India and Vietnam have been two foci of Soviet diplomacy in Asia. This book examines the relations between India, as a poor parliamentary democracy, and the USSR and relations with Vietnam help demonstrate the relationship between the USSR and an Asian communist power.
Contributors draw on a wide array of new material, from recently opened archival sources to literature and film, and meld approaches from diplomatic history to development studies to explain the choices India made and to frame the decisions by its policymakers. Together, the essays demonstrate how India became a powerful symbol of decolonization and an advocate of non-alignment, disarmament and global governance as it stood between the United States and the Soviet Union, actively fostering dialogue and attempting to forge friendships without entering into formal alliances. Sweeping in its scope yet nuanced in its analysis, this is the authoritative account of India and the Cold War.
Focusing on the two tumultuous decades framed by Indian independence in 1947 and the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, The Cold War on the Periphery explores the evolution of American policy toward the subcontinent. McMahon analyzes the motivations behind America's pursuit of Pakistan and India as strategic Cold War prizes. He also examines the profound consequences—for U.S. regional and global foreign policy and for South Asian stability—of America's complex political, military, and economic commitments on the subcontinent. McMahon argues that the Pakistani-American alliance, consummated in 1954, was a monumental strategic blunder. Secured primarily to bolster the defense perimeter in the Middle East, the alliance increased Indo-Pakistani hostility, undermined regional stability, and led India to seek closer ties with the Soviet Union. Through his examination of the volatile region across four presidencies, McMahon reveals the American strategic vision to have been "surprinsgly ill defined, inconsistent, and even contradictory" because of its exaggerated anxiety about the Soviet threat and America's failure to incorporate the interests and concerns of developing nations into foreign policy. The Cold War on the Periphery addresses fundamental questions about the global reach of postwar American foreign policy. Why, McMahon asks, did areas possessing few of the essential prerequisites of economic-military power become objects of intense concern for the United States? How did the national security interests of the United States become so expansive that they extended far beyond the industrial core nations of Western Europe and East Asia to embrace nations on the Third World periphery? And what combination of economic, political, and ideological variables best explain the motives that led the United States to seek friends and allies in virtually every corner of the planet? McMahon's lucid analysis of Indo-Pakistani-Americna relations powerfully reveals how U.S. policy was driven, as he puts it, "by a series of amorphous—and largely illusory—military, strategic, and psychological fears" about American vulnerability that not only wasted American resources but also plunged South Asia into the vortex of the Cold War.
Here is the history of the disintegration of the Russian Empire, and the emergence of a multinational Communist state. Pipes tells how the Communists exploited the new nationalism of the peoples of the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Volga-Ural area—first to seize power and then to expand into the borderlands.
India was the Soviet Union's most important trading partner among the less developed countries (LDCs) and the largest recipient of Soviet aid to non-socialist LDCs. Similarly the Soviet Union is one of India's largest trade partners. In this 1991 book, Santosh Mehrotra presents a comprehensive study of this trading relationship and the transfer of technology from the Soviet Union. He begins by outlining Indian economic strategy since the 1950s and the role of Soviet and East European technical assistance. Part II examines Soviet technological transfer to India since 1955. The final chapters analyse Indo-Soviet trade in the 1970s and 1980s, covering payment arrangements and bilateral trading. The book is an exhaustive analysis of economic relations between an industrialised planned economy and a developing market economy. It will therefore become essential reading for students and specialists of development economics and international relations as well as for government and institutional economists in international trade and finance.
Examining India-America relations between 1942-62, this book reconsiders the role of America in shaping the imagination of post-colonial India. It rejects a conventional orthodoxy that assigns a limited role to America and challenges narratives which neglect the natural asymmetries and focus on discord and differences to define India-America relations. Integrating the security, political and economic elements of the Indo-American relationship it presents a synthesis of India’s encounter with the post-war hegemon and looks at the military, economic and political involvement of America during the ‘transfer of power’ from Britain to India. Bhardwaj delves into the role of American non-government agencies and examines the anti-communist ideological linkages that the Indian political class developed with America, the influence of this bonding and the role of American ideas, experts, funds, international relations and strategy in shaping India’s social, economic and educational institutions. Analyzing India’s non-alignment policy and its linkages to American policy on the non-communist neutrals, it argues that India’s movement towards the Soviet Union and away from China in the mid 1950s was in tune with the American strategy to cause the Sino-Soviet split. The book presents a fresh perspective based on authentic records and adds a new dimension to the understanding of modern Indian history and Indo-American relations. It will appeal to scholars and students of Indian and American history, international relations and strategy.
This book chronicles the final two decades in the history of the Soviet Union and presents a story that is often lost in the standard interpretations of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Although there were numerous reasons for the collapse of communism, it did not happen—as it may have seemed to some—overnight. Indeed, says Roman Szporluk, the root causes go back even earlier than 1917. To understand why the USSR broke up the way it did, it is necessary to understand the relationship between the two most important nations of the USSR—Russia and Ukraine—during the Soviet period and before, as well as the parallel but interrelated processes of nation formation in both states. Szporluk details a number of often-overlooked factors leading to the USSR's fall: how the processes of Russian identity formation were not completed by the time of the communist takeover in 1917, the unification of Ukraine in 1939–1945, and the Soviet period failing to find a resolution of the question of Russian-Ukrainian relations. The present-day conflict in the Caucasus, he asserts, is a sign that the problems of Russian identity remain.
Examines the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the birth of the Russian state, focusing on Yeltsin's disastrous policies, which brought on an economic collapse almost twice as severe as America's Great Depression.