Bringing together substantial essays by leading scholars, this volume offers a comprehensive introduction to and analysis of the politics of the People's Republic of China from 1949 to 1989. The first four chapters are drawn from the Cambridge History of China, Volumes 14 and 15. The last chapter, covering the events of the 1980s, has been written specifically for this volume. The particular strength of the volume is the depth of expert knowledge provided for each extraordinary period due to each period being covered by a specialist on the events of that time. The volume should serve equally well for the general reader with an interest in China and for students, as well as serving as a valuable reference for specialists.
Since the victory of the 1949 revolution the incumbency of the Chinese Communist Party has been characterized by an almost relentless struggle to legitimize its monopoly on political power. During the Mao era, attempts to derive legitimacy focused primarily on mass participation in political affairs, a blend of Marxist and nationalist ideology, and the charismatic authority of Mao Zedong. The dramatic failure of the Cultural Revolution forced the post-Mao leadership to discard these discredited paradigms of legitimacy and move towards an almost exclusively performance based concept founded on market economic reform. The reforms during the 1980s generated a number of unwelcome but inevitable side effects such as official corruption, high unemployment and significant socio-economic inequality. These factors culminated ultimately in the 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and throughout China. Since Tiananmen the party has sought to diversify the basis of its legitimacy by adhering more closely to constitutional procedures in decision making and, to a certain extent, by reinventing itself as a conservative nationalist party. This probing study of post-communist revolution Chinese politics sets out to discover if there is a plausible alternative to the electoral mode or if legitimacy is the exclusive domain of the multi-party system.
This book provides an in-depth analysis of the relations between China and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from 1949 to 1989. These relations were characterized by some “ups” but many more “downs,” e.g. when, in the early 1960s, the Soviet Union ordered its vassal state in East Berlin to begin treating its former socialist comrade and brother-in-arms as an adversary and indeed enemy. Drawing on a wealth of archival material, especially from the archive of the GDR’s ruling party, this book examines selected issues and elements of East German and Chinese domestic and foreign policy. In order to better grasp the nature and the historical context of the bilateral relationship, it offers detailed insights into the following aspects: 1. the bilateral “honeymoon period” from 1949 to the late 1950s, which was accompanied by the two parties supporting and applauding each other’s oppressive domestic and ill-fated economic policies, including Mao’s Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution; 2. relations during the 1960s, when the “Sino-Soviet Split” defined the quality and level of bilateral animosities; 3. the 1970s, when Beijing replaced socialist comradeship with East Berlin with trade and aid from the US and West Germany; and 4. the resumption of Sino-East German relations in the 1980s and the subsequent period up to the Tiananmen Square protests and the collapse of the GDR in 1989. The book will appeal to historians, political scientists and scholars of international relations, as well as policymakers, diplomats, and others with an interest in this previously under-researched area.
As the world watched the crumbling away of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the pro-democracy movement in China was dealt a severe blow in June of 1989. Also referred to as the June 4th Incident, the Tiananmen Square protest included students, intellectuals, and workers demanding democratic reforms and social change. To break up the escalating protest armed soldiers stormed the square killing close to two hundred demonstrators and injuring thousands more. Culture and Politics in China explores the events, trends, and tendencies that led to the student demonstrations. This volume objectively presents a wide range of information permitting readers a comprehensive understanding of the circumstances that culminated on the events of June 4, 1989. Documents include eyewitness accounts by student leaders Chai Ling and Wu'er Kaixi, the speeches of Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun justifying the use of force, analysis of the events by the Marxist theorist Su Shaozhi, the writings of young intellectuals Yan Jiaqi, Liu Xiaobo, and others. Selections include essays on the May Fourth Movement of 1919 and the television documentary, the "Yellow River Elegy" which question the Chinese cultural tradition. Leading political scientists contribute to this volume. Lee presents an analysis of the role of Deng Xiaoping in the events at Tiananmen Square, and his views on the Chinese Communist party-state and the pro-democracy movement King Tsao, who was at the square, views the demonstrations as a form of civil disobedience and dissent against the party-state. He gives an eyewitness account and a contextual analysis of some of the events and underlying themes. Steven Mark, a journalist, presents an analysis of the various roles of both the Chinese and Western press, beginning with their role in shaping public opinion before the demonstrations and continuing as the media scrambled to cover China's biggest news story since the communist takeover in 1949. Those who are interested in present and future developments in the world's most populous nation will find this volume indispensable.
Along with the political and economic reforms that have characterized the post-Mao era in China there has been a potentially revolutionary change in Chinese science and technology. Here sixteen scholars examine various facets of the current science and technology scene, comparing it with the past and speculating about future trends. Two chapters dealing with science under the Nationalists and under Mao are followed by a section of extensive analysis of reforms under Deng Xiaoping, focusing on the organizational system, the use of human resources, and the emerging response to market forces. Chapters dealing with changes in medical care, agriculture, and military research and development demonstrate how these reforms have affected specific areas during the Chinese shift away from Party orthodoxy and Maoist populism toward professional expertise as the guiding principle in science and technology. Three further chapters deal with China's interface with the world at large in the process of technology transfer. Both the introductory and concluding chapters describe the tension between the Chinese Communist Party structure, with its inclinations toward strict vertical control, and the scientific and technological community's need for a free flow of information across organizational, disciplinary, and national boundaries.
For more than a century, no US adversary or coalition of adversaries - not Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or the Soviet Union - has ever reached sixty percent of US GDP. China is the sole exception, and it is fast emerging into a global superpower that could rival, if not eclipse, the United States. What does China want, does it have a grand strategy to achieve it, and what should the United States do about it? In The Long Game, Rush Doshi draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources, including decades worth of party documents, leaked materials, memoirs by party leaders, and a careful analysis of China's conduct to provide a history of China's grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. Taking readers behind the Party's closed doors, he uncovers Beijing's long, methodical game to displace America from its hegemonic position in both the East Asia regional and global orders through three sequential "strategies of displacement." Beginning in the 1980s, China focused for two decades on "hiding capabilities and biding time." After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, it became more assertive regionally, following a policy of "actively accomplishing something." Finally, in the aftermath populist elections of 2016, China shifted to an even more aggressive strategy for undermining US hegemony, adopting the phrase "great changes unseen in century." After charting how China's long game has evolved, Doshi offers a comprehensive yet asymmetric plan for an effective US response. Ironically, his proposed approach takes a page from Beijing's own strategic playbook to undermine China's ambitions and strengthen American order without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan.
How China Became Capitalist details the extraordinary, and often unanticipated, journey that China has taken over the past thirty five years in transforming itself from a closed agrarian socialist economy to an indomitable economic force in the international arena. The authors revitalise the debate around the rise of the Chinese economy through the use of primary sources, persuasively arguing that the reforms implemented by the Chinese leaders did not represent a concerted attempt to create a capitalist economy, and that it was 'marginal revolutions' that introduced the market and entrepreneurship back to China. Lessons from the West were guided by the traditional Chinese principle of 'seeking truth from facts'. By turning to capitalism, China re-embraced her own cultural roots. How China Became Capitalist challenges received wisdom about the future of the Chinese economy, warning that while China has enormous potential for further growth, the future is clouded by the government's monopoly of ideas and power. Coase and Wang argue that the development of a market for ideas which has a long and revered tradition in China would be integral in bringing about the Chinese dream of social harmony.
How the Chinese Communist Party maintains its power by both repressing and responding to its people Since 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has maintained unrivaled control over the country, persisting even in the face of economic calamity, widespread social upheaval, and violence against its own people. Yet the party does not sustain dominance through repressive tactics alone—it pairs this with surprising responsiveness to the public. The Party and the People explores how this paradox has helped the CCP endure for decades, and how this balance has shifted increasingly toward repression under the rule of President Xi Jinping. Delving into the tenuous binary of repression and responsivity, Bruce Dickson illuminates numerous questions surrounding the CCP’s rule: How does it choose leaders and create policies? When does it allow protests? Will China become democratic? Dickson shows that the party’s dual approach lies at the core of its practices—repression when dealing with existential, political threats or challenges to its authority, and responsiveness when confronting localized economic or social unrest. The state answers favorably to the demands of protesters on certain issues, such as local environmental hazards and healthcare, but deals harshly with others, such as protests in Tibet, Xinjiang, or Hong Kong. With the CCP’s greater reliance on suppression since Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012, Dickson considers the ways that this tipping of the scales will influence China’s future. Bringing together a vast body of sources, The Party and the People sheds new light on how the relationship between the Chinese state and its citizens shapes governance.
