Aus dem Inhalt: Die transzendentallogische Funktion des Ich (Klaus Hammacher). - Du formel au transcendental: remarques sur l'itineraire de Husserl et de Fichte (Therese Pentzopoulou-Valalas). - Fichte und das Problem des intelligiblen Fatalismus (Georg Wallwitz). - Die Philosophie in Freiheit setzen: Freiheitsbegriff und Freiheit des Begriffs bei Schelling (Felix Duque).
To become fully aware of the original and radical character of his transcendental phenomenology Edmund Husserl must be located within the historical tradition of Western philosophy. Although he was not a historian of philosophy, Husserl's his torical reflections convinced him that phenomenology is the necessary culmination of a centuries-old endeavor and the solution to the contemporary crisis in European science and European humanity itself.l This teleological viewpoint re quires the commentator to consider the tradition of Western philosophy from Husserl's own perspective. Husserl maintained that the Cartesian tum to the "Cogito" represents the crucial breakthrough in the historical advance of Western thought toward philosophy as rigorous science. Hence 2 he concentrated almost exclusively on the modem era. Much has been written of Husserl's relationship to Descartes, Kant, and the neo-Kantians. His connections with Locke, Berkeley, and Hume have not been examined as closely despite his fre quent allusions to these British empiricists. Among these thinkers David Hume gained from Husserl the more extensive considera tion. Commentators have pointed out correctly that Husserl always criticized unsparingly Hume's sheer empiricistic approach to the problem of cognition. Such an approach, in Husserl's view, can only result in the "naturalization of consciousness" from which stem that "psychologism" and "sensualism" which lead Hume inevitably into the contradictory impasse of solipsism 3 and skepticism.
These essays span a period of fourteen years. The earliest was written in 1960, the latest in 1983. They all represent various attempts to understand the motives and the central concepts of Husserl's transcen dental phenomenology, and to locate the latter in the background of other varieties of transcendental philosophy. Implicitly, they also con tain a defense of transcendental philosophy, and make attempts to respond to the more familiar criticisms against it. It is hoped that they will contribute to a better understanding not only of Husserl's transcen dental phenomenology but also of transcendental philosophy in gener al. The ordering of the essays is not chronological. They are rather divided thematically into three groups. The first group of six essays is concerned with relating Husserlian phenomenology to more contem porary analytic concerns: in fact, the opening essay on Husserl and Frege establishes a certain continuity of concern with my last published book with that title. Of these, Essay 2 was written for an American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division symposium in which the other symposiast was John Searle. The discussion in that symposium concentrated chiefly on the relation between intentionality and causali ty - which led me to write Essay 6, later read as the Gurwitsch Memo rial Lecture at the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philos ophy meetings in 1982 at Penn State.
TOPOLOGIE DES LOGOS UND KANT-INTERPRETATION {sect} I. Topologie des Logos Die Geschichte der Philosophie ist die Geschichte der Entwicklung des Logos. Jedes System der Philosophie hat seinen Logos. Jedes System der Philosophie, welches seinen Logos hat, ist yom Standpunkte der Entwicklung der Philosophie als Ganzem gesehen eine notwendige Entwicklung des Logos. Die Geschichte der Philosophie ist, wie Hegel sagte, eine Entwicklung des absoluten Geistes. Aber diese Entwicklung des Logos solI man nicht als dialektische Entwicklung, wie Hegel sie sah, bezeichnen. Vielmehr befindet sich das System der Hegelschen Philosophie seiber an einer besonderen Stelle der Entwicklung des Logos. Die Entwicklung des Logos ist nicht immer dialektisch-formelle Entwicklung und wird nicht in Dialektik bis zum AuBersten getrieben. Wir mussen uns davor huten, die Entwicklung des Logos formell dialek tisch zu sehen. Vielmehr mussen wir die Entwicklung des Logos - in der Phase der notwendigen Entwicklung, in der er sich befinde- positiv betrachten. Dialektische Konstruktion der Geschichte der Philosophie auf Kosten der Tatsachen, wie Hegel sie trieb, ist dogma tisch-idealitisches Verhalten, und unser Verhalten soIl nicht solches sein. Betrachten wir positiv die Entwicklung des Logos in der Geschich te der Philosophie, so entsteht nicht dialektische Geschichtsauffassung, sondern Topologie der Entwicklung des Logos: kurz, die Topologie des Logo~. Nach der Topologie des Logos wird jedem System der Philoso phie sein Topos in der Entwicklung des Logos als Ganzem gegeben.
In a critical dialogue with the metaphysical tradition from Plato to Hegel to contemporary schools of thought, the author convincingly argues that traditional rationalist metaphysics has failed to accomplish its goal of demonstrating the existence of a divine cause and moral purpose of the world. To replace the defective rationalist metaphysics, the author builds a new metaphysics on the idea that moods and affects make manifest the world's felt meanings; he argues that each feature of the world is a felt meaning in the sense that each feature is a source of a feeling-response, if and when it appears. The author asserts that we must synthesize our two ways of knowing - poetic evocations and exact analyses - in order to decide which mood or affect is the appropriate appreciation of any given feature of the world. Smith gives evocative and exact explications of such features as the world's temporality, appearance, and mind-independency, as these features appear in the appropriate recitations.
Tran Duc Thao, a brilliant student of philosophy at the Ecole Normale Super- ieure within the post-1935 decade of political disaster, born in Vietnam shortly after the F ir st World War, recipient of a scholarship in Paris in 1935 37, was early noted for his independent and originaI mind_ While the 1930s twisted down to the defeat of the Spanish Republic, the compromise with German Fascism at Munich, and the start of the Second World War, and while the 1940s began with hypocritical stability at the Western Front fol- lowed by the defeat of France, and the occupation of Paris by the German power together with French collaborators, and the n ended with liberation and a search for a new understanding of human situations, the young Thao was deeply immersed in the classical works of European philosophy. He was al so the attentive but critical student of a quite special generation of French metaphysicians and social philosophers: Gaston Berger, Maurice Merleau- Ponty, Emile Brehier, Henri Lefebvre, Rene le Senne, Jean-Paul Sartre, perhaps the young Louis Althusser. They, in their several modes of response, had been meditating for more than a decade on the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, which came to France in the thirties as a new metaphysical enlighten- ment - phenomenology.
