Is drug addiction really a disease? Is sexuality inborn and fixed or mutable? Science is where we often turn when we can't achieve moral clarity. In The Noble Lie, acclaimed and controversial science writer Gary Greenberg shows how scientists try to use their findings to resolve the dilemmas raised by some of the most hotly contested issues of our time, from gay rights to euthanasia and the drug war. He reveals how their answers often turn out to be more fiction than science—and explores whether they cause more harm than good.
This book defends an account of the positive psychological, ethical, and political value of simulated human experience. Philosophers from Plato and Augustine to Heidegger, Nozick, and Baudrillard have warned us of the dangers of living on too heavy a diet of illusion and make-believe. But contemporary cultural life provides broader, more attractive opportunities to do so than have existed at any other point in history. The gentle forms of self-deceit that such experiences require of us, and that so many have regarded as ethically unwholesome or psychologically self-destructive, can in fact serve as vital means to political reconciliation, cultural enrichment, and even (a kind of) utopia. The first half of the book provides a highly schematic definition of simulated experience and compares it with some claims about the nature of simulation made by other philosophers about what it is for one thing to be a simulation of another. The author then provides a critical survey of the views of some major authors about the value of certain specific types of simulated experience, mainly in order to point out the many puzzling inconsistencies and ambiguities that their thoughts upon the topic often exhibit. In the second half of the book, the author defends an account of the positive social value of simulated experience and compares his own position to the ideas of a number of utopian political thinkers, as well as to Plato's famous doctrine of the "noble lie." He then makes some tentative practical suggestions about how a proper appreciation of the value of simulated experience might influence public policy decisions about such matters as the justification of taxation, paternalistic "choice management," and governmental transparency. A Defense of Simulated Experience will appeal to a broad range of philosophers working in normative ethics, aesthetics, the philosophy of technology, political philosophy, and the philosophy of culture who are interested in questions about simulated experience. The book also makes a contribution to the emerging field of Game Studies.
This book provides a fresh and comprehensive account of this outstanding work, which remains among the most frequently read works of Greek philosophy, indeed of Classical antiquity in general.
Only a noble lie can save us from the psychological and social chaos now threatened by the spread of skepticism about the meaning of life and the universe.
"This book is a comprehensive investigation of lying in everyday life. What exactly is a lie, and how does lying differ from related phenomena such as ‘bullshit’ or being truthful? Lars Svendsen also investigates the ethics of lying – why is lying almost always morally wrong, and why is lying to one’s friends especially bad? The book concludes by looking at lying in politics, from Plato’s theory of the ‘noble lie’ to Donald Trump. Svendsen’s conclusion is that, even though we all occasionally lie, we are for the most part trustworthy. Trusting others makes you vulnerable, and you will be duped from time to time, but that is – all things considered – preferable to living in a constant state of distrust."--Publisher description.
In this section-by-section commentary, Benardete argues that Plato's Republic is a holistic analysis of the beautiful, the good, and the just. This book provides a fresh interpretation of the Republic and a new understanding of philosophy as practiced by Plato and Socrates. "Cryptic allusions, startling paradoxes, new questions . . . all work to give brilliant new insights into the Platonic text."—Arlene W. Saxonhouse, Political Theory
To some, it is the voice of the nation, yet to others it has never been clearer that the BBC is in the grip of an ideology that prevents it reporting fairly on the world. Many have been scandalised by its pessimism on Brexit and its one-sided presentation of the Trump presidency, whilst simultaneously amused by its outrage over 'fake news'. This punchy polemic galvanises the debate over how our licence-fee money is spent, and asks whether the BBC is a fair arbiter of the news, or whether it is a conduit for pervasive and institutional liberal left-wing bias.
When Plato wrote his dialogues, written texts were disseminated primarily by performance and oral recitation. Literacy, however, was spreading, and Frank is the first to point out that the dialogues offer two distinct ways of learning to read. One method treats learning to read as being led to true beliefs about letters and syllables by an authoritative teacher. The other method, recommended by Socrates, focuses on learning to read by trial and error, and on the opinions learners come to have based on their own fallible experiences. In all the dialogues in which these methods appear, learning to read is likened to coming to know, and the significant differences between the two methods are at the center of Frank's argument. When learning to read is understood as a practice of assimilating true beliefs by an authoritative teacher, it reflects the dominant scholarly account of Plato's philosophy as authoritative knowledge and of Plato's politics as, if not authoritarian, then at least anti-democratic. Rulers should have such authoritative knowledge and be philosopher-kings. However, learning to read or coming to know by way of Socrates' method, leads to quite a different set of conclusions. Professor Frank resists the claim that Plato's dialogues seek to endorse or enforce a hierarchy of knowledge and politics. Instead, she argues that they offer a philosophical education in self-authorization by representing and enacting challenges to all claims to expert authority, including those of philosophy.
