The third chapter provides a necessary condition for the existence of a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a circular model when consumers have heterogeneous unit transportation costs. Given a fixed mean of unit transportation costs in the population, the candidate symmetric equilibrium price is always smaller when there is heterogeneity in the unit transportation costs than when there is not. Hence, given the assumption of free entry, the market may generate less brands with heterogeneity.
The Organization of Industry collects essays written over two decades—pieces prepared especially for this volume, previously unpublished material, and reprinted articles drawn from numerous sources, many which include additional commentary by the author. The essays are unified by George J. Stigler's careful analysis and by his clear and witty style. In part one, Stigler examines the nature of competition and monopoly. In part two he discusses the forces that determine the size structure of industry, including barriers to entry, economics of scale, and mergers. Part three contains articles on a wide range of topics, such as profitability, delivered price systems, block booking, the economics of information, and the kinky oligopoly demand curve and rigid price. Part four offers a discussion of antitrust policy and includes Stigler's recommendations for future policy as well as an examination of the effects of past policies. "Stigler's writings might well be subtitled 'The Joys of Doing Economics.' He, more than any other contemporary American economist, dispels the gloom surrounding economic theory. It is impossible to confront the subject treated with such humor and verve and come away still believing that economics is the dismal science."—Shirley B. Johnson, American Scholar
Expanded and updated coverage of such key areas as positivism and economic methodology as well as special methodological problems and perspectives enhances this new edition of twenty-two classic and more recent pivotal investigations into the philosophy of economics.
This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.
In Great Minds In Management Ken G. Smith and Michael A. Hitt have brought together some of the most influential and original thinkers in management. Their contributions to this volume not only outline their landmark contributions to management theory, but also reflect on the process of theory development, presenting their own personal accounts of the gestation of these theories. The result is not only an ambitious and original panorama of the key ideas in management theory presented by their originators, but also a unique collection of reflections on the process of theory development, an area which to date little has been written about by those who have actually had experience of building theory. In their concluding chapter, Ken G. Smith and Michael A. Hitt draw together some common themes about the development of management theory over the last half a century, and suggest some of the conclusions to be drawn about how theory comes into being. Contributors: Chris Argyris, Albert Bandura, Jay B. Barney, Lee R. Beach, Kim Cameron, Michael R. Darby, Robert Folger, R. Edward Freeman, Michael Frese, J. Richard Hackman, Donald C. Hambrick, Michael A. Hitt, Anne S. Huff, Gary P. Latham, Edwin A. Locke, Henry Mintzberg, Terrence R. Mitchell, Richard T. Mowday, Ikujiro Nonaka, Greg R. Oldham, Jeffrey Pfeffer, Lyman W. Porter, Denise M. Rousseau, W. Richard Scott, Ken G. Smith, Barry M. Staw, Richard M. Steers, Victor H. Vroom, Karl E. Weick, Oliver E. Williamson, Sidney G. Winter, and Lynn Zucker,
