Current inquiries into the political economy of financial policymaking in Malaysia tend to focus on the high-level drama of crisis politics or simply point to the limited impact of post-crisis financial reforms, given that politico-business relations have remained close. In so doing, pundits ignore a number of intriguing questions: what is the relationship between financial development and financialisation and how has it played out in the Malaysian context? And more generally: how can a country like Malaysia become significantly more financially developed, yet fail to emancipate the financial system from political control; a core element of the financial development discourse? To unravel the complexities of this puzzle, this book subjects the history and contemporary practices of financial policymaking in Malaysia to scrutiny. It argues that to understand financial development in Malaysia, its progress and reversals, it is important to conceptualise it as a political, rather than a merely technical process. In so doing, the book echoes a more profound concern in the political economy literature, namely the evolving relationship between states and markets, and the supposed retreat or reassertion of the state at a time of increasing (financial) globalisation. The book can generate further insights into the evolving role of the state with regard to broader processes of development and marketisation, as they relate specifically to finance.
Industrial policy has long been regarded as a strategy to encourage sector-, industry-, or economy-wide development by the state. It has been central to competitiveness, catching up, and structural change in both advanced and developing countries. It has also been one of the most contested perspectives, reflecting ideologically inflected debates and shifts in prevailing ideas. There has lately been a renewed interest in industrial policy in academic circles and international policy dialogues, prompted by the weak outcomes of policies pursued by many developing countries under the direction of the Washington Consensus (and its descendants), the slow economic recovery of many advanced economies after the 2008 global financial crisis, and mounting anxieties about the national consequences of globalization. The Oxford Handbook of Industrial Policy presents a comprehensive review of and a novel approach to the conceptual and theoretical foundations of industrial policy. The Handbook also presents analytical perspectives on how industrial policy connects to broader issues of development strategy, macro-economic policies, infrastructure development, human capital, and political economy. By combining historical and theoretical perspectives, and integrating conceptual issues with empirical evidence drawn from advanced, emerging, and developing countries, The Handbook offers valuable lessons and policy insights to policymakers, practitioners and researchers on developing productive transformation, technological capabilities, and international competitiveness. It addresses pressing issues including climate change, the gendered dimensions of industrial policy, global governance, and technical change. Written by leading international thinkers on the subject, the volume pulls together different perspectives and schools of thought from neo-classical to structuralist development economists to discuss and highlight the adaptation of industrial policy in an ever-changing socio-economic and political landscape.
The debate over how far governments should intervene in economies in order to promote economic growth, a debate which from the 1980s seemed settled in favour of the neo-liberal, non-interventionist consensus, has taken on new vigour since the financial crisis of 2008 and after. Some countries, most of them in industrialised Asia, have survived the crisis, and secured equitable economic growth, by adopting a developmental state model, whereby governments have intervened in their economies, often through explicit support for individual companies. This book explores debates about government intervention, assesses interventionist policies, including industrial and innovation policies, and examines in particular the key institutions which play a crucial role in implementing government policies and in building the bridge between the state and the private sector. The countries covered include China, India, South Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan, together with representative countries from Europe and Latin America.
This pioneering volume develops an institutionalist analysis of Malaysias post-colonial economy by exploring the political economy of development and particularly the interface between economics and law. The various authors show that economic policy initiatives in Malaysia have often been accompanied by corresponding legislative and regulatory reforms intended to create an appropriate legal environment, and that economic problems or crises arising from earlier policies have led to major legislative innovations.
The first edition of the book was published in 1974, and received a book award for best non-fiction in English presented by the National Book Development Council of Singapore in 1976, while the Second Edition published in 1986, saw much more econometric-statistical analysis. This Third Edition highlights the role of banking and finance in the economic development of Singapore and Malaysia; recent developments in Singapore and Malaysia are analysed; and special topics are presented in Epilogues 1 and 2.
This book sheds new light on the evolutionary role of financial system and the interacting mechanisms between financial development and economic growth in the context of Malaysia.
Why do some authoritarian regimes topple during financial crises, while others steer through financial crises relatively unscathed? In this book, Thomas B. Pepinsky uses the experiences of Indonesia and Malaysia and the analytical tools of open economy macroeconomics to answer this question. Focusing on the economic interests of authoritarian regimes' supporters, Pepinsky shows that differences in cross-border asset specificity produce dramatically different outcomes in regimes facing financial crises. When asset specificity divides supporters, as in Indonesia, they desire mutually incompatible adjustment policies, yielding incoherent adjustment policy followed by regime collapse. When coalitions are not divided by asset specificity, as in Malaysia, regimes adopt radical adjustment measures that enable them to survive financial crises. Combining rich qualitative evidence from Southeast Asia with cross-national time-series data and comparative case studies of Latin American autocracies, Pepinsky reveals the power of coalitions and capital mobility to explain how financial crises produce regime change.