Three Essays on Institutional Investors and Income Taxes
Three Essays on Institutional Investors and Income Taxes

Author: Spencer Conley Usrey

Publisher:

Published: 2009

Total Pages: 136

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

This dissertation investigates the role of institutional investors in capital market tax studies. Specifically, this studies examines how institutional investors influence firms' cost of capital and financing decisions following changes in personal tax rates on debt and equity income. The dissertation is organized into three essays that examine these topics. The first two essays examine tax rate changes in 1997 and 2003 that reduced the personal tax rates on interest, capital gains and dividends. Essay 3 summarizes relevant literature involving institutional investors and capital market tax studies. Essay 1 investigates whether differences between the tax liabilities of the underlying shareholders of institutional investors affect firms' capital structures and decisions to issue debt versus equity following changes in tax rates on investment income received by individuals. The study predicts that firms with high concentrations of tax disadvantaged institutional investors (institutions whose underlying shareholders are taxable) will issue more equity relative to debt than those with high concentrations of tax-advantaged institutional investors (institutions whose underlying shareholders are not taxable). The results find that the financing decisions of firms with high levels of tax-disadvantaged institutional investors are influenced by changes in individual tax rates. Essay 2 investigates whether differences in the tax attributes of the underlying shareholders of institutional investors influences the impact of equity tax rate changes on a firm's cost of equity. The study examines a sample period of two years (eight quarters) around the enactment of the 1997 and 2003 Acts. The study finds that firms with high levels of tax-disadvantaged ownership experienced a decrease in their cost of equity capital following a decrease in the individual tax rate on capital gains. In addition, the interaction of the institutional investor dummy variable and a dummy variable indicating the observation is after the 2003 Act indicates that the cost of equity capital for firms with high levels of tax-disadvantaged ownership decreased following the 2003 Act. The results of Essays 1 and 2 provide evidence that institutional investors are not homogeneous with respect to their influence on firms' cost of capital and financing decisions following changes in individual tax rates.

The Behavior of Institutional Investors
The Behavior of Institutional Investors

Author: Alexander Pütz

Publisher:

Published: 2012

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9783832531898

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Institutional investors such as mutual funds and hedge funds play an important role in today's financial markets. This thesis consists of three essays which empirically study the behavior of active fund managers. In particular, the first essay investigates whether managers behave rationally or if some of them unconsciously make wrong investment decisions due to behavioral biases. The second essay examines whether some managers intentionally act to solely advance their own interests by strategically valuing the security positions in their portfolio. The third essay analyzes what the managers' education reveals about their investment behavior.

Three Essays on Institutional Investors
Three Essays on Institutional Investors

Author: Ligang Zhong

Publisher:

Published: 2012

Total Pages: 436

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

In this dissertation, I investigate the impact of institutional investors on security prices and corporate policies, and offer a new perspective on the vital role that institutional investors play in the modern capital market. Specifically, on the impact on security price movements, I design a new measure of stock-level sentiment based on mutual fund publically disclosed portfolio information and provide a new dimension to better predict stock returns. A trading strategy based on the new sentiment metrics can generate an annualized alpha of 21.27%. The abnormal returns cannot be explained by the time-varying expected returns and transaction costs, and can be best explained by mutual fund overreactions. Hence, my findings can be interpreted as a new anomaly in a new era-when institutional investors are the marginal traders. On the impact on corporate policy side, I document two pieces of new empirical evidence on the importance of long-term institutional holdings: the entrenchment effect of long-term institutional holdings in the context of corporate financing decisions and the active monitoring role of long-term institutional investors in the context of international firms' accounting qualities. Combined with previous studies which favour a long-term institutional investor, the evidence on the cost side of long-term holding I document here can serve as the first call for an optimal investment horizon for firms operating in the U.S.

Three Essays on Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance
Three Essays on Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance

Author: Rasha Ashraf

Publisher:

Published: 2007

Total Pages:

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

The first essay analyzes mutual funds' proxy voting records on shareholder proposals. The results indicate that mutual funds support shareholder proposals and vote against management for proposals that are likely to increase shareholders' wealth and rights, in firms with weaker external monitoring mechanisms, in firms with entrenched management, and when funds have longer investment horizon. Mutual funds mostly take management sides on executive compensation related proposals, when they have higher ownership concentration, and when they belong to bigger fund families. The results further indicate that there is a positive reputational effect for the funds undertaking a monitoring role. Moreover, mutual funds reduce holdings when they disapprove of managements' policy, but before doing so they take on an activist role by supporting shareholder proposals. The second essay investigates institutional investors' trading behavior of acquiring firm stocks surrounding merger activities. We label investment companies and independent investment advisors as active institutions and banks, nonbank trusts and insurance companies as passive institutions. We find active institutions increase holdings of acquiring firm stocks for mergers with higher wealth implications. However, active institutions overreact to stock mergers at the announcement, which they appear to correct at the resolution quarter of the merger. The trading behavior of passive institutions suggests that these institutions disregard the market response of merger announcement in trading acquiring firm stocks at the announcement quarter. The passive institutions gradually update their beliefs and trade on the basis of merger wealth effect at the resolution quarter. The third essay examines relation between executive compensation structure with the existing level and changes of takeover defense mechanisms of firms. According to "managerial entrenchment hypothesis," higher managerial power from adoption of takeover defense mechanisms would lead to generating higher rents for executives. "Efficient contracting hypothesis" argue that higher anti-takeover provisions would contribute in achieving efficient contracting by deferring compensation into the future due to the low possibility of hostile takeover. The results support managerial entrenchment hypothesis with regard to existing level of takeover defense mechanisms. With regard to changes in anti-takeover provisions, the existing level of managerial power influence the future pay structure.

Essays in Institutional Investor Behavior
Essays in Institutional Investor Behavior

Author: Viktoriya Lantushenko

Publisher:

Published: 2016

Total Pages: 226

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

This dissertation consists of one chapter studying mutual fund active management and two chapters examining institutional trading in various settings. The three essays in my dissertation explore institutional investor behavior. My first paper titled "Innovation in mutual fund portfolios: Implications for fund alpha" introduces a new measure of portfolio holdings that has power to explain future fund abnormal returns. This measure is defined as "return on portfolio innovation." It is constructed as the return on completely new portfolio positions that a fund has not held before. I evaluate the return on newly added positions because their performance can signal the quality of managerial effort. On average, a one-standard deviation increase in the return on innovation increases the Carhart (1997) four-factor fund alpha by approximately 0.34 to 0.52 percent per year. The results have important implications for fund performance and manager behavior. The second essay titled "Institutional property-type herding in real estate investment trusts," with Edward Nelling, explores whether institutional investors exhibit herding behavior by property type in real estate investment trusts (REITs). Our analysis of changes in institutional portfolio holdings suggests strong evidence of this behavior. We analyze the autocorrelation in aggregate institutional demand, and find that most of it is driven by institutional investor following the trades of others. Although momentum trading explains a small amount of this herding, institutional property type demand is more strongly associated with lagged institutional demand than lagged returns. The results suggest that correlated information signals drive herding in REITs. In addition, we examine the extent to which herding in REIT property types affects price performance in the private real estate market. We find that information transmission resulting from institutional herding in REITs occurs faster in public real estate markets than in private markets. The final essay titled "Investing in innovation: Evidence from institutional trading around patent publications," with Edward Nelling, examines institutional trading activity around patent publication dates. Unlike previous studies that use the future citations count to proxy for patent value, we measure the value of innovation by the three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around announcements. We find an increase in institutional demand for a firm's shares around patent announcements, and this increase is correlated with announcement returns. In addition, the increase in demand is greater when the firm's shareholder base consists of a higher percentage of long-term institutions. We find no correlation between patent announcement returns and the future number of citations. Patent announcements are also associated with increases in liquidity and analyst coverage, indicating that innovation may reduce information uncertainty between a firm and its investors. In addition, firms that announce patents outperform those in a control sample over a long-run. Overall, our results suggest that both investors and firms benefit from innovation.