The author examines historical and contemporary examples of military involvement in counterterrorism, outlining the specific roles which the armed forces of liberal democracies have performed in combating terrorism, both in a domestic and international context. He describes the political, strategic, conceptual, diplomatic, and ethical problems that can arise when a state's armed forces become engaged in counterterrorism, and argues that military power can only be employed as part of a coordinated counterterrorist strategy aimed at the containment and frustration -- rather than the physical elimination -- of the terrorist group(s) concerned.
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, the U.S. Government was criticized for adopting a militaristic response to the threat posed by al-Qaeda and affiliated groups. As the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that in Northern Ireland demonstrate, any liberal democracy that uses its armed forces to combat terrorism will incur controversy both domestically and internationally. The use of military power in counterterrorism is contentious, because historical and contemporary examples suggest that it can have the following negative strategic, political, and ethical effects: The state can generate indigenous resentment that terrorist groups can exploit, and can, by resorting to military force, kill or maim a substantial number of civilians. It can also encourage human rights abuses that are antithetical to the norms of a liberal democracy-- such as the maltreatment and torture of detainees --and can (as demonstrated by Uruguay in 1973 and Russia currently) lead to the subversion of the constitutional order and its replacement by authoritarian rule. While addressing these criticisms, this Letort Paper also argues that there are contingencies in which democratic states are obliged to employ military means in order to protect their citizens from the threat of terrorism, whether in a purely domestic context or when facing a transnational terrorist network such as al-Qaeda. While outlining the specific roles that armed forces can perform (including hostage rescue, military aid to the civil authority, interdiction, and intelligence-gathering), this paper also describes the strategic, political, diplomatic, and ethical challenges that arise from using military means to fight terrorism either on one's home soil or in the international arena. This paper's principal conclusion is that democratic governments can use their armed forces if the existing police/judicial framework cannot address the threat posed by terrorists, but that military means have to be integrated as part of an overarching strategy to contain terrorism and to limit the capacity of its practitioners to conduct attacks against citizens. The author also outlines a series of questions that civilian decisionmakers should ideally resolve prior to turning counterterrorism missions over to their military counterparts. Strategic Studies Institute. LeTort Paper.
Although military power is only one component of the portfolio of instruments that can be brought to bear in the fight against terrorist groups, military capabilities play unique and crucial roles in the overall strategy. These capabilities will call for a mix of forces somewhat different from those fielded today as well as new concepts and technologies. Equally challenging will be the tasks of training/advising friendly forces and protecting forces and interests around the world.
Countries sponsoring and supporting terrorism impede the efforts of the United States and the international community to fight terrorism. Until states that support terrorism cease such sponsorship, they remain a critical foundation for terrorist groups and their operations. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the U.S. military's role in coercing states to cease their sponsorship of terrorism. Using game theory, this thesis analyzes the utility of military force against state-sponsored terrorism. It explains why past military responses did not pose a credible threat and were thus, an ineffective instrument of national power. It then examines how military force is employed in the current war on terrorism. The findings of this thesis suggest that the limited military strikes employed against states for their role in terrorist attacks prior to September 11, 2001, preconditioned the leaders of supportive states to believe U.S. leadership lacked commitment in its strategy to end state-sponsored terrorism. The findings also suggest the dramatic change in the United Stat method of employing its military forces against state sponsors of terrorism after September 11, 2001, created the credible, coercive military threat required to accomplish the U.S. national objective of ending state- sponsored terrorism.
This book examines the Army's role in the war on terrorism; the Army's homeland security needs; the implications of increased emphasis on Asia; the Army's role in coalition operations; the unfinished business of jointness-the lessons learned from operations and how to prepare for the future; the Army's deployability, logistical, and personnel challenges; and whether the Army can afford its Transformation. These examinations are bracketed by an introduction, a description of the Army's place in the new national security strategy, and a summary of the authors' conclusions.
Despite persistent counterterrorism (CT) operations, globally the threat of violent extremism (VE) is higher today than in August 2001. Though it has effective CT capability, the U.S. military lacks a comprehensive strategy for countering and eliminating the drivers of VE. Because unstable, fragile states provide gateways for violent extremist organizations to establish a territorial base and recruit, the Department of Defense should adopt a comprehensive counter-VE strategy that complements reactive CT operations with preventative, proactive stability operations. Stability operations as part of CVE strategy should be grounded in an understanding of local context that identifies and addresses the grievances that lead to VE. Such operations require close partnering with civil society organizations.
The confluence of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack and the U.S. Army's historic role to support civil authorities has resulted in substantial new challenges for the Army. To help meet these challenges, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology requested the National Research Council (NRC) carry out a series of studies on how science and technology could assist the Army prepare for its role in homeland security (HLS). The NRC's Board on Army Science and Technology formed the Committee on Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security to accomplish that assignment. The Committee was asked to review relevant literature and activities, determine areas of emphasis for Army S&T in support of counter terrorism and anti-terrorism, and recommend high-payoff technologies to help the Army fulfill its mission. The Department of Defense Counter-Terrorism Technology Task Force identified four operational areas in reviewing technical proposals for HLS operations: indications and warning; denial and survivability; recovery and consequence management; and attribution and retaliation. The study sponsor asked the Committee to use these four areas as the basis for its assessment of the science and technology (S&T) that will be important for the Army's HLS role. Overall, the Committee found that: There is potential for substantial synergy between S&T work carried out by the Army for its HLS responsibilities and the development of the next generation Army, the Objective Force. The Army National Guard (ARNG) is critical to the success of the Army's HLS efforts.
