The first documented, systematic study of a truly revolutionary subject, this 1937 text remains the definitive guide to guerrilla warfare. It concisely explains unorthodox strategies that transform disadvantages into benefits.
Seasoned soldier and scholar of military science, Jehan Morel introduces us to the world of guerilla and counter-guerilla warfare in a captivating book that is part practical handbook and part historical examination of the major contemporary geopolitical movements. Relying on his first-hand counter-insurgency experience in Indochina and Central Africa and on his encyclopedic knowledge of asymmetric warfare, this thoroughly researched work gives us an inner glimpse of their actual nature. A world where the strong fervor and boldness of rebels need to be supported by clarity of purpose, strategic planning and perfect execution to achieve their goals: proclaiming the independence of a country under occupation, overthrowing the country's regime or beating a foreign invading army through a war of attrition. Counter-guerilla warfare is also subjected to the same methodical examination that provides the ideal structural foundation of its organization and the recommended astute to eradicate an insurgency. Its reading gives to the reader the details of the ideal organizations of guerilla and counter-guerilla alike; the infrastructure and resources needed to support their actions; as well as the minutiae of their typical operations (attack of an outpost, headquarters, a military parade, a patrol; a prison raid, a road or river convoy ambush, jungle combat, urban guerrilla, street fighting ...). It takes us to the "hidden" theaters of war that play major roles in a guerrilla: funding, intelligence, deception, psychological, penetration of the enemy, cyber warfare, communications, all of them key components that affect the issue of the conflict, yet are usually overlooked in favor of the more "news-friendly" martial aspect of war. It takes us to the discovery of the true decisive factor of the success of guerilla or counter-guerilla operations: winning the heart and minds of the local population, whose support is essential and which bestows legitimacy to the "cause." Securing that support requires outlining clear rules of engagements, having a drastic code of justice and ensuring harmonious relationships between the guerilla (or counter-guerilla) operatives and the local population. Then, taking a step back from the day-to-day cycle of actions and retaliations, the author provides an in-depth analysis of the major geopolitical and geostrategic upheavals of our era, from the war of Indochina and the bloody "events" of Algeria, according to the official language-to today's ISIS operations in Iraq and Syria, from the Colombian FARCs and ELN, the Indian Naxalites to the Ugandan LRA. Providing contextual analysis and historical background to each of these, he points out the failures of his own indecisive country in the regions where he was operating, brings a magnifying glass to the myriad of conflicts of local or global importance, retraces their roots (ethnic rivalries, political enmities, religious fundamentalism, money) and elucidates their stakes. Jehan Morel give us a fascinating book that is realistic about the present and pessimistic about the future.
Extensively illustrated with 52 detailed campaign and battle maps and diagrams, this book, originally published in 1990, surveys the evolution of warfare in Europe from Napoleon to the end of the twentieth century and in Asia from the Middle Ages. It considers the interaction of technology and warfare. With wide-ranging examples, the book includes two in depth case studies, one on the Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group and its predecessors in the Russian Imperial Army, the other on the history of land warfare, including guerilla warfare, in Asia. In this book the author demonstrates that military history can be of immense practical help to the modern military analyst and professional. Now updated with a new introduction to take into account changes since 1990, this book remains of essential value to students, teachers & professionals in political & social history, international relations, defence, war & peace studies.
Guerrilla insurgencies continue to rage across the globe, fueled by ethnic and religious conflict and the easy availability of weapons. At the same time, urban population centers in both industrialized and developing nations attract ever-increasing numbers of people, outstripping rural growth rates worldwide. As a consequence of this population shift from the countryside to the cities, guerrilla conflict in urban areas, similar to the violent response to U.S. occupation in Iraq, will become more frequent. Urban Guerrilla Warfare traces the diverse origins of urban conflicts and identifies similarities and differences in the methods of counterinsurgent forces. In this wide-ranging and richly detailed comparative analysis, Anthony James Joes examines eight key examples of urban guerrilla conflict spanning half a century and four continents: Warsaw in 1944, Budapest in 1956, Algiers in 1957, Montevideo and São Paulo in the 1960s, Saigon in 1968, Northern Ireland from 1970 to 1998, and Grozny from 1994 to 1996. Joes demonstrates that urban insurgents violate certain fundamental principles of guerrilla warfare as set forth by renowned military strategists such as Carl von Clausewitz and Mao Tse-tung. Urban guerrillas operate in finite areas, leaving themselves vulnerable to encirclement and ultimate defeat. They also tend to abandon the goal of establishing a secure base or a cross-border sanctuary, making precarious combat even riskier. Typically, urban guerrillas do not solely target soldiers and police; they often attack civilians in an effort to frighten and disorient the local population and discredit the regime. Thus urban guerrilla warfare becomes difficult to distinguish from simple terrorism. Joes argues persuasively against committing U.S. troops in urban counterinsurgencies, but also offers cogent recommendations for the successful conduct of such operations where they must be undertaken.
This book deals with guerrilla warfare; it does not aim at presenting a universal theory, for such a theory would be either exceedingly vague or exceedingly wrong. The present volume is the first part of a wider study which, the author believes, has not been attempted before - a critical interpretation of guerrilla and terrorist theory and practice
âRevolutionâ is a word that causes fear in some, exhilaration in others, and confusion in most. Originally used to describe a restoration, it eventually came to mean a sweeping, sudden attack on an existing order. Human history has borne witness to a variety of national and social revolutionsâpopulation revolution, revolution of ideas, technological revolution, and revolution in education. Simultaneously, there has been a proliferation of literature on revolution, armed struggle, and violence aimed at unseating policies and leadership of governments and societies. Revolutionary struggles are more than simply armed internal conflict; they involve the essence of the political system. The desire to make such phenomena understandable often leads to oversimplification. Attempts to encompass their multi-dimensional nature, on the other hand, can become immersed in complexities, ambiguities, and misinterpretations. The perspective of this classic volume, available in paperback for the first time, is that revolution is here to stay. Guerrilla warfare, according to Sarkesian, is a particularly useful strategy for the weak, the frustrated, the alienated, and seekers of power against existing regimes. The collected works in this volume examine the social roots of revolution, development of strategy and tactics, practice in city and countryside, dilemmas of attackers and defenders. The actors and thinkers collected and analyzed here range from leading political analysts, anthropologists, sociologists, historians, and officials as well as practitioners of guerrilla warfare. This core text with primary sources in the area of war, revolution, and insurgence develops an understanding of revolution, traces the growth of guerilla doctrine, and studies the specifics of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary guerilla warfare.
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.