In this 2001 book Jonathan Price attempts to demonstrate that Thucydides consciously viewed and presented the Peloponnesian War in terms of a condition of civil strife - stasis, in Greek. Thucydides defines stasis as a set of symptoms indicating an internal disturbance in both individuals and states. This diagnostic method, in contrast to all other approaches in antiquity, allows an observer to identify stasis even when the combatants do not or cannot openly acknowledge the nature of their conflict. The words and actions which Thucydides chooses for his narrative meet his criteria for stasis: the speeches in the History represent the breakdown of language and communication characteristic of internal conflict, and the zeal for victory led to acts of unusual brutality and cruelty, and overall disregard for genuinely Hellenic customs, codes of morality and civic loyalty. Viewing the Peloponnesian War as a destructive internal war had profound consequences for Thucydides' historical vision.
As a sustained analysis of the connections between narrative structure and meaning in the History of the Peloponnesian War, Carolyn Dewald's study revolves around a curious aspect of Thucydides' work: the first ten years of the war's history are formed on principles quite different from those shaping the years that follow. Although aspects of this change in style have been recognized in previous scholarship, Dewald has rigorously analyzed how its various elements are structured, used, and related to each other. Her study argues that these changes in style and organization reflect how Thucydides' own understanding of the war changed over time. Throughout, however, the History's narrative structure bears witness to Thucydides' dialogic efforts to depict the complexities of rational choice and behavior on the part of the war's combatants, as well as his own authorial interest in accuracy of representation. In her introduction and conclusion, Dewald explores some ways in which details of style and narrative structure are central to the larger theoretical issue of history's ability to meaningfully represent the past. She also surveys changes in historiography in the past quarter-century and considers how Thucydidean scholarship has reflected and responded to larger cultural trends.
Since antiquity, Book 8 of Thucydides’ History has been considered an unpolished draft which lacks revision. Even those who admit that the book has some elements of internal coherence believe that Thucydides, if death had not prevented him, would have improved many chapters or even the whole structure of the book. Consequently, while the first seven books of the History have been well examined through the last two centuries, the narrative plan of Book 8 remains an obscure subject, as we do not possess an extensive and detailed presentation of its whole narrative design. Vasileios Liotsakis tries to satisfy this central desideratum of the Thucydidean scholarship by offering a thorough description of the compositional plan, which, in his opinion, Thucydides put into effect in the last 109 chapters of his work. His study elaborates on the structural parts of the book, their details, and the various techniques through which Thucydides composed his narration in order to reach the internal cohesion of these chapters as well as their close connection to the rest of the History. Liotsakis offers us an original approach not only of Book 8 but also of the whole work, since his observations reshape our overall view of the History.
Ideas of history: Ktema es aiei : Thucydides' concept of "learning through history" and its realization in his work / Kurt A. Raaflaub -- The distribution of character judgments in Thucydides / Matthieu de Bakker -- Ascribing motivation in Thucydides : between historical research and literary representation / Melina Tamiolaki -- The causes of the Athenian pestilence and the plague / Paul Demont -- Representations of time and space: The presence of the past in Thucydides / Jonas Grethlein -- The Cylon conspiracy : Thucydides and the uses of the past / Tim Rood -- Katâ ethne kai kata poleis : from the catalogues to the archaeologies / Roberto Nicolai -- In the shadow of Pericles: Athens' Samian victory and the organization of the Pentekontaetia / Marek Węcowski -- Transformations of landscapes in Thucydides / Vassiliki Pothou -- Thucydides and politics: "Reading" Athens : foreign perceptions of the agency of leaders and demos in Thucydides / Sarah Brown Ferrario -- Thucydides and the masses / Suzanne Saad -- Thucydides' Pericles : between historical reality and literary representation /Panos Christodoulou -- Aspects of the narrative: The balance of power and compositional balance: Thucydides, book I / June Allison -- Blurring the boundaries of speech: Thucydides and indirect discourse / Paula Debnar -- The narrative strategy: observations on the 7th book of Thucydides / Anna Lamari -- "The dot on the i" : Thucydidean epilogues / Hans-Peter Stahl -- The narrative legacy of Thucydides: Polybius book 1 / Nikos Miltsios -- The language of Thucydides: The litotes of Thucydides / Pierre Pontier -- History as presence : time, tense and narrative modes in Thucydides / Rutger J. Allan -- Textual structure and modality in Thucydides' military exhortations / Antonis Takmakis, Charalambos Themistokleous -- Attributive discourse in the speeches of Thucydides / Maria Pavlou -- Difficult statements in Thucydides / Jonathan Price -- The language of Pericles / Daniel P. Tompkins.
This is the first in a series of volumes which together will provide an entirely new history of ancient Greek (narrative) literature. Its organization is formal rather than biographical. It traces the history of central narrative devices, such as the narrator and his narratees, time, focalization, characterization, description, speech, and plot. It offers not only analyses of the handling of such a device by individual authors, but also a larger historical perspective on the manner in which it changes over time and is put to different uses by different authors in different genres. The first volume lays the foundation for all volumes to come, discussing the definition and boundaries of narrative, and the roles of its producer, the narrator, and recipient, the narratees.
This book, the second of two monographs, consists of contributions by world-class scholars on Thucydides' legacy to the political process. It also includes a careful examination of the usefulness and efficacy of the interdisciplinary approach to political order in the ancient world and proposes new paths for the future study.
The cause of great power war is a perennial issue for the student of politics. Some 2,400 years ago, in his monumental History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides wrote that it was the growth of Athenian power and the fear that this power inspired in Sparta which rendered the Peloponnesian War somehow necessary, inevitable, or compulsory. In this new political psychological study of Thucydides' first book, S.N. Jaffe shows how the History's account of the outbreak of the war ultimately points toward the opposing characters of the Athenian and Spartan regimes, disclosing a Thucydidean preoccupation with the interplay between nature and convention. Jaffe explores how the character of the contest between Athens and Sparta, or how the outbreak of a particular war, can reveal Thucydides' account of the recurring human causes of war and peace. The political thought of Thucydides proves bound up with his distinctive understanding of the interrelationship of particular events and more universal themes.
The notion of a "Thucydides Trap" that will ensnare China and the United States in a 21st century conflict-much as the rising power of Athens alarmed Sparta and made war "inevitable" between the Aegean superpowers of the 5th century BCE-has received global attention since entering the international relations lexicon 6 years ago. Scholars, journalists, bloggers, and politicians in many countries, notably China, have embraced this beguiling metaphor, coined by Harvard political science professor Graham Allison, as a framework for examining the likelihood of a Sino-American war. This case study examines the Thucydides Trap metaphor and the response it has elicited. Hewing closely to what the historian of the Peloponnesian War actually says about the causes and inevitability of war, it argues that, while Thucydides' text does not support Allison's normative assertion about the "inevitable" result of an encounter between "rising" and "ruling" powers, the History of the Peloponnesian War (hereafter, History) does identify elements of leadership and political dynamic that bear directly on whether a clash of interests between two states is resolved through peaceful means or escalates to war. It is precisely because war typically begins with a considered decision by a national command authority to reject other options and mobilize for conflict (and thus always entails an element of choice) that insight from Thucydides' History remains relevant and beneficial for the contemporary strategist, or citizen, concerned in such decisions.Accordingly, this case study concludes that the Thucydides Trap, as conceived and presented by Graham Allison, draws welcome attention both to Thucydides and to the pitfalls of great power competition, but fails as a heuristic device or predictive tool in the analysis of contemporary events. Allison's metaphor offers, at best, a potentially misleading over-simplification of Thucydides' nuanced and problematic account of the origins of the epochal conflict that defined his age. Moreover, it overlooks actual insights from the History that can help political decisionmakers-including, but not limited to, those of the United States and China-either avoid war or, if ignored, pose genuine policy "traps" that can make an avoidable war more likely, and a necessary war more costly.
