its Net Cash Requirement by £335.2 million, primarily because of weaknesses in monitoring its budget for the operation of its rail franchises; The Teachers' Pension Scheme (England & Wales) breached its Net Cash Requirement by £11.9 million because the Department for Education underestimated the number of members that would retire in 2010-11 and overestimated the contributions that would be collected from employers. On the basis of an examination of the reasons why these two bodies exceeded their voted provisions, the Committee has no objection to Parliament providing the necessary amounts by means of an Excess Vote. Nevertheless, it expects both bodies to set out what actions they have taken to improve their financial management and avoid exceeding their allocated resources in the future.
Infrastructure UK, an advisory unit within the Treasury, was established in 2010 with a remit to specify what economic infrastructure is needed in the UK, to identify the key barriers to achieving that investment and to mobilise systems and resources, both public and private to make it happen. The first National Infrastructure Plan was published in 2010. The latest update of the plan, published in December 2012, comprised over 500 prospective programmes and projects for new economic infrastructure expected to cost £310 billion. Some 64% of this amount is expected to be spent on infrastructure that will be wholly owned and financed by the private sector with households bearing the costs through higher bills or fares. Many of the investment proposals impact on energy supply and are therefore particularly time critical. The Committee believes that this will lead to higher costs which will be borne by consumers and are particularly concerned at the impact of higher energy bills on those with low incomes. Many of the programmes are broad categories and in total they include more than 200 individual projects. This does not suggest a properly targeted and prioritised infrastructure plan. Furthermore, the statutory framework provided by the Energy Bill is coming rather late in the day when the energy crunch is fast approaching. It is likely that the UK will buy ever more energy from overseas and at a higher price due to the failure to secure investment. In these circumstances greater transparency is needed over investors' costs, risks and rewards
FiReControl was an ambitious project with the objectives of improving national resilience, efficiency and technology by replacing the control room functions of 46 local Fire and Rescue Services in England with a network of nine purpose-built regional control centres using a national computer system. The project was launched in 2004, but following a series of delays and difficulties, was terminated in December 2010 with none of the original objectives achieved and a minimum of £469 million being wasted. The Department attempted, without sufficient mandatory powers, to impose a single, national approach on locally accountable Fire and Rescue Services who were reluctant to change the way they operated. There were no basic project approval checks and balances - decisions were taken before a business case, project plan or procurement strategy had been developed and tested. The result was hugely unrealistic forecast costs and savings, naève over-optimism on the deliverability of the IT solution and under-appreciation or mitigation of the risks. Fundamentals of project management were absent: the centres were constructed and completed whilst there was considerable delay in even awarding the IT contract, let alone developing the essential IT infrastructure. There was a high turnover of senior managers although none have been held accountable for the failure. The IT contract went to a company with no direct experience of supplying the emergency services. £84.8 million is now earmarked to meet the project's original objectives, to improve resilience, efficiency and interoperability within the Fire and Rescue Service but there is no certainty this will provide value for money.
This report examines existing approaches to formula funding across government, and the principles that should be carried forward to new arrangements. Government departments distributed £152 billion, one-fifth of all government spending, to local public bodies in 2011-12 based on the three grants considered: Primary Care Trust Allocations; Dedicated Schools Grant; and the Department for Communities and Local Government's Formula Grant. These distribute funding to local public bodies in a range of sectors, including health, education, local government, police and fire and rescue services. The formula funding systems are complex, difficult to understand, and have led to inequitable allocations. For Dedicated Schools Grant, based mainly on historical spending patterns, per pupil funding for schools with similar characteristics can vary by as much as 40%. Under Formula Grant, nearly 20% of authorities received allocations which are more than 10% different from calculated needs. The priorities accorded to different elements of the formulae are judgements which have a direct impact on the distribution of funds. In some cases the basis for the judgement is guided by authoritative, published independent advice. In other cases, the basis for judgement lacks transparency, and external advice lacks status and influence. Only 4% of respondents to DCLG's consultation supported the current version of the model used to calculate Formula Grant. Some of the data used by departments in calculating relative needs is inaccurate and out of date. Current reviews of formula funding provide opportunities to address the weaknesses identified in this report.
