This book presents the theory of Industrial Organization in a unified and concise way. It presents the main models and results in the area, using game theory as a unifying theoretical background. Besides corrections and new sections, the new edition contains a new chapter on games of incomplete information. More than 200 excercises help the reader to understand the results of the book.
One of the most fascinating debates of our times is the discussion over the merits and capabilities of market economies. Very often, one sees strong endorsements to the idea that markets provide an efficient way of allocating resources. Some years ago, opposite views on this issue used to be very popular (at least in Europe) and were held by similarly qualified people. In my opinion, the contribution of economics to this question can not be dismissed on the grounds that economics still in its infancy and that this question is a "practical" one (whatever this means). Economics started with similar naive ideas, two hundred years ago. In particular it has taken a long time to realize that competition does not work in such a smooth way as many classical writers thought it did, and that many facts can not be explained by the theory of perfectly competitive markets. This issue is explored at depth in the Introduction to this Lectures. In this sense the contribution of the Theory of industrial Organization has been to make a convincing case for the view that monopoly and oligopoly can persist in the long run in a world populated by rational agents. Despite of the fact that we are far from having a satisfactory theory of how markets work, progress has been immense, and we certainly understand why current theories are still not completely satisfactory.
This book takes a radically different approach to the analysis of competition by rejecting the perfect vs. imperfect competition dichotomy and draws on the insights of classical political economists such as Marx, Schumpeter, Hayek and Andrews.
This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.
Economic space is the distance that separates economic agents such as manufacturers and consumers. Distance naturally imposes costs on the economic agents, but it has long been a neglected element in orthodox economic theory, one thought to complicate the issue unnecessarily. However, the theoretical implications of assuming away spatial elements may be especially significant for pricing practices and hence for competition. This volume shows why and in what ways the concept of economic space is vital and thus needed to reform orthodox price theory. It negates the classical paradigm of perfect competition and calls for a spatial price theory of imperfect competition. Among Hiroshi Ohta's findings in spatial microeconomic theory are that unlimited entry of new firms into the market may not lower consumer prices and that increased labor productivity in a spatial economy may actually lower real wages. Researchers and students of economic geography and regional science and economics will find the author's careful analysis, equations, and illustrations valuable in understanding a decade of advances in spatial price theory and in exploring new theories of competition.
What are the central questions of economics and how do economists tackle them? This book aims to answer these questions in 100 essays, written by economists and selected from "The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics". It shows how economists deal with issues ranging from trade to taxation.
This collection of readings provides a broad overview of the major theoretical concepts in the field and includes papers on industry size, quantity and price competition, entry barriers, product differentiation, incomplete information and general equilibrium with imperfect competition.
The first textbook to present a comprehensive and detailed economic analysis of electricity markets, analyzing the tensions between microeconomics and political economy. The power industry is essential in our fight against climate change. This book is the first to examine in detail the microeconomics underlying power markets, stemming from peak-load pricing, by which prices are low when the installed generation capacity exceeds demand but can rise a hundred times higher when demand is equal to installed capacity. The outcome of peak-load pricing is often difficult to accept politically, and the book explores the tensions between microeconomics and political economy. Understanding peak-load pricing and its implications is essential for designing robust policies and making sound investment decisions. Thomas-Olivier Léautier presents the model in its simplest form, and introduces additional features as different issues are presented. The book covers all segments of electricity markets: electricity generation, under perfect and imperfect competition; retail competition and demand response; transmission pricing, transmission congestion management, and transmission constraints; and the current policy issues arising from the entry of renewables into the market and capacity mechanisms. Combining anecdotes and analysis of real situations with rigorous analytical modeling, each chapter analyzes one specific issue, first presenting findings in nontechnical terms accessible to policy practitioners and graduate students in management or public policy and then presenting a more mathematical analytical exposition for students and researchers specializing in the economics of electricity markets and for those who want to understand and apply the underlying models.
The ambition of the theory of imperfectly competitive markets is to explain the working of markets in which the issue of strategic interaction among firms is central. Our analysis of this problem will be based on equilibrium concepts borrowed from Game Theory. This research program arises several questions on its feasibility like the empirical relevance of the results, the substantial theoretical insights obtained in this way, etc. Unfortunately, most of these questions can not be answered in the short run. This book is written in the hope that this research strategy is meaningful, but about its final success no body can tell. Another important question is if simpler models could deliver the essential insights offered by the theory of imperfectly competitive mar kets. This Introduction will be devoted to argue that, currently, there is no alternative to the approach presented in this book. Consider the following fact: A square inch of soil in the Explanada of Ali cante (located in front of the sea, right in the middle of downtown) cost several times more than a square inch of soil in San Vicente del Raspeig (located sev eral miles toward the interior of the peninsula). l How can we explain such a thing? First notice that because of the large quantity of possible traders involved in this market, we can safely assume that any agent has to accept the market price, i. e. is a price-taker.