Structures of Judicial Decision Making from Legal Formalism to Critical Theory

Structures of Judicial Decision Making from Legal Formalism to Critical Theory

Author: Roy Lavon Brooks

Publisher:

Published: 2005

Total Pages: 396

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

To order a paperback version of this book, please click here. This is a general book on jurisprudence designed for both the novice and more experienced student, which makes it suitable for first-year law students. It is the first book to distinguish and connect traditional theories of judicial decision-making (e.g., legal formalism, textualism, legal realism, and legal process) with "critical process" (which is critical theory transformed from a theory of legal criticism into a theory of judicial decision-making). Brooks breaks new ground on several other fronts as well -- he employs an innovative framework that divides judicial decision-making models into the "logical method" and the "policy method;" offers a more nuanced conceptualization of judicial policy-formulation in which judges are seen as not only making policy, but also (and more typically) as discovering and vindicating policy; redefines "policy-making" in a manner that is different from our traditional understanding of the term; and synthesizes critical process into three judicial models: symmetrical, asymmetrical, and hybrid. The book is written in two parts. Part 1 (Traditional Process) discusses five major traditional judicial models, each reflective of either the logical method or the policy method. Part 1 ends with a synthesis of the traditional models (dividing them into three categories), which judges who have used the book find to be most useful. Part 2 (Critical Process) begins with a discussion of critical theory's central theme and operating elements and then transforms these features into a theory of outsider-oriented judicial decision making, something judges can actually use in deciding cases. Critical theory is thus transformed into "critical process."


The Behavior of Federal Judges

The Behavior of Federal Judges

Author: Lee Epstein

Publisher: Harvard University Press

Published: 2013-01-07

Total Pages: 491

ISBN-13: 0674070682

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Judges play a central role in the American legal system, but their behavior as decision-makers is not well understood, even among themselves. The system permits judges to be quite secretive (and most of them are), so indirect methods are required to make sense of their behavior. Here, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge work together to construct a unified theory of judicial decision-making. Using statistical methods to test hypotheses, they dispel the mystery of how judicial decisions in district courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court are made. The authors derive their hypotheses from a labor-market model, which allows them to consider judges as they would any other economic actors: as self-interested individuals motivated by both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of their work. In the authors' view, this model describes judicial behavior better than either the traditional “legalist” theory, which sees judges as automatons who mechanically apply the law to the facts, or the current dominant theory in political science, which exaggerates the ideological component in judicial behavior. Ideology does figure into decision-making at all levels of the federal judiciary, the authors find, but its influence is not uniform. It diminishes as one moves down the judicial hierarchy from the Supreme Court to the courts of appeals to the district courts. As The Behavior of Federal Judges demonstrates, the good news is that ideology does not extinguish the influence of other components in judicial decision-making. Federal judges are not just robots or politicians in robes.


A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review

A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review

Author: W. J. Waluchow

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2006-12-25

Total Pages: 7

ISBN-13: 1139462814

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

In this study, W. J. Waluchow argues that debates between defenders and critics of constitutional bills of rights presuppose that constitutions are more or less rigid entities. Within such a conception, constitutions aspire to establish stable, fixed points of agreement and pre-commitment, which defenders consider to be possible and desirable, while critics deem impossible and undesirable. Drawing on reflections about the nature of law, constitutions, the common law, and what it is to be a democratic representative, Waluchow urges a different theory of bills of rights that is flexible and adaptable. Adopting such a theory enables one not only to answer to critics' most serious challenges, but also to appreciate the role that a bill of rights, interpreted and enforced by unelected judges, can sensibly play in a constitutional democracy.


Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Legal Theory, and Judicial Restraint

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Legal Theory, and Judicial Restraint

Author: Frederic R. Kellogg

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2011-06-30

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9780521321921

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, is considered by many to be the most influential American jurist. The voluminous literature devoted to his writings and legal thought, however, is diverse and inconsistent. In this study, Frederic R. Kellogg follows Holmes's intellectual path from his early writings through his judicial career. He offers a fresh perspective that addresses the views of Holmes's leading critics and explains his relevance to the controversy over judicial activism and restraint. Holmes is shown to be an original legal theorist who reconceived common law as a theory of social inquiry and who applied his insights to constitutional law. From his empirical and naturalist perspective on law, with its roots in American pragmatism, emerged Holmes's distinctive judicial and constitutional restraint. Kellogg distinguishes Holmes from analytical legal positivism and contrasts him with a range of thinkers.


How Judges Judge

How Judges Judge

Author: Brian M. Barry

Publisher: Taylor & Francis

Published: 2020-11-26

Total Pages: 375

ISBN-13: 0429657498

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

A judge’s role is to make decisions. This book is about how judges undertake this task. It is about forces on the judicial role and their consequences, about empirical research from a variety of academic disciplines that observes and verifies how factors can affect how judges judge. On the one hand, judges decide by interpreting and applying the law, but much more affects judicial decision-making: psychological effects, group dynamics, numerical reasoning, biases, court processes, influences from political and other institutions, and technological advancement. All can have a bearing on judicial outcomes. In How Judges Judge: Empirical Insights into Judicial Decision-Making, Brian M. Barry explores how these factors, beyond the law, affect judges in their role. Case examples, judicial rulings, judges’ own self-reflections on their role and accounts from legal history complement this analysis to contextualise the research, make it more accessible and enrich the reader’s understanding and appreciation of judicial decision-making. Offering research-based insights into how judges make the decisions that can impact daily life and societies around the globe, this book will be of interest to practising and training judges, litigation lawyers and those studying law and related disciplines.


Supreme Court Decision-Making

Supreme Court Decision-Making

Author: Cornell W. Clayton

Publisher: University of Chicago Press

Published: 1999

Total Pages: 368

ISBN-13: 9780226109541

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

What influences decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court? For decades social scientists focused on the ideology of individual justices. Supreme Court Decision Making moves beyond this focus by exploring how justices are influenced by the distinctive features of courts as institutions and their place in the political system. Drawing on interpretive-historical institutionalism as well as rational choice theory, a group of leading scholars consider such factors as the influence of jurisprudence, the unique characteristics of supreme courts, the dynamics of coalition building, and the effects of social movements. The volume's distinguished contributors and broad range make it essential reading for those interested either in the Supreme Court or the nature of institutional politics. Original essays contributed by Lawrence Baum, Paul Brace, Elizabeth Bussiere, Cornell Clayton, Sue Davis, Charles Epp, Lee Epstein, Howard Gillman, Melinda Gann Hall, Ronald Kahn, Jack Knight, Forrest Maltzman, David O'Brien, Jeffrey Segal, Charles Sheldon, James Spriggs II, and Paul Wahlbeck.


Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making

Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making

Author: Paul M. Collins, Jr.

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2008-08-15

Total Pages: 249

ISBN-13: 0199707227

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

The U.S. Supreme Court is a public policy battleground in which organized interests attempt to etch their economic, legal, and political preferences into law through the filing of amicus curiae ("friend of the court") briefs. In Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making, Paul M. Collins, Jr. explores how organized interests influence the justices' decision making, including how the justices vote and whether they choose to author concurrences and dissents. Collins presents theories of judicial choice derived from disciplines as diverse as law, marketing, political science, and social psychology. This theoretically rich and empirically rigorous treatment of decision-making on the nation's highest court, which represents the most comprehensive examination ever undertaken of the influence of U.S. Supreme Court amicus briefs, provides clear evidence that interest groups play a significant role in shaping the justices' choices.


Judicial Reputation

Judicial Reputation

Author: Nuno Garoupa

Publisher: University of Chicago Press

Published: 2015-11-20

Total Pages: 286

ISBN-13: 022629059X

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

In "Judicial Reputation: A Comparative Theory, "Tom Ginsburg and Nuno Garoupa mean to explain how judges respond to the reputational incentives provided by the different audiences they interact with--lawyers and law professors; politicians; the media; and the public itself--as well as how legal systems design their judicial institutions to calibrate the locally appropriate balance among audiences. Making use by turns of careful empirical work and penetrating conceptual insights, Ginsburg and Garoupa argue that any given judicial structure is best understood not through the lens of legal culture, origin, or tradition, but through the economics of information and reputation.