The U.S. Naval Institute Chronicles series focuses on the relevance of history by exploring topics like significant battles, personalities, and service components. Tapping into the U.S. Naval Institute's robust archives, these carefully selected volumes help readers understand nuanced subjects by providing unique perspectives and some of the best contributions that have helped shape naval thinking over the many decades since the Institute’s founding in 1873. Famous as "boots on the ground," U.S. marines have long played a vital role in the air as well. In these pages readers will find both history and analysis as Naval Institute authors record and assess this lesser-known but significant aspect of "Leatherneck" combat over the last century.
This heavily illustrated work is the only book to describe the entire history of the U.S. Marine Corps' air arm. With hundreds of rare photographs, this fourth edition represents a major redesign and update of the last edition, published more than a decade ago. Chapters include descriptions of early development and training, as well as combat deployments during World War I and in Central America. World War II and Korea, Vietnam, the Balkans, and Southwest Asia campaigns are also well covered. The book's emphasis is on the Marines who made up the air squadrons, developed the aircraft and tactics, and fought the battles as the main support of troops on the ground. The text includes first-person accounts and comments from many participants--aviators and crewmen alike.
“A complete operational history of the Bismarck . . . with period photos [and] underwater photography of the wreck, allowing a forensic analysis of the damage.” —Seapower This new book offers a forensic analysis of the design, operation, and loss of Germany’s greatest battleship, drawing on survivors’ accounts and the authors’ combined decades of experience in naval architecture and command at sea. Their investigation into every aspect of this battleship is informed by painstaking research, including extensive interviews and correspondence with the ship’s designers and the survivors of the battle of the Denmark Strait and Bismarck’s final battle. Albert Schnarke, the former gunnery officer of Tirpitz, Bismarck’s sister ship, aided the authors greatly by translating and supplying manuscript materials from those who participated in the design and operations. Survivors of Bismarck’s engagements contributed to this comprehensive study including D.B.H. Wildish, RN, damage control officer aboard HMS Prince of Wales, who located photographs of battle damage to his ship. After the wreck was discovered in 1989, the authors served as technical consultants to Dr. Robert Ballard, who led three trips to the site. Filmmaker and explorer James Cameron has also contributed a chapter, giving a comprehensive overview of his deep-sea explorations on Bismarck and sharing his team’s remarkable photos of the wreck. The result of nearly six decades of research and collaboration, this is an “encyclopedic and engrossing” account (Naval Historical Foundation) of the events surrounding one of the most epic naval battles of World War II. And Battleship Bismarck finally resolves some of the major questions around her career, not least the most profound one of all: Who sank the Bismarck, the British or the Germans?
This analytic and historical study provides a revealing look at naval operational intelligence by embracing the fundamental question of what OPINTEL is and how it answers the fundamental question "Where is the enemy, in what strength, and disposition, and what is he doing right now?" It is primarily the result of an Operational Intelligence Lessons-Learned Symposium held at the National Maritime Intelligence Training Center in Dam Neck, Virginia, 12-13 September 1998. The participants included senior intelligence professionals whose mandate was to explore the ramifications of the evolution of naval operational intelligence since World War II. Current practices were also explored with inputs from current practitioners as represented by various fleet and shore commands. Additional sources for the study were oral interviews and correspondence with senior members of the intelligence community. The authors have scrupulously taken the work as close to the edge of security classification as is possible to enhance its value without being damaging to national security.
This work features the fresh thinking of twenty-eight leading authors from a variety of military and national security disciplines. Following an introduction by Lt. Gen. James Dubik, Commander I Corps, U.S. Army, the anthology first considers the general question of whether there is a distinctly American way of war. Dr. Colin Gray's opening essay "The American Way of War: Critique and Implications" provides a state of the question perspective. Sections on operational art, with writers addressing the issues in both conventional and small wars; stability and reconstruction; and intelligence complete the volume. Among the well-known contributors are Robert Scales, Mary Kaldor, Ralph Peters, Jon Sumida, Grant Hammond, Milan Vego, and T.X. Hammes. The anthology is part of a larger Rethinking the Principles project, sponsored by the Office of Force Transformation and the U.S. Navy to examine approaches to the future of warfare. Footnotes, index, and a bibliographic essay make the work a useful tool for students of war and general readers alike.
The national conversation regarding the United States Navy has, for far too long, been focused on the popular question of how many ships does the service need? "To Provide and Maintain a Navy," a succinct but encompassing treatise on sea power by Dr. Henry J "Jerry" Hendrix, goes beyond the numbers to reveal the crucial importance of Mare Liberum (Free Sea) to the development of the Western thought and the rules based order that presently governs the global commons that is the high seas. Proceeding from this philosophical basis, Hendrix explores how a "free sea" gave way to free trade and the central role sea borne commercial trade has played in the overall rise in global living standards. This is followed by analysis of how the relative naval balance of power has played out in terms of naval battles and wars over the centuries and how the dominance of the United States Navy following World War II has resulted in seven decades of unprecedented peace on the world's oceans. He further considers how, in the years that followed the demise of the Soviet Union, both China and Russia began laying the groundwork to challenge the United States maritime leadership and upend five centuries of naval precedents in order to establish a new approach to sovereignty over the world's seas. It is only at this point that Dr. Hendrix approaches the question of the number of ships required for the United States Navy, the industrial base required to build them, and the importance of once again aligning the nation's strategic outlook to that of a "seapower" in order to effectively and efficiently address the rising threat. "To Provide and Maintain a Navy" is brief enough to be read in a weekend but deep enough to inform the reader as to the numerous complexities surrounding what promises to be the most important strategic conversation facing the United States as it enters a new age of great power competition with not one, but two nations who seek nothing less than to close and control the world's seas.
This is the history of the founding in 1882 and operation through two world wars of America's first permanent intelligence agency, the Office of Naval Intelligence. In this study Dr. Jeffery M. Dorwart shows how and why a tiny late 19th century U.S. Navy bureau created to collect information about foreign warship design became during two world wars a complex and sometimes troubled domestic and worldwide intelligence agency. More significantly, this history of O.N.I. demonstrates how the founders and first generations of U.S. naval officers trained to man warships at sea confronted what seemed an inherent dilemma in new missions that interfered with providing technical and operational information to their navy. Dorwart explains the forces that created this dilemma and how ONI officers responded in different ways to their intelligence mission. This history recounts how from the very beginning ONI duty during the last decades of the 19th century seemed conflicting. Some found the new assignment very rewarding in collecting and collating data for the U.S. to build a "New Navy" of steel and steam-powered warships armed with the latest rifled ordnance. But other naval officers saw assignment to this tiny office as a monotonous dead-end assignment endangering their careers as shipboard operators. Dorwart shows how the first and second world wars and interwar period dramatically accelerated the naval intelligence office's dilemma. The threats in both oceans from powerful enemy navies equipped with the latest technology and weaponry gave an urgency to the collection of information on the strategies, warships, submarines, and aircraft development of potential and actual naval enemies. But at the same time ONI was asked to provide information of possible domestic threats from suspected enemy spies, terrorists, saboteurs or anti-war opponents. This led ONI officers to wiretap, break and enter, pursue surveillance of all types of people from foreign agents to Americans suspected of opposition to strengthening the U.S. Navy or becoming involved in world wars. This history explains that many ONI directors and officers were highly motivated to collect as much information as possible about the naval-military capabilities and strategies of Germany, Italy, Japan, and even allies. ONI officers understood that code-breaking was part of their job as well. But this all led some to become deeply involved in domestic spying, wiretapping, breaking and entering on private property. These extralegal and at times illegal operations, Dorwart argues, confused some ONI officers, leading to too much information that clouded vital intelligence such as Japanese plans to attack American naval bases. In the end, this study demonstrates the dilemma confronted between 1882 and 1945 by dedicated U.S. naval officers attached to or collecting information worldwide for the Office of Naval Intelligence.
The Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG) provides the 38th Commandant's strategic direction for the Marine Corps and mirrors the function of the Secretary of Defense's Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). It serves as the authoritative document for Service-level planning and provides a common direction to the Marine Corps Total Force. It also serves as a road map describing where the Marine Corps is going and why; what the Marine Corps force development priorities are and are not; and, in some instances, how and when prescribed actions will be implemented. This CPG serves as my Commandant's Intent for the next four years. As Commandant Neller observed, "The Marine Corps is not organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet the demands of the rapidly evolving future operating environment." I concur with his diagnosis. Significant change is required to ensure we are aligned with the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and DPG, and further, prepared to meet the demands of the Naval Fleet in executing current and emerging operational naval concepts. Effecting that change will be my top priority as your 38th Commandant. This CPG outlines my five priority focus areas: force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership. I will use these focal areas as logical lines of effort to frame my thinking, planning, and decision-making at Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), as well as to communicate to our civilian leadership. This document explains how we will translate those focus areas into action with measurable outcomes. The institutional changes that follow this CPG will be based on a long-term view and singular focus on where we want the Marine Corps to be in the next 5-15 years, well beyond the tenure of any one Commandant, Presidential administration, or Congress. We cannot afford to retain outdated policies, doctrine, organizations, or force development strategies. The coming decade will be characterized by conflict, crisis, and rapid change - just as every decade preceding it. And despite our best efforts, history demonstrates that we will fail to accurately predict every conflict; will be surprised by an unforeseen crisis; and may be late to fully grasp the implications of rapid change around us. The Arab Spring, West African Ebola Outbreak, Scarborough Shoal standoff, Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine, and weaponization of social media are but a few recent examples illustrating the point. While we must accept an environment characterized by uncertainty, we cannot ignore strong signals of change nor be complacent when it comes to designing and preparing the force for the future. What is abundantly clear is that the future operating environment will place heavy demands on our Nation's Naval Services. Context and direction is clearly articulated in the NDS and DPG as well as testimony from our uniformed and civilian leadership. No further guidance is required; we are moving forward. The Marine Corps will be trained and equipped as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness and prepared to operate inside actively contested maritime spaces in support of fleet operations. In crisis prevention and crisis response, the Fleet Marine Force - acting as an extension of the Fleet - will be first on the scene, first to help, first to contain a brewing crisis, and first to fight if required to do so. The Marine Corps will be the "force of choice" for the President, Secretary, and Combatant Commander - "a certain force for an uncertain world" as noted by Commandant Krulak. No matter what the crisis, our civilian leaders should always have one shared thought - Send in the Marines.
