Author: Matthew Knowles

Publisher:

Published: 2017

Total Pages: 198

ISBN-13:

"This dissertation consists of three essays concerning the macroeconomic implications of financial market frictions that limit the ability of firms to obtain external finance. Each of the three chapters employs a theoretical macroeconomic model, combined with some empirical analysis, to study unanswered questions in the literature related to the importance of these financial market frictions for the wider economy. The three chapters consider, in turn, the effect of banking crises on investment, output and employment, the implications of financial market frictions for optimal capital taxation, and the effect of banking deregulation on the distribution of income. The first chapter studies the long slumps in output and employment following banking crises. In a panel of OECD and emerging economies, I find that recessions are associated with larger initial drops in investment and more persistent drops in output if they occur simultaneously with banking crises. Furthermore, the banking crises that are followed by more persistent output slumps are associated with particularly large initial drops in investment. I show that these patterns can arise in a model where a financial shock temporarily increases the costs of external finance for investing entrepreneurs. This leads to a drop in investment and a persistent slump in output. Critical to the model is the distinction between different types of capital with different depreciation rates. Intangible capital and equipment have high depreciation rates, leading these stocks to drop substantially when investment falls after a financial shock. If wages display some rigidity, this induces a slump in output and employment that persists for roughly a decade, through the contribution of the decline in equipment and intangibles to declining production and labor demand. I find that this mechanism can account for almost a third of the persistent drop in output and employment in the US Great Recession (2007-2014). In the model, TFP and government spending shocks lead to relatively smaller declines in investment and less persistent drops in output; so the model is also consistent with the more transitory output drops seen after non-financial recessions, where such shocks may have been more important. The second chapter, based on work co-written with Corina Boar, considers the implications of financial market frictions for optimal linear capital taxation, in a setting where the government is concerned with redistribution. By including financial frictions, we emphasize the effect of a new channel affecting the equity-efficiency trade-off of redistribution: taxes affect the allocative efficiency of capital and, ultimately, total factor productivity. We find that high tax rates can be optimal, provided that they are applied to wealth, rather than risky capital. Under plausible parameter values, we find that the optimal tax on risky capital is lower than that on wealth, and roughly in line with current U.S. levels. This suggests welfare gains from taxing wealth at a higher rate than risky capital. The third chapter, based on work co-written with Corina Boar and Yicheng Wang, studies the effect of banking deregulation in the US on the distribution of income, from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. We focus on the effect of the removal of interstate banking and branching restrictions over the 1970-1994 period. We present a theoretical model based on Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) to illustrate the channels through which this deregulation may affect the income distribution. In the model, income inequality rises after banking deregulation for some values of the parameters--because deregulation decreases the cost of borrowing, which primarily benefits wealthy firm-owners. We empirically estimate the effect of interstate banking and branching deregulation on income inequality by exploiting variations in the timing of deregulation across states. We find that the removal of banking restrictions increased the Gini coefficient by 6 percent in the long run."--Pages ix-xi.