Three Essays on Electoral Rules and Competitive Authoritarian Elections
Author: Shichao Ma
Publisher:
Published: 2019
Total Pages: 178
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOK"This dissertation consists of three essays on elections in democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes. The first chapter examines how the incumbent in an authoritarian regime eliminates his opponents in a competitive election. The rest two chapters study how elections and electoral rules affect the behavior of politicians and political parties in ethnic mobilization and the formation of trade treaties. In the first chapter, I study optimal repression in competitive autocracies by building a citizen-candidate model in which one candidate, the incumbent, can selectively eliminate other citizen-candidates. I find that the incumbent either eliminates all competitive challengers to win the election, removes a smaller subset of challengers to select a preferable successor, or runs a free and fair election and loses power. In a free and fair election, the median voter result does not hold. For a large range of parameters, the successor selected by the incumbent can be more moderate than any candidate that would emerge from a free and fair election. Consequently, compared to a free and fair election, the median voter may be better off in a rigged election. The second chapter examines the influence of two major electoral rules on people's ethnic salience through politician's mobilization and nation-building effort. Building on the constructivist view of ethnicity, I model electoral competition between ethnic entrepreneurs and a national unitary actor under majoritarian and proportional representation voting rules. The model shows that proportional representation encourages ethnic mobilization and discourages nation-building while majoritarian rule has the opposite effect. Using data from eighteen African democracies, I find citizens feel their ethnic identities more salient under proportional representation than under majoritarian rule when approaching elections. The third chapter proposes a novel explanation for why states form preferential trade agreements (PTAs). I argue that current governments, anticipating them losing power in the future, use PTAs to constrain future governments. This mechanism can generate two unique observable implications that are not compatible with existing theories. Because the demand for constraining opponents varies with electoral institutions and electoral prospects, I expect governments are more likely to ratify PTAs under the under majoritarian electoral rules and before losing elections. Empirical results from a dataset of all PTAs from 1945 to 2006 strongly support these hypotheses."--Pages x-xi.