This study explores the growing competition for scarce dollars at the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA). It traces the authorities, roles, and missions assigned to the agency and the growing trend of using what was originally intended to be a research and development budget for procurement and sustainment of missile defense assets. As adversary missile arsenals develop in both size and sophistication, continued improvements to our current missile defense systems will be required to keep pace with the threat. The combination of an ever shrinking top line and new roles and missions being assigned to MDA make that task difficult. Finding a new path forward and more clearly defining the position of the agency inside the Department of Defense will be essential for a more sustainable missile defense posture.
In policy pronouncements over the last two administrations, the protection of the American homeland was regularly identified as the first priority of U.S. missile defense efforts. Homeland missile defense today is provided by the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program and other elements of the larger Ballistic Missile Defense System. The limited defenses fielded today have advanced considerably since limited defensive operations began in late 2004, but nevertheless they remain too limited and too modest relative to emerging threats. The Missile Defense Agency’s path to improve the system may require additional effort to stay ahead of even limited missile threats. This report explains how the current system works, as well as current and potential plans to modernize the system, and the authors offer recommendations for future evolution of the system.
The National Defense Authorization Act of 2016 mandates a review of missile defeat policy, strategy, and capability to be completed by January 2018. This upcoming Missile Defeat Review (MDR) represents an opportunity for the Trump administration to articulate a vision for the future of air and missile defense. This collection of expert essays explores how the strategic environment for missile defense and defeat has evolved since 2010 and offers recommendations to help guide and inform the MDR’s development.
Despite a U.S. focus on securing an international deal to curb Iran’s nuclear development for the last several years, the United States lacks a strategy to combat the full range of Iranian activities that threaten the interests of the United States and its allies but fall short of conventional warfare. In this report, CSIS’s International Security Program sets forth analysis of Iran’s strategy, motivations, military, and paramilitary capabilities and evaluates the effects of Iranian behavior on key U.S. partners. The study leverages the expertise of contributing authors at CSIS, the American Enterprise Institute, the Center for Naval Analyses, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Harvard University and the University of Hawaii to inform its analysis. The study proposes a framework for deterring Iran, including practical recommendations for the U.S. administration and Congress that would enhance the security of the United States and its allies and partners.
The role that nuclear weapons play in international security has changed since the end of the Cold War, but the need to maintain and replenish the human infrastructure for supporting nuclear capabilities and dealing with the multitude of nuclear challenges remains essential. Recognizing this challenge, CSIS launched the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) in 2003 to develop the next generation of policy, technical, and operational nuclear professionals through outreach, mentorship, research and debate. PONI runs two signature programs—the Nuclear Scholars Initiative and the Annual Conference Series—to engage emerging nuclear experts in thoughtful and informed debate and research over how to best address the nuclear community’s most pressing problems. The papers in this volume comprise research from participants in the 2017 Nuclear Scholars Initiative and PONI Conference Series. PONI sponsors this research to provide a forum for facilitating new and innovative thinking and a platform for emerging thought leaders across the nuclear enterprise. Spanning a wide range of technical and policy issues, these selected papers further discussion in their respective areas.
These are extraordinary times in U.S. national security policy. America remains engaged in both Iraq and Afghanistan while facing a global economic downturn. Homeland security concerns still abound in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Even as the financial crisis places considerable pressure on the U.S. budget, President Obama will have to spend a great deal of time and money on national security, hard power, and war. How should these competing demands be prioritized? How much money will be needed? How much will be available, and how should it be spent? Budgeting for Hard Power continues the long and proud tradition of Brookings analysis on defense spending. As with previous volumes, this book examines the budgets of the Pentagon and the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons programs. But Michael O'Hanlon takes his analysis further, addressing the wide range of activities crucial for American security as a result of 9/11 and the ongoing wars. He considers homeland security resources and selected parts of the State Department and foreign operations budgets—offering a more complete overall look at the elements that make up America's "hard power" budget, a concept that he and Kurt Campbell wrote about in Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security (2006). With future federal deficits projected to top $1 trillion, O'Hanlon calls for Defense, State, and Homeland Security budgets to be as frugal as possible. At the same time, he recognizes that resources should be selectively increased in certain areas to compensate for years of systematic underfunding, especially in certain areas of homeland security, diplomacy, and foreign assistance. In his typically clear and concise manner, O'Hanlon shows policymakers how to wrestle with the resource allocation decisions affecting the national security of the United States.
The Aegis BMD program gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. Under current plans, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis ships is scheduled to grow from 20 at the end of FY 2010 to 38 at the end of FY 2015. Contents of this report: (1) Intro.; (2) Background: Planned Quantities of Ships, Ashore Sites, and Interceptor Missiles; Aegis BMD Flight Tests; Allied Participation and Interest in Aegis BMD Program; (3) Issues for Congress: Demands for BMD-Capable Aegis Ships; Demands for Aegis Ships in General; Numbers of SM-3 Interceptors; SM-2 Block IV Capability for 4.0.1 and Higher Versions; (4) Legislative Activity for FY 2011. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand publication.
