This authoritative history of the Treasury provides a new perspective on public policy-making in the twentieth century as it explores the role and functions of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the consequent implications for the changing role of the Treasury. As the central department in British government, the Treasury plays a key role in decisions on public expenditure, and on raising taxes and loans. Professor Peden traces the development of the Treasury's responsibility for managing the national economy and looks at how it became increasingly involved in international relations from the time of the First World War. In further examining the relations between ministers and their official advisers, this history explores the growing influence of economists in Whitehall.
In further examining the relations between ministers and their official advisers, this history explores the growing influence of economists in Whitehall."--Jacket.
The relationship between the British government and the City of London has become central to debates on modern British economic, political and social life. For some the City's financial and commercial interests have exercised a dominant influence over government economic policy, creating a preoccupation with international markets and the strength of sterling which impaired domestic industrial and social well-being. Others have argued that government seriously constricted financial markets, jeopardising Britain's most successful economic sector. This collection of essays was the first book to address these issues over the entire twentieth century. It brings together leading financial and political historians to assess the government-City relationship from several directions and by examination of key episodes. As such, it will be indispensable not just for the study of modern British politics and finance, but also for assessment of the worldwide problem of tensions between national governments and international financial centres.
Nobody doubts that politicians ought to fulfil their promises – what people cannot agree about is what this means in practice. The purpose of this book is to explore this issue through a series of case studies. It shows how the British model of politics has changed since the early twentieth century when electioneering was based on the articulation of principles which, it was expected, might well be adapted once the party or politician that promoted them took office. Thereafter manifestos became increasingly central to electoral politics and to the practice of governing, and this has been especially the case since 1945. Parties were now expected to outline in detail what they would do in office and explain how the policies would be paid for. Brexit has complicated this process, with the ‘will of the people’ as supposedly expressed in the 2016 referendum result clashing with the conventional role of the election manifesto as offering a mandate for action.
This title was first published in 2002: There are few students of European economic history who will not have come across the writings of Derek H. Aldcroft. His contributions to the field of economic and social history are vast and distinguish him as one of the most prolific economic historians of the 20th century. This volume honours Derek's contribution to the literature of economic and social history and its contents reflect his wide-ranging interests, particularly on issues relating to transport history and the growth and structural change in economies. From transport in the Industrial Revolution to late 20th-century international financial architecture, the essays in this book, contributed by leading economic historians, are a tribute to a remarkable scholar.
This volume identifies and compares 'fiscal squeezes' (major efforts to cut public spending and/or raise taxes) in the UK over a century from 1900 to 2015. The authors examine how different the politics of fiscal squeeze and austerity is today from what it was a century ago, how (if at all) fiscal squeezes reshaped the state and the provision of public services, and how political credit and blame played out after austerity episodes. The analysis is both quantitative and qualitative, starting with reported financial outcomes from historical statistics and then going behind those numbers to explore the political choices and processes in play. This analysis identifies some patterns that have not been explained or even recognized in earlier works on retrenchment and austerity. For example, it identifies a long term shift from what it terms a 'surgery without anaesthetics' approach (deep but short-lived episodes of spending restraint or tax increases) in the earlier part of the period towards a 'boiling frogs' approach (episodes in which the pain is spread out over a longer period) in more recent decades. It also identifies a curious reduction of revenue-led squeezes in more recent decades, and a puzzle over why blame-avoidance logic only led to outsourcing painful decisions over squeeze in a minority of cases. Furthermore, the volume's distinctive approach to classifying types of fiscal squeezes and qualitatively assessing their intensity seeks to solve the puzzle as to why voter'punishment' of governments that impose austerity policies seems to be so erratic.
The impetus for the conference that was the basis for this volume emanated from the influence of two brilliant minds-Egon Sohmen and Adam Klug, who both died at an early age, leaving their families and the professions of economics and economic history with major voids. In the course of research on the origins of Open Economy Macroeconomics, the significant contributions of Egon Sohmen came to the fore. After correspondence with some of those involved in the early development of the Open Economy Macromodel, we turned to Adam Klug for his views on the matter-as he had dealt with the history of intertemporal trade models in his Ph. D. thesis. And it was Adam who suggested the idea of a conference bringing together economists and economic historians. At this point we want to acknowledge the very generous grant from the Egon Sohmen Foundation and the active participation of Dr. Helmut Sohmen and Mrs. Renee Sohmen at the conference. We also want to thank Prof. Sir Aaron Klug, Nobel Laureate, and the Klug family for their support and the financial contribution of the Adam Klug Memorial Lecture Fund at Ben Gurion University. Other institutions that contributed to the conference were the Gianni Foundation; Bank of Israel; University of North Carolina; Department of Economics, Faculty of Social Science and Aharon Meir Center for Banking, Bar Ilan University; Department of Economics and Faculty of Social Science, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.
This new collection of essays by a panel of established international scholars sheds new light on what some of those influences were and what actions were taken as a result of Britain's Far Eastern commitments. Not only are new evidence and approaches to those issues addressed presented, but new avenues for further research are clearly outlined.
The 1930s policy of appeasement is still fiercely debated by historians, critics and contemporary political commentators, more than 70 years after the signing of the 1938 Munich Agreement. What is less well-understood, however, is the role of public opinion on the formation of British and French policy in the period between Munich and the outbreak of the Second World War; not necessarily what public opinion was but how it was perceived to be by those in power and how this contributed to the policymaking process. It therefore fills a considerable gap in an otherwise vast literature, seeking to ascertain the extent to which public opinion can be said to have influenced the direction of foreign policy in a crucial juncture of British and French diplomatic history. Employing an innovative and unique methodological framework, the author distinguishes between two categories of representation: firstly, 'reactive' representations of opinion, the immediate and spontaneous reactions of the public to circumstances and events as they occur; and secondly, 'residual' representations, which can be defined as the remnants of previous memories and experiences, the more general tendencies of opinion considered characteristic of previous years, even previous decades. It is argued that the French government of Édouard Daladier was consistently more attuned to the evolution of 'reactive' representations than the British government of Neville Chamberlain and, consequently, it was the French rather than the British who first pursued a firmer policy towards the European dictatorships. This comparative approach reveals a hitherto hidden facet of the diplomatic prelude to the Second World War; that British policy towards France and French policy towards Britain were influenced by their respective perceptions of public opinion in the other country. A sophisticated analysis of a crucial period in international history, this book will be essential reading for scholars of the origins of World War II, the political scenes of late 1930s Britain and France, and the study of public opinion and its effects on policy.
This new collection of essays, from leading British and Canadian scholars, presents an excellent insight into the strategic thinking of the British Empire. It defines the main areas of the strategic decision-making process that was known as 'Imperial Defence'. The theme is one of imperial defence and defence of empire, so chapters will be historiographical in nature, discussing the major features of each key component of imperial defence, areas of agreement and disagreement in the existing literature on critical interpretations, introducing key individuals and positions and commenting on the appropriateness of existing studies, as well as identifying a raft of new directions for future research.
