In 1938 the U.S. Government took under its wing an infant airline industry. Government agencies assumed responsibility not only for airline safety but for setting fares and determining how individual markets would be served. Forty years later, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 set in motion the economic deregulation of the industry and opened it to market competition. This study by Steven Morrison and Clifford Winston analyzes the effects of deregulation on both travelers and the airline industry. The authors find that lower fares and better service have netted travelers some $6 billion in annual benefits, while airline earnings have increased by $2.5 billion a year. Morrison and Winston expect still greater benefits once the industry has had time to adjust its capital structure to the unregulated marketplace, and they recommend specific public polices to ensure healthy competition.
The author discusses the question of federal preemption of intrastate transportation and the experience of intrastate deregulation in some states. He examines the issue of whether more deregulation is in the public interest and, if economic deregulation is to be retained, what form it should take. The author's summary and conclusions can be the basis for study of the effects of economic deregulation in the transportation industry. This book can be a resource for executives dealing with deregulation in such industries as: transportation, telecommunications, broadcasting, electric utilities, cable television, oil and gas, and securities and banking. Defense Transportation Journal This book provides a comprehensive assessment of the social nd economic consequences of one of America's most important infrastructure industries--transportation. Dr. Dempsey traces the legal and political movement from regulation to deregulation. He proceeds to review the empirical results of a decade of deregulation upon airlines, railroads, trucking, and bus companies, and the effects of deregulation upon the shipping and traveling public that rely upon them. The book begins with an analysis of the events that led our nation to establish a regime of economic regulation upon the transportation industry. It also examines the metamorphosis toward deregulation and focuses on several areas in which there has been a significant adverse impact, including economic efficiency, pricing, service, and safety. Dempsey's book addresses the question of federal preemption of intrastate transportation and the experience of intrastate deregulation in some states. Dempsey further examines the issue of whether more deregulation is in the public interest and, if economic regulation is to be retained, what form it should take. The book concludes with an analysis of the public interest in transportation, focusing upon the policy objectives essential in accomplishing social and economic goals beyond allocative efficiency. This book is a necessary resource for executives dealing with deregulation in such industries as: transportation, telecommunications, broadcasting, electric utilities, cable television, oil and gas, and securities and banking.
For close to 100 years, America's surface freight industries, primarily rail and trucking, operated under the protective wing of the U.S. government. In 1980 Congress, finding vast inefficiencies in the two industries, substantially deregulated both, opening them at last to market competition. Deregulation has brought with it many changes—for firms within the industries, for their labor force, and for shippers and their customers. Clifford Winston, Thomas M. Corsi, Curtis M. Grimm, and Carol A Evans provide a comprehensive evaluation of the effect of the deregulation legislation on the rail and trucking industries. According to the authors, deregulation has made substantial progress in solving the two most vexing problems of the surface freight transportation industry—excessive rates in the trucking industry and insufficient returns on investment in the rail industry. Competition and efficiency have returned to both industries, and although the labor force in each has suffered wage and job losses, shippers and their customers have gained roughly $20 billion a year in benefits. The authors recommend policies that would continue to promote competition and the efficient use of highway and railway infrastructure.
June 1997 This paper examines the economic impact of regulation in industrial and developing countries. It argues that economic analysis can play an important role in restructuring regulated industries and developing more effective regulations, and in reducing politically driven regulation and capture. The past two decades have seen an unparalleled rise in new health, safety, and environmental regulations in industrial countries. At the same time, in some countries there has been substantial economic deregulation of several industries (including airlines, railroads, trucking, energy, telecommunications, and financialmarkets). Developing countries are engaged in deregulating some sectors of the economy and devising new regulatory frameworks for others. After reviewing the literature, Guasch and Hahn provide an overview of the costs and benefits of regulation throughout the world, highlight the potential gains from reform of regulation and deregulation in both industrial and developing countries, draw lessons from experience with government regulation, and suggest how to improve regulation in developing countries. They find that it is possible to explore systematically the costs and benefits of regulatory activities using standard economic analysis. They conclude that regulation - especially regulation aimed at controlling prices and entry into markets that would otherwise be workably competitive - can limit growth and significantly reduce economic welfare. Although unnecessary process regulation can hurt the economy, social regulations may significantly benefit the average consumer. But some regulations do not meet goals effectively and may sometimes reduce living standards. Developing countries can consider several regulatory policies, tools, and frameworks to improve their approach to regulation. What they choose will depend on available administrative expertise and resources, as well as political constraints and economic impacts. Generally, local and national capabilities for evaluating regulation need to be improved. Regulation is not generally undesirable, but it often has undesirable economic consequences, which result in part from political forces to redistribute wealth. These forces need can be mitigated by more sharply evaluating the consequences and tradeoffs of proposed regulations. This paper - a joint product of the Office of the Chief Economist and Senior Vice President, Development Economics and the Advisory Group, Latin America and the Caribbean Technical Department - was produced as a background paper for World Development Report 1997 on the role of the state in a changing world.
The past thirty years have witnessed a transformation of government economic intervention in broad segments of industry throughout the world. Many industries historically subject to economic price and entry controls have been largely deregulated, including natural gas, trucking, airlines, and commercial banking. However, recent concerns about market power in restructured electricity markets, airline industry instability amid chronic financial stress, and the challenges created by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which allowed commercial banks to participate in investment banking, have led to calls for renewed market intervention. Economic Regulation and Its Reform collects research by a group of distinguished scholars who explore these and other issues surrounding government economic intervention. Determining the consequences of such intervention requires a careful assessment of the costs and benefits of imperfect regulation. Moreover, government interventions may take a variety of forms, from relatively nonintrusive performance-based regulations to more aggressive antitrust and competition policies and barriers to entry. This volume introduces the key issues surrounding economic regulation, provides an assessment of the economic effects of regulatory reforms over the past three decades, and examines how these insights bear on some of today’s most significant concerns in regulatory policy.
Beginning with railroad regulation in 1887 and continuing for eight decades, the U.S. Federal Government expanded its regulatory scope to cover key transportation, telecommunications and energy sectors. In the last quarter of the 20th century this long-term trend was abruptly and dramatically reversed as important sectors of the U.S. economy were deregulated. This important collection charts the causes and effects of this process. Alongside an original introduction, the carefully selected analyses provided in this volume consider the political and economic forces behind the elimination of regulatory authority and describe how this historic turnaround took place. Did the cessation of government control enable vigorous competition or promote stifling monopolies? The answers found here will inform debates surrounding the regulation of financial and information markets. This collection will be a valuable source of reference for anyone interested in the process of deregulation.
Financial regulation is often framed as a question of economic efficiency. This paper, by contrast, puts the distributive implications of financial regulation center stage. We develop a model in which the financial sector benefits from risk-taking by earning greater expected returns. However, risktaking also increases the incidence of large losses that lead to credit crunches and impose negative externalities on the real economy. We describe a Pareto frontier along which different levels of risktaking map into different levels of welfare for the two parties. A regulator has to trade off efficiency in the financial sector, which is aided by deregulation, against efficiency in the real economy, which is aided by tighter regulation and a more stable supply of credit. We also show that financial innovation, asymmetric compensation schemes, concentration in the banking system, and bailout expectations enable or encourage greater risk-taking and allocate greater surplus to the financial sector at the expense of the rest of the economy.
In England, it has been possible since 2013 to convert an office building into residential use without needing planning permission (as has been required since 1948). This book explores the consequences of this central government driven deregulation on local communities. The policy decision was primarily about boosting the supply of housing, but reflects a broader neoliberal ideology which seeks to reform public planning in many countries to reduce perceived interference in free markets. Drawing on original research in the English local authorities of Camden, Croydon, Leeds, Leicester and Reading, the book provides a case study of the implementation of planning deregulation which demonstrates the lowering of standards in housing quality, the reduced ability of the local state to proactively steer development and plan for their places, and the transfer of wealth from the public to private spheres that has resulted. Comparative case studies from Glasgow and Rotterdam call into question the very need for the deregulation in the first place.
