The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution

The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution

Author: Matthew Adler

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2009-07-30

Total Pages: 412

ISBN-13: 0195343298

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A volume of original essays that discusses the applicability of H. L. A. Hart's rule of recognition model of a legal system to U. S. Constitutional law as discussed in his book "The concept of law".


The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution

The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution

Author: Kenneth Einar Himma

Publisher:

Published: 2009

Total Pages: 389

ISBN-13: 9780199867806

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This volume includes both jurisprudence, using the U.S. as a 'test case' that highlights the strengths and limitations of the rule of recognition model, and constitutional theory, by showing how the model can illuminate topics such as the role of the Supreme Court, the constitutional status of precedent, and much more.


The Law of Nations and the United States Constitution

The Law of Nations and the United States Constitution

Author: Anthony J. Bellia (Jr)

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2017

Total Pages: 321

ISBN-13: 019984125X

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The law of nations and the Constitution -- The law merchant and the Constitution -- The law of state-state relations and the Constitution -- The law of state-state relations in federal courts -- The law maritime and the Constitution -- Modern customary international law -- The inadequacy of existing theories of customary -- Judicial enforcement of customary international law against foreign nations -- Judicial enforcement of customary international law against the United States -- Judicial enforcement of customary international law against U.S. states


The Concept Of Law (Oip)

The Concept Of Law (Oip)

Author: Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart

Publisher:

Published: 2002-10-24

Total Pages: 328

ISBN-13: 9780195664171

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The Book Has Extensive Notes On The Theoretical Work Of Other Jurists Including References To Austin`S Imperative Theory, Kelson`S Theory Of Basic Norm, And Fuller`S Natural Law Theory.


Thoughts and Ways of Thinking

Thoughts and Ways of Thinking

Author: Benjamin Brown

Publisher: Ubiquity Press

Published: 2017-08-31

Total Pages: 188

ISBN-13: 1911529218

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Why do we think differently from one another? Why do religious people adhere to their faith even against reason, whilst atheist thinkers label it “nonsense”? Why do some judges turn more to moral values and others less? Why do we attach different meanings to the same words? These questions can be tackled on psychological or sociological levels, but we can also analyze the subjects on the epistemological level. That is the purpose of this book. Thoughts and Ways of Thinking offers Source Theory as a single explanation for epistemic processes and their religious, legal and linguistic derivatives. The idea is simple: our senses, our understanding, our memory, the testimonies that we trust, and many other objects transmit data to us and so shape our beliefs. In this function they serve as our truth sources. Different beliefs stem from different sources or different hierarchies between same sources. This notion is formalized here through the new tool of Source Calculus, and, after balancing its relativistic consequences by adding pragmatic constraints, it is applied to the philosophies of religion, law and language. With this unified theory, old doubts are framed in new perspectives, and some of them even find their solution.


A Right to Lie?

A Right to Lie?

Author: Catherine J. Ross

Publisher: University of Pennsylvania Press

Published: 2021-11-30

Total Pages: 184

ISBN-13: 0812253256

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Do the nation's highest officers, including the President, have a right to lie protected by the First Amendment? If not, what can be done to protect the nation under this threat? This book explores the various options.


Constitutional Fidelity, the Rule of Recognition, and the Communitarian Turn in Contemporary Positivism

Constitutional Fidelity, the Rule of Recognition, and the Communitarian Turn in Contemporary Positivism

Author: Matthew D. Adler

Publisher:

Published: 2014

Total Pages: 25

ISBN-13:

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Contemporary positivism has taken a communitarian turn. Hart, in the Postscript to quot;The Concept of Law,quot; clarifies that the rule of recognition is a special sort of social practice: a convention. It is not clear whether Hart, here, means convention in the strict sense elaborated by David Lewis, or in some weaker sense. A number of contemporary positivists, including Jules Coleman (at one point), Andrei Marmor, and Gerald Postema, have argued that the rule of recognition is something like a Lewis-convention. Others have suggested that the rule of recognition is conventional in a weaker sense - specifically, by figuring in a shared cooperative activity (SCA) among officials. Chris Kutz, Scott Shapiro, and Jules Coleman (more recently) have adopted this model. This Article criticizes the Lewis-convention and SCA models of the rule of recognition, drawing on U.S. constitutional theory. Imagine a society of U.S. officials who are committed to the text of the 1787 Constitution in a strong way: each official would continue to accept the text as supreme law even if every other official defected to an alternative text, and no official is prepared to bargain or negotiate with the others about the supremacy of the text. The social practice among these officials is neither a Lewis-convention (since there is no alternative text to which every official would shift if every other official did), nor an SCA (since the officials have no general intention to mesh their conceptions of legal validity, and in particular have no intention to compromise with officials who deny the supremacy of the 1787 text). Therefore, under the Lewis-convention and SCA models, a hypothetical society of U.S. officials who are committed, first and foremost, to the 1787 text rather than to the community of officials, is not a full-fledged legal system. But this is deeply counterintuitive. The hypothetical society simply embodies, in a particularly pure form, an attitude of fidelity to the 1787 text that many officials and citizens currently profess. The tension between the Lewis-convention and SCA models of the rule of recognition, and constitutional fidelity, points the way to a different model of the rule of recognition: namely, that the rule of recognition is a social norm.


An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution

An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution

Author: A.V. Dicey

Publisher: Springer

Published: 1985-09-30

Total Pages: 729

ISBN-13: 134917968X

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A starting point for the study of the English Constitution and comparative constitutional law, The Law of the Constitution elucidates the guiding principles of the modern constitution of England: the legislative sovereignty of Parliament, the rule of law, and the binding force of unwritten conventions.


The Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of Law

The Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of Law

Author: Richard S. Kay

Publisher: CUA Press

Published: 2014-11-10

Total Pages: 320

ISBN-13: 0813226872

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The Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of Law explores the relationship between law and revolution. Revolt - armed or not - is often viewed as the overthrow of legitimate rulers. Historical experience, however, shows that revolutions are frequently accompanied by the invocation rather than the repudiation of law. No example is clearer than that of the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89. At that time the unpopular but lawful Catholic king, James II, lost his throne and was replaced by his Protestant son-in-law and daughter, William of Orange and Mary, with James's attempt to recapture the throne thwarted at the Battle of the Boyne in Ireland. The revolutionaries had to negotiate two contradictory but intensely held convictions. The first was that the essential role of law in defining and regulating the activity of the state must be maintained. The second was that constitutional arrangements to limit the unilateral authority of the monarch and preserve an indispensable role for the houses of parliament in public decision-making had to be established. In the circumstances of 1688-89, the revolutionaries could not be faithful to the second without betraying the first. Their attempts to reconcile these conflicting objectives involved the frequent employment of legal rhetoric to justify their actions. In so doing, they necessarily used the word "law" in different ways. It could denote the specific rules of positive law; it could simply express devotion to the large political and social values that underlay the legal system; or it could do something in between. In 1688-89 it meant all those things to different participants at different times. This study adds a new dimension to the literature of the Glorious Revolution by describing, analyzing and elaborating this central paradox: the revolutionaries tried to break the rules of the constitution and, at the same time, be true to them.