Minns argues that the industrial transformations of Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan were based on the existence of powerful developmentalist states in each. It explores the origins of such states and their dynamics and connects the form of autonomy they enjoy within their countries to the policies they pursue.
This book explores the variations in the transformation of the Asian developmental state in South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Based on an original theory, the author argues that these variations are influenced by two factors: industrial structure and democratic transition, both of which are shaped by the strategic calculations of the ruling elites to maintain power. The theory concerns two concurrent political processes during the state’s development process, namely the emergence of economic interest groups with varying levels of policy constraints on the state; and the process of democratic transition driven by the rise of the middle class. The book will appeal to students and researchers in the fields of Asian politics, development studies, political economy and comparative politics.
"Despite the otherworldly situations he's gotten into, Keiichi's everyday joy is still found as an engineer and mechanic. And as Chihiro's training retreat by the seashore continues, the two of them put that shared passion into practice by building two bikes based on different philosophies, with the help of her old high-school friends Eri and Tasuga--plus (or maybe minus) the 'help' of Urd and Skuld!"--p.[4] of cover.
Developmental state, n.: the government, motivated by desire for economic advancement, intervenes in industrial affairs. The notion of the developmental state has come under attack in recent years. Critics charge that Japan's success in putting this notion into practice has not been replicated elsewhere, that the concept threatens the purity of freemarket economics, and that its shortcomings have led to financial turmoil in Asia. In this informative and thought-provoking book, a team of distinguished scholars revisits this notion to assess its continuing utility and establish a common vocabulary for debates on these issues. Drawing on new political and economic theories and emphasizing recent events, the authors examine the East Asian experience to show how the developmental state involves a combination of political, bureaucratic, and moneyed influences that shape economic life in the region. Taking as its point of departure Chalmers Johnson's account of the Japanese developmental state, the book explores the interplay of forces that have determined the structure of opportunity in the region. The authors critically address the argument for centralized political involvement in industrial development (with a new contribution by Johnson), describe the historical impact of colonialism and the Cold War, consider new ideas in economics, and compare the experiences of East Asian countries with those of France, Brazil, Mexico, and India.
Economic Development of Emerging East Asia presents economic studies of Taiwan and South Korea, compares them chiefly with Japan and the United States and finds that these East Asian countries are still in the process of emerging in the world economy. A timely quantitative and econometric analysis of the regional economies of emerging East Asia, the volume examines development indicators, effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, productivity growth, catching up and convergence of long run real GDP per capita growth, the time required for a country to catch up, colonialism and economic development in Taiwan and India. Arranged in increasing complexity of economic analyses, the chapters in this book provide a comprehensive understanding of emerging East Asian economies. In addition to serving as a handy reference for regional economists, policy analysts and researchers, Economic Development of Emerging East Asia can also be used as a textbook on economics and business.
This book evaluates the record of the Left in Brazil and Venezuela, two key cases of the “pink tide” wave. The wave of Left governments that emerged across Latin America in the early 2000s – a process dubbed the “pink tide” – has been on the wane in recent years. The Left regimes that, at one point, seemed unbeatable have either been defeated at the ballot, ousted through coups or have had to contend with increasing economic and political conflicts which have nullified many of their achievements. This book argues – like many voices on the Left today – that the waning of the “pink tide” in the region must be viewed in the context of the Left’s inability to initiate radical structural changes in its constituencies. At the same time, however, the book makes the case for a more nuanced and balanced evaluation of the development record of the Left than is often done. In doing so, it seeks to go beyond the reform–revolution binary that has blinkered recent assessments and intends to highlight alternative paths that the Left could have taken.
Brilliant and engagingly written, Why Nations Fail answers the question that has stumped the experts for centuries: Why are some nations rich and others poor, divided by wealth and poverty, health and sickness, food and famine? Is it culture, the weather, geography? Perhaps ignorance of what the right policies are? Simply, no. None of these factors is either definitive or destiny. Otherwise, how to explain why Botswana has become one of the fastest growing countries in the world, while other African nations, such as Zimbabwe, the Congo, and Sierra Leone, are mired in poverty and violence? Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson conclusively show that it is man-made political and economic institutions that underlie economic success (or lack of it). Korea, to take just one of their fascinating examples, is a remarkably homogeneous nation, yet the people of North Korea are among the poorest on earth while their brothers and sisters in South Korea are among the richest. The south forged a society that created incentives, rewarded innovation, and allowed everyone to participate in economic opportunities. The economic success thus spurred was sustained because the government became accountable and responsive to citizens and the great mass of people. Sadly, the people of the north have endured decades of famine, political repression, and very different economic institutions—with no end in sight. The differences between the Koreas is due to the politics that created these completely different institutional trajectories. Based on fifteen years of original research Acemoglu and Robinson marshall extraordinary historical evidence from the Roman Empire, the Mayan city-states, medieval Venice, the Soviet Union, Latin America, England, Europe, the United States, and Africa to build a new theory of political economy with great relevance for the big questions of today, including: - China has built an authoritarian growth machine. Will it continue to grow at such high speed and overwhelm the West? - Are America’s best days behind it? Are we moving from a virtuous circle in which efforts by elites to aggrandize power are resisted to a vicious one that enriches and empowers a small minority? - What is the most effective way to help move billions of people from the rut of poverty to prosperity? More philanthropy from the wealthy nations of the West? Or learning the hard-won lessons of Acemoglu and Robinson’s breakthrough ideas on the interplay between inclusive political and economic institutions? Why Nations Fail will change the way you look at—and understand—the world.
Long run processes of socio-economic change generate prodigious problems of social conflict and social control, and governments responsible for these processes must therefore manage the resultant conflict. Consequently, the success or failure of a government's management of such conflicts is a crucial factor in development outcomes. This volume investigates the political struggle for development specifically in two vital regions - East Asia and Latin America. This analysis calls into question the dominant emphasis on institutional and cultural bases for stable growth. A careful historical account of the two regions is presented, which permits the rigorous testing of conventional wisdoms regarding development. Of importance to a broad range of academics in the spheres of development studies, politics, political economy and sociology, this book will also make an interesting read for those with a general interest in these areas.
Perhaps the most commonly held assumption in the field of development is that middle classes are the bounty of economic modernization and growth. As countries gradually transcend their agrarian past and become urbanized and industrialized, so the logic goes, middle classes emerge and gain in number, complexity, cultural influence, social prominence, and political authority. Yet this is only half the story. Middle classes shape industrial and economic development, they are not merely its product; the particular ways in which middle classes shape themselves - and the ways historical conditions shape them - influence development trajectories in multiple ways. This is the story of South Korea's and Taiwan's economic successes and Argentina's and Mexico's relative 'failures' through an examination of their rural middle classes and disciplinary capacities. Can disciplining continue in a context where globalization squeezes middle classes and frees capitalists from the state and social contracts in which they have been embedded?