This book provides detailed information about how US Army units were organised and operated in America's longest war. Vietnam Special Forces veteran Gordon L Rottman examines the different types of infantry battalions and the units that supported them, their training and organisation down to platoon level. Aspects of the US Army's conventional and unconventional warfare doctrine are also addressed, along with a discussion of how replacements were trained and integrated into units. Among other areas of the US Army's involvement covered are individual and crew-served weapons, artillery, armoured fighting vehicles, transport, logistics, the complex chain of command, and combat operations.
Artillery fire support bases of the Freeworld forces played a critical role in the conduct of operations during the Vietnam War. They served to lay down high-volume fire on enemy firing sites, supported friendly infantry operations, and executed harassing fire missions where exact targets were not known. But the firebases themselves which housed a range of other facilities such as troop shelters, surveillance radars and command centers had to be defended against ground attack, and as a result became significant fortifications in their own right. This book describes the design, development and operational history of the fire support bases throughout the conflict.
This book tells the compelling story of the average US infantryman in the Vietnam War (1955-1975). Beginning with conscription, enlistment, Basic Training, and Advanced Individual Training at the Armed Forces Induction Center at Fort Polk (the infamous “Tigerland”), it goes on to explore the day-to-day realities of service in Vietnam, from routine tasks at the firebase to search-and-destroy missions, rocket attacks, and firefights in the field. Weaponry, clothing, and equipment are all described and shown in detailed color plates. A vivid picture of the unique culture and experiences of these soldiers emerges – from their vernacular to the prospect of returning to an indifferent, if not hostile, homeland.
This is the second volume in a series of chronological histories prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam War. This volume details the Marine activities during 1965, the year the war escalated and major American combat units were committed to the conflict. The narrative traces the landing of the nearly 5,000-man 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its transformation into the ΙII Marine Amphibious Force, which by the end of the year contained over 38,000 Marines. During this period, the Marines established three enclaves in South Vietnam’s northernmost corps area, I Corps, and their mission expanded from defense of the Da Nang Airbase to a balanced strategy involving base defense, offensive operations, and pacification. This volume continues to treat the activities of Marine advisors to the South Vietnamese armed forces but in less detail than its predecessor volume, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1964; The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era.
The Vietnamese knew the Long-Range Patrol Scouts as “the men with green faces,” a reference to the camouflage paint that they used. Operating in patrols of four to six men these men were like ghosts – scouting far behind enemy lines. This book examines the Long-Range Patrol Scout's superior stealth movement techniques, camouflage and concealment, tracking, counter-tracking, observation, and other fieldcraft skills. It also examines the occasions they participated in small-scale direct actions including ambushes and raids. Written by a Special Forces' Vietnam veteran, this book not only depicts the remarkable lives of these scouts when on campaign, but also details the training and conditioning that it took to become one of these shadow warriors.
Of the many facets of the American war in Southeast Asia debated by U.S. authorities in Washington, by the military services and the public, none has proved more controversial than the air war against North Vietnam. The air war s inauguration with the nickname Rolling Thunder followed an eleven-year American effort to induce communist North Vietnam to sign a peace treaty without openly attacking its territory. Thus, Rolling Thunder was a new military program in what had been a relatively low-key attempt by the United States to win the war within South Vietnam against insurgent communist Viet Cong forces, aided and abetted by the north. The present volume covers the first phase of the Rolling Thunder campaign from March 1965 to late 1966. It begins with a description of the planning and execution of two initial limited air strikes, nicknamed Flaming Dart I and II. The Flaming Dart strikes were carried out against North Vietnam in February 1965 as the precursors to a regular, albeit limited, Rolling Thunder air program launched the following month. Before proceeding with an account of Rolling Thunder, its roots are traced in the events that compelled the United States to adopt an anti-communist containment policy in Southeast Asia after the defeat of French forces by the communist Vietnamese in May 1954.
NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRODUCT -- OVERSTOCK SALE - Significantly reduced list price This book tells the mostly forgotten story of the accelerating mental health problems that arose among the troops sent to fight in South Vietnam, especially the morale, discipline, and heroin crisis that ultimately characterized the second half of the war. This situation was unprecedented in U.S. military history and dangerous, and reflected the fact that during the war America underwent its most divisive period since the Civil War and, as a result, the war became bitterly controversial. The author is a career Army psychiatrist who led a psychiatric unit in Vietnam. In the years following his return, he was dismayed to discover that the Army had conducted no formal review of this alarming situation, including from the standpoint of military psychiatry, and had lost or destroyed all of the pertinent clinical records. In addition to permitting a study of the psychological wounds and their treatment in Vietnam, these records would have been priceless in the treatment of the legions of veterans who presented serious adjustment problems and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. As a consequence, Dr Camp has been relentless in combing the professional, civilian, and surviving military literature--including unpublished documents--to construct a compelling narrative documenting the successes and failures of Army psychiatry and the Army leadership in Vietnam in responding to these psychiatric and behavioral challenges. The result is a book that is both scholarly and intensely personal, includes vivid case material and anecdotes from colleagues who also served there, and is replete with illustrations and correspondence. It presents the story of Vietnam in a fresh manner--through the psychiatrist's eyes, and sensibilities.
Vietnam was the US Special Forces most complex and controversial mission, one that began in 1957 and ended in 1973. Camp strike forces, mobile strike forces, mobile guerrilla forces, special reconnaissance projects, training missions and headquarters duty provided vastly differing experiences and circumstances for SF soldiers. Other fluctuating factors were the terrain, the weather and the shifting course of the war itself. Gordon Rottman examines the training, life, weapons and combat experiences of the Special Forces soldier in this challenging environment.
The U.S. Marine Corps' war in Vietnam was a mixtureof large-scale conventional battles against mainViet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA)units and smaller pacification operations designed to securethe South Vietnamese population from Communist insurgents.During the latter half of 1965, Marine forces foughtrepeated engagements against large Viet Cong units, mostnotably the 1st Viet Cong Regiment. The first battle, a fight inAugust to secure the area around Chu Lai called OperationStarlite, inflicted significant casualties upon this force. However,within just a few months, the Communist unit reconstituteditself, forcing the Marines to launch another operationto destroy the formation in December. The Marines codenamedthis action Operation Harvest Moon.Operation Harvest Moon has largely been overlooked inhistories of the Vietnam War. While Operation Starlite wasconsidered a major success and a clear demonstration of thesuperiority of America's conventional military forces comparedto the Viet Cong, Harvest Moon was less decisive.The following year, the Marine Corps' attention also beganto shift north toward the demilitarized zone (DMZ) as moreregular North Vietnamese combat forces put pressure on theMarines' area of operations. Consequently, the battle wasovershadowed by larger engagements.Nevertheless, the operation was important for a numberof reasons. Harvest Moon was the Marines' last large-scale,conventional operation of 1965 in Vietnam. Fought in thevalleys and hills between the city of Tam Ky and the inlandoutpost of Hiep Duc, it was the largest combined operationbetween Marine units and the South Vietnamese militaryto that date. Perhaps most importantly, the battle demonstratedmany of the frustrations and problems faced by allthe American forces in South Vietnam as they tried to defeatthe Viet Cong-led insurgency. The disparity in the fightingabilities between the Marines and South Vietnamese Armyunits hindered combat effectiveness. The lack of coordinationbetween the two forces, and between the Marine Corpsand U.S. Air Force, also led to heavy losses on the allied side.Enjoying logistical support from North Vietnam, the 1st VietCong Regiment was able to defeat South Vietnamese forceswhile largely evading American units.
The defeat of South Vietnam was arguably America’s worst foreign policy disaster of the 20th Century. Yet a complete understanding of the endgame—from the 27 January 1973 signing of the Paris Peace Accords to South Vietnam’s surrender on 30 April 1975—has eluded us. Black April addresses that deficit. A culmination of exhaustive research in three distinct areas: primary source documents from American archives, North Vietnamese publications containing primary and secondary source material, and dozens of articles and numerous interviews with key South Vietnamese participants, this book represents one of the largest Vietnamese translation projects ever accomplished, including almost one hundred rarely or never seen before North Vietnamese unit histories, battle studies, and memoirs. Most important, to celebrate the 30th Anniversary of South Vietnam’s conquest, the leaders in Hanoi released several compendiums of formerly highly classified cables and memorandum between the Politburo and its military commanders in the south. This treasure trove of primary source materials provides the most complete insight into North Vietnamese decision-making ever complied. While South Vietnamese deliberations remain less clear, enough material exists to provide a decent overview. Ultimately, whatever errors occurred on the American and South Vietnamese side, the simple fact remains that the country was conquered by a North Vietnamese military invasion despite written pledges by Hanoi’s leadership against such action. Hanoi’s momentous choice to destroy the Paris Peace Accords and militarily end the war sent a generation of South Vietnamese into exile, and exacerbated a societal trauma in America over our long Vietnam involvement that reverberates to this day. How that transpired deserves deeper scrutiny.
