In The Religion Clauses, Erwin Chemerinsky and Howard Gillman examine the extremely controversial issue of the relationship between religion and government. They argue for a separation of church and state. To the greatest extent possible, the government should remain secular. At the same, time they contend that religion should not provide a basis for an exemptions from general laws, such as those prohibiting discrimination or requiring the provision of services.
The First Amendment of the U. S. Constitution begins: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ." The Supreme Court has consistently held that these words, usually called the "religion clauses," were meant to prohibit laws that violate religious freedom or equality. In recent years, however, a growing number of constitutional law and history scholars have contended that the religion clauses were not intended to protect religious freedom, but to reserve the states' rights to legislate on. If the states' rights interpretation of the religion clauses were correct and came to be accepted by the Supreme Court, it could profoundly affect the way the Court decides church-state cases involving state laws. It would allow the states to legislate on religion-even to violate religious freedom, discriminate on the basis of religion, or to establish a particular religion. This book carefully, thoroughly, and critically examines all the arguments for such an interpretation and, more importantly, all the available historical evidence. It concludes that the clauses were meant to protect religious freedom and equality of the individuals not the states' rights
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution begins: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Taken as a whole, this statement has the aim of separating church and state, but tensions can emerge between its two elements—the so-called Nonestablishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause—and the values that lie beneath them. If the government controls (or is controlled by) a single church and suppresses other religions, the dominant church’s “establishment” interferes with free exercise. In this respect, the First Amendment’s clauses coalesce to protect freedom of religion. But Kent Greenawalt sets out a variety of situations in which the clauses seem to point in opposite directions. Are ceremonial prayers in government offices a matter of free exercise or a form of establishment? Should the state provide assistance to religious private schools? Should parole boards take prisoners’ religious convictions into account? Should officials act on public reason alone, leaving religious beliefs out of political decisions? In circumstances like these, what counts as appropriate treatment of religion, and what is misguided? When Free Exercise and Nonestablishment Conflict offers an accessible but sophisticated exploration of these conflicts. It explains how disputes have been adjudicated to date and suggests how they might be better resolved in the future. Not only does Greenawalt consider what courts should decide but also how officials and citizens should take the First Amendment’s conflicting values into account.
Many legal theorists and judges agree on one major premise in the field of law and religion: that religion clause jurisprudence is in a state of disarray and has been for some time. In Masters of Illusion, Frank S. Ravitch provocatively contends that both hard originalism (a strict focus on the intent of the Framers) and neutrality are illusory in religion clause jurisprudence, the former because it cannot live up to its promise for either side in the debate and the latter because it is simply impossible in the religion clause context. Yet these two principles have been used in almost every Supreme Court decision addressing religion clause questions. Ravitch unpacks the various principles of religion clause interpretation, drawing on contemporary debates such as school prayer and displaying the Ten Commandments on courthouses, to demonstrate that the neutrality principle does not work in a pluralistic society. When defined by large, overarching principles of equality and liberty, neutrality fails to account for differences between groups and individuals. If, however, the Court drew on a variety of principles instead of a single notion of neutrality to decide whether or not laws facilitated or discouraged religious practices, the result could be a more equitable approach to religion clause cases.
Leonard Levy's classic work examines the circumstances that led to the writing of the establishment clause of the First Amendment: 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. . . .' He argues that, contrary to popular belief, the framers of the Constitution intended to prohibit government aid to religion even on an impartial basis. He thus refutes the view of 'nonpreferentialists,' who interpret the clause as allowing such aid provided that the assistance is not restricted to a preferred church. For this new edition, Levy has added to his original arguments and incorporated much new material, including an analysis of Jefferson's ideas on the relationship between church and state and a discussion of the establishment clause cases brought before the Supreme Court since the book was originally published in 1986.
Guardian of the Wall examines Leo Pfeffer's church-state thought and its influence on the U.S. Supreme Court. The book argues that Pfeffer’s understanding of the First Amendment’s religion clauses, shaped as it was by his historical and religious context, led him to advocate a separationist historical narrative and absolutist application of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. Pfeffer’s jurisprudence was pivotal in shaping the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment throughout the last half of the twentieth century. Guardian of the Wall challenges the popular contention that Pfeffer’s separationist philosophy was hostile to religion and sought to remove religion from the public square. Instead, it illustrates how Pfeffer believed a broad reading of both religion clauses protected religious freedom, secured religious equality, and fostered authentic participation of religion in public life. The book concludes by analyzing the Court’s shift away from the strict separation of church and state during the past thirty years and contends that the Court should reconsider Pfeffer’s approach to the First Amendment’s religion clauses.
Editor Robert Winters covers the historical development of the right of assembly and petition, how the Supreme Court defines the rights of assembly and association, and the role of assembly and petition in social movements.
In Beyond Belief, Beyond Conscience, Pulitzer Prize-winning author Jack Rakove makes broad claims about how religious freedom affects us. He contrasts the radical course of American developments with the more complicated ways in which Europeans tried to promote religious tolerance. He argues that both freedom of conscience and disestablishment were critical constitutional principles whose significance we no longer fully appreciate. Rakove explains why Jefferson's and Madison's understanding of these concepts were influential to their constitutional thinking. And he examines some of our contemporary controversies over church and state from the vantage point, not of legal doctrine, but of the deeper history that gave the U.S. its unique approach to religious freedom.
Here is a concise overview of the historical development and judicial interpretation of the First Amendment religion clauses. It begins with a survey of the history of American religious liberty, goes on to present the views of the Founding Fathers, and then considers the core value of religious liberty and the constitutional purposes that implement that value. the book ends on a practical note by applying these principles to questions of equal access, religious symbolism in public life, and the task of defining religion for constitutional purposes. As the authors note in their introduction, "the historical principles that animate the religion clauses are more than an abstract intellectual exercise. . . . They provide an essential context for guiding the resolution of modern religious liberty issues."
